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Abstract
Smart grid utilizes different communication technologies to enhance the reliability and ef-
ficiency of the power grid; it allows bi-directional flow of electricity and information, about
grid status and customers requirements, among different parties in the grid, i.e., connect gen-
eration, distribution, transmission, and consumption subsystems together. Thus, smart grid
reduces the power losses and increases the efficiency of electricity generation and distribution.
Although smart grid improves the quality of grid’s services, it exposes the grid to the cyber
security threats that communication networks suffer from in addition to other novel threats
because of power grid’s nature. For instance, the electricity consumption messages sent from
consumers to the utility company via wireless network may be captured, modified, or replayed
by adversaries. As a consequent, security and privacy concerns are significant challenges in
smart grid.
Smart grid upgrade creates three main communication architectures: The first one is the
communication between electricity customers and utility companies via various networks; i.e.,
home area networks (HANs), building area networks (BANs), and neighbour area networks
(NANs), we refer to these networks as customer-side networks in our thesis. The second ar-
chitecture is the communication between EVs and grid to charge/discharge their batteries via
vehicle-to-grid (V2G) connection. The last network is the grid’s connection with measurements
units that spread all over the grid to monitor its status and send periodic reports to the main
control center (CC) for state estimation and bad data detection purposes.
This thesis addresses the security concerns for the three communication architectures. For
customer-side networks, the privacy of consumers is the central concern for these networks; also,
the transmitted messages integrity and confidentiality should be guaranteed. While the main
security concerns for V2G networks are the privacy of vehicle’s owners besides the authenticity
of participated parties. In the grid’s connection with measurements units, integrity attacks,
such as false data injection (FDI) attacks, target the measurements’ integrity and consequently
mislead the main CC to make the wrong decisions for the grid.
The thesis presents two solutions for the security problems in the first architecture; i.e.,
the customer-side networks. The first proposed solution is security and privacy-preserving
scheme in BAN, which is a cluster of HANs. The proposed scheme is based on forecasting the
future electricity demand for the whole BAN cluster. Thus, BAN connects to the electricity
provider only if the total demand of the cluster is changed. The proposed scheme employs the
lattice-based public key NTRU crypto-system to guarantee the confidentiality and authenticity
of the exchanged messages and to further reduce the computation and communication load.
The security analysis shows that our proposed scheme can achieve the privacy and security
requirements. In addition, it efficiently reduces the communication and computation over-
head. According to the second solution, it is lightweight privacy-preserving aggregation scheme
that permits the smart household appliances to aggregate their readings without involving the
connected smart meter. The scheme deploys a lightweight lattice-based homomorphic crypto-
system that depends on simple addition and multiplication operations. Therefore, the proposed
scheme guarantees the customers’ privacy and message integrity with lightweight overhead.
In addition, the thesis proposes lightweight secure and privacy-preserving V2G connection
scheme, in which the power grid assures the confidentiality and integrity of exchanged infor-
mation during (dis)charging electricity sessions and overcomes EVs’ authentication problem.
The proposed scheme guarantees the financial profits of the grid and prevents EVs from act-
ing maliciously. Meanwhile, EVs preserve their private information by generating their own
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pseudonym identities. In addition, the scheme keeps the accountability for the electricity-
exchange trade. Furthermore, the proposed scheme provides these security requirements by
lightweight overhead; as it diminishes the number of exchanged messages during (dis)charging
sessions. Simulation results demonstrate that the proposed scheme significantly reduces the
total communication and computation load for V2G connection especially for EVs.
FDI attack, which is one of the severe attacks that threatens the smart grid’s efficiency
and reliability, inserts fake measurements among the correct ones to mislead CC to make
wrong decisions and consequently impact on the grid’s performance. In the thesis, we have
proposed an FDI attack prevention technique that protects the integrity and availability of
the measurements at measurement units and during their transmission to the CC, even with
the existence of compromised units. The proposed scheme alleviates the negative impacts of
FDI attack on grid’s performance. Security analysis and performance evaluation show that our
scheme guarantees the integrity and availability of the measurements with lightweight overhead,
especially on the restricted-capabilities measurement units.
The proposed schemes are promising solutions for the security and privacy problems of the
three main communication networks in smart grid. The novelty of these proposed schemes
does not only because they are robust and efficient security solutions, but also due to their
lightweight communication and computation overhead, which qualify them to be applicable on
limited-capability devices in the grid. So, this work is considered important progress toward
more reliable and authentic smart grid.
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Over many decades, the electricity grid, with approximately the same infrastructure, has gen-
erated electrical power from central generator plants resources, such as oil, hydro, and gas. In
addition, it has distributed the energy in one direction from generation stations to end-users.
In the early twenty-first century, scientists are utilizing the great progress in information and
communication technology and merging it with the regular electricity grid to form the smart
grid. The main target of this incorporation is to connect the components of the electricity grid
via communication networks, such as Internet or sensor networks, to gather data about grid
conditions and consumers’ requirements.
This integration accordingly enhances the electricity distribution and diminishes the huge
waste in the ordinary grid; the grid operator can estimate the peak time, when the demand
for electricity is high, and the off time, when the demand is low, and exploits this knowledge
to regulate the electricity consumption and reduce the losses by two ways. The first one is
to encourage the customers to use their high-consumption electrical appliances during the off
period by reducing the electricity price during that period. Second, the electric vehicles (EVs)
can work as temporary storages for the power; accordingly, the electricity will be charged from
the grid to the vehicle in the off period; in contrast, the electricity will be discharged from
the vehicle to the grid in the peak period. In next section, we define the smart grid, its main
objectives, the new deployed devices, and the different techniques used in it.
1.1 Smart Grid Definition
Smart grid utilizes the communication technologies to improve the power fault detection, reduce
the electrical waste and enhance the self-healing feature of the grid. To fulfill these character-
istics, various communication techniques, such as power line carrier (PLC), WiFi, ZigBee,
and Internet, are utilized to connect different parts of the grid, i.e., generation, distribution,
transmission, and consumption systems, together. Then, smart grid utilizes this connection
to exchange information about grid conditions between participated parties; also, it allows the
electricity flow between the service provider and customers in both directions.
The main targets of smart grid are to reduce the power losses and maintain the electricity
generation-consumption ratio to stabilize the power grid, e.g., the electricity amount in the
grid is around a certain level all the time. Consequently, the efficiency of electricity generation
increases. This upgrade requires merging sensors and measurement devices, such as smart
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Figure 1.1: Smart grid.1
meters and phasor measurement units (PMUs), in the power grid. The main functions for these
meters are aggregating information about the power grid status in different zones. According
to smart meters, they are deployed in the customer side networks, e.g., houses and industrial
buildings to aggregate the electricity consumption for each individual appliance and send the
total consumption to the utility. Then, the utility calculates the accurate electricity bill for
each customer. While, PMUs are high-speed secured sensors distributed throughout the grid
transmission lines. They monitor the grid status and quickly detect any anomaly behaviours
and threats that could lead to blackouts.
Smart grid correspondingly introduces new types of networks, such as home area networks
(HANs), neighbourhood area networks (NANs), and vehicle-to-grid (V2G) networks, also ex-
ploits the existing wide area network (WAN) infrastructure. The HAN is a connection between
the house’s smart meter and the smart household appliances, in which the smart meter aggre-
gates the electricity readings for the appliances and forwards them to the utility company for
billing purposes; the smart meter sends its aggregated readings periodically, e.g., every 15 min-
utes. The building area networks (BANs) and the industrial area networks (IANs) are types of
HANs that connect several HANs in the same residual or industrial area to the local substation.
While each NAN forwards the periodic reports for the HANs in its region to the utility control
center (CC) via the existing WAN. According to the V2G connection, the grid operator com-
municates with the EVs to charge/discharge them according to the current electricity demand;
the main function of these connections is scheduling the EV charging/discharging operations
to avoid the uncoordinated actions that cause negative impacts on the grid. For the CC’s
connection with the measurement units, it is significant to transfer real-time information about
grid status and consumers’ requirements to help CC to make the right decision for the grid.
Figure 1.1 shows smart grid as integration between power grid and communication architectures
[1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9].
Although these networks provide noteworthy communication services to the different parties
1Picture source: http://www.nist.gov/itl/antd/emntg/smartgrid.cfm.
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in the grid, they expose the power grid to the cyber security threats that communication
networks suffer from. So, smart grid could be threatened by malicious adversaries, who attempt
to intercept, modify, or block the exchanged electrical information, or by dishonest consumers,
who send fake readings to reduce their payment amount or try to steal the neighbours’ electrical
shares. In addition, the power grid becomes vulnerable to the thorough attacks that target the
grid infrastructure and cause huge blackouts. In next section, we briefly introduce the main
security concerns in smart grid.
1.2 Smart Grid Security Concerns
The upgrade of power grid exposes it to the cyber security threats that communication networks
suffer from, such as malicious attacks that can forge the electricity consumption readings,
extract personal information from the readings, or establish Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks.
In addition, novel threats are introduced to the grid because of its special nature, such as false
date injection (FDI) attacks that inject fake information about grid’s status to mislead the
CC to make wrong decisions that impact negatively on the grid stability and reliability. The
security concerns in smart grid can be categorized into three major groups [1, 4, 8, 9, 10, 11,
12, 13, 14, 15, 16]:
• The users privacy and information confidentiality are significant concerns in smart grid
especially for customers, i.e., in houses, residential units, and industrial buildings. Per-
sonal information and daily habits can be revealed to the outsiders from analyzing the
electricity consumption pattern. Therefore, any eavesdropper, who has moderate data
analysis tools, can threaten the customers’ privacy and extract vital information about
the householders, such as when they are in the house, what are the types of electrical ap-
pliances they usually use. Thus, the attacker can break the house while the householders
are outside. According to the industrial institutes, the adversary may get important data
about the institutions production from its consumed power and sell this information to
the competitors. In conclusion, the privacy for electricity users and exchanged informa-
tion confidentiality are fundamental factors that should be considered in any proposed
security schemes for smart grid.
• Second, the data integrity is a serious concern. As adversaries may attempt to alter
or fabricate the exchanged messages between different parties in the grid. There are
two obvious examples of integrity attacks in smart grid. First one is when a malicious
consumer attempts to forge his/her electricity reading by compromising the smart meter
to reduce the electricity bill. Second attack is the FDI attack, in which the adversary
compromises several measurement units and exploits them to inject false information
about the grid conditions; this attack misleads the CC to make improper decisions for
the grid. The consequences of this attack extremely affect all the involved parties in the
grid.
• Third concern is the grid’s resources availability. Malicious adversaries can target the
network resources, e.g., by DoS attacks. They attempt to block, delay or corrupt the
transmitted information or make it unavailable to the different parties in the grid. For
instance, an attacker can falsify a large number of electricity request messages via a
group of compromised smart meters and ask for huge amount of energy trying to make
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the utility CC unavailable to the legitimate users. Consequently, smart grid networks
should be robust to network availability attacks, because the network unavailability could
lead to severe consequences, such as loss the real-time monitoring of the critical power
infrastructures, which subsequently lead to large-scale power system disasters, i.e., huge
blackouts.
In summary, merging communication technologies in power grid exposes the grid to unfa-
miliar security problems that imported from the communication networks in addition to new
threats due to the power grid nature. In general, the main security risks for smart grid are
network resources and information availability, data integrity, and customers privacy and data
confidentiality. Therefore, we study the security threats regarding the three different scenarios
for smart grid networks and propose efficient security techniques to solve these problems or al-
leviate their impacts on the grid’s performance. The succeeding section presents our objectives
and the thesis motivations.
1.3 Motivation and Objectives
The thesis addresses the security threats in the three different communication architectures of
smart grid and proposes efficient security and privacy-preserving schemes:
• The first part of the thesis addresses the security threats during the electricity readings
aggregation at the customer side at HANs, BANs, and IAN, e.g., in houses, residential
buildings, or industrial buildings, additionally, the problems during transmitting these
aggregated readings via NANs to the utility for billing purposes. Mainly, the privacy
of consumers is the central concern for these networks; also, the transmitted messages
integrity and confidentiality should be guaranteed. Furthermore, the authenticity of dif-
ferent connected parties must be assured.
Many research works are proposed to addresses these security concerns especially preserving-
privacy mechanisms; the suggested approaches can be divided into three classes. First
class solutions are deploying hardware devices, such as EVs or temper-resistance devices,
to conceal the real consumption of the place. However, these solutions are expensive to
deploy with every device in the grid. While second class studies suggest applying signal
distortion function on the electrical reading signal at the transmitter, then reconstructing
the original signal again at the receiver. But this operation requires difficult computa-
tions and complex data mining techniques. Finally, cryptographic security schemes are
used to guarantee the security and privacy of the connected parties and the exchanged
messages. Some privacy-preserving public key systems are proposed to conserve the cus-
tomers’ privacy in addition to the confidentiality and integrity of the exchanged messages.
These privacy schemes are based on two main cryptographic ideas: homomorphic encryp-
tion and anonymization techniques. However, most of the proposed schemes are high
computation and communication complexity, and the deployed devices in customer-side
networks smart grid, i.e., smart meters and smart appliances, are limited computation
capabilities and restricted power abilities [45, 48, 50, 61, 70].
Consequently, we have proposed two lightweight security frameworks to guarantee the
privacy and security requirements for customer side networks. The first proposed scheme
is based on forecasting the electricity demand for a cluster of HANs in a residential area.
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Utilizing the NTRU lattice-based crypto-system, the proposed scheme guarantees the
confidentiality and authenticity of exchanged messages and to further reduce computa-
tion and communication load. While the second proposed solution is a lightweight secu-
rity and privacy-preserving scheme that deploys lightweight lattice-based homomorphic
crypto-system to secure the readings aggregation process inside HANs. Thus, the pro-
posed scheme guarantees the customers privacy and messages integrity with lightweight
overhead.
• The second part of the thesis analyzes the security threats for V2G connections. Generally,
the main security concerns for V2G networks are the privacy of vehicle’s owners besides
the authenticity of different parties.
Several research studies are proposed to conserve the demanded security level and bound
the threats impact on V2G connection. These existing solutions are based on four differ-
ent security procedures, such as encryption schemes, authentication mechanisms, physical
security methods, and anonymization techniques. First group of proposed schemes uti-
lizes public key schemes, such as elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) and symmetric key
schemes, as advanced encryption standard (AES) to create a security framework that
guarantees V2G security requirements. According to the second category, several re-
searchers use different authentication mechanisms, such as Diffie-Hellman key exchange
protocol, to assure the validity of vehicles and other related devices, i.e., aggregators.
Third category is based on anonymizing the vehicles utilizing several anonymization
mechanisms, such as partially-blind signature scheme, so that no one can like between
the vehicles’ identities and their charging behaviours or locations. According to physical
layer protection mechanisms, various physical security techniques are utilized, e.g., using
a channel-based key management to setup a symmetric key between two remote nodes to
resist DoS and jamming attacks [72, 75, 77, 79, 83]. However, the proposed solutions in
the literature provide high communication and computation overhead and require usage
of special hardware devices.
Thus, we have proposed lightweight secure and privacy-preserving V2G connection scheme,
where the grid assures confidentiality and integrity of exchanged information during
(dis)charging electricity sessions and overcomes EVs’ authentication problem. The pro-
posed scheme guarantees the financial profits of the grid and prevents EVs from acting
maliciously. Meanwhile, EVs preserve their private information by generating their own
pseudonym identities. In addition, the scheme keeps the accountability for electricity-
exchange trade. Furthermore, the proposed scheme provides these security requirements
by lightweight overhead; as it diminishes the number of exchanged messages during
(dis)charging sessions.
• Finally, the third part of the thesis studies the FDI attacks and analyze the previously
proposed detection techniques. FDI attacks target the measurements units that spread in
the power grid to monitor its status. The objective of FDI attacks is to mislead the main
CC to make the wrong decisions for the grid. Several solutions are proposed to mainly
detect the presence of any malicious measurements; some solutions utilize more powerful
state estimation tools for accurate bad data detection. While, many studies utilize various
optimization techniques to detect the attacks and provide protection models. Certain
cryptographic schemes, such as watermarking, are employed to detect FDI attacks [87,
88, 99, 106, 111, 122, 123, 129, 134]. However, most of the research works focus on
detecting FDI attacks not resisting them.
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In the thesis, we have proposed an FDI attack prevention technique that protects the
integrity and availability of the measurements at measurement units and during their
transmission to the CC, even with the existence of compromised units. The proposed
scheme alleviates the negative impacts of FDI attack on grid’s performance. Security
analysis and performance evaluation show that our scheme guarantees the integrity and
availability of the measurements with lightweight overhead.
1.4 Outlines of the Thesis
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents a detailed background about smart grid
and its security concerns. Chapter 3 defines the main security and privacy problems in the
three main communication architectures in smart grid and the related work in the literature.
Chapter 4 presents the first proposed solution for security and privacy problems in customer-
side networks and demonstrates its security analysis and performance evaluation. Chapter
5 describes the second proposed scheme, investigates its security features, and evaluates its
performance. Chapter 6 introduces the proposed solution for security and privacy threats
in V2G connections. Chapter 7 proposes the efficient prevention technique for FDI attacks.
Finally, Chapter 8 concludes the thesis and indicates the future directions.
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Chapter 2
Background and Literature Survey
Smart grid can be defined as the incorporation between the communication and information
technology and the traditional power grid. It utilizes the networking techniques to exchange
information about the grid conditions and customers’ demands. The main target of this in-
tegration is to improve the power generation process and reduce the electricity losses. In
addition, smart grid merges the renewable power resources with the traditional power gener-
ators to cover the increased electricity demand. Another benefit for smart grid is assisting in
CO2 emissions reduction and environment protection. Additionally, more distributed genera-
tors (DGs) are inserted in smart grid to satisfy the high electricity demands; they mostly are
renewable resources-based generators, such as wind turbines, and solar panels. Furthermore,
original techniques, such as micro-grids and V2G connection, are utilized in smart grid. The
micro-grid offers electrical self-sufficiency for a specific area using one or more DGs and storage
units and allows the area to be isolated or connected to the main grid according to the current
status of the grid; this feature protects the micro-grid in case of blackout and assists the self-
healing of the grid. In addition, smart grid utilizes the EVs’ batteries as temporary storage
units for the extra generated power during low demand periods; V2G networks organize the
charging/discharging operations of the EVs’ batteries to guarantee balanced electricity level
in the grid [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6]. This chapter defines the smart grid importance, describes its
architecture, and briefly introduces its main security concerns.
2.1 Smart Grid Benefits
According to the service provider, i.e., utility companies, smart grid technology can significantly
enhance the reliability and efficiency of the power grid. The grid’s reliability means reducing
the probability of blackouts and guaranteeing the required level of electricity supply to all
customers. The electricity company is responsible for providing a specific electricity demand to
each customer according to its type, i.e., residential or industrial. In case of electricity shortage,
there will be huge financial and economic losses for the customer especially industrial ones and
as consequence for the electricity company, which is obligated to pay a fine to the affected
customer.
On the other hand, the grid’s efficiency is to reduce the power losses; the efficiency can
be satisfied by rearranging the electricity consumption patterns for users. For instance, the
electricity company can encourage the residential customers to use their high-consumption
appliances at the low peak load period by decreasing the power price at that period. In
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addition, applying security scheme in smart grid can assist to decrease the power theft, which is
an effective reason for electricity losses in many countries. As a result, the electricity generation
will be organized and even reduced. Moreover, the insertion of renewable generation resources
in the new smart grid can lessen the burden on the traditional plant generators.
Smart grid can improve the efficiency of the maintenance and replacement operations for
the involved devices in the grid. For example, there are many deployed sensors in smart grid for
monitoring purposes; they monitor the performance of the different devices and send an alarm
message to the control center in case of error. Finally, smart grid is a friend to the environment,
as it organizes the electricity production and uses renewable generation resources. Accordingly,
smart grid plays a significant role in CO2 emission reduction. To conclude, the utility companies
are interested in smart grid to assure the optimal usage of the electrical power and provide more
luxury services to the customers, and consequently, increase their financial profits [1, 4, 5, 7, 8].
2.2 Smart Grid Architecture
Smart grid introduces new components and protocols in the power grid to achieve the smart
grid’s functions. This section introduces the smart grid’s reference model, its different layers
and their functions, and then the smart grid’s systems.
2.2.1 Smart Grid Reference Model
There are many proposed frameworks to identify the structure of smart grid. According to [2],
smart grid reference model composes of seven functional domains:
• Bulk Generation: Electricity is usually generated from non-renewable resources, such as
coal and gas generators. In smart grid, the renewable sources, e.g., wind turbines and
solar panels, are merged with the traditional ones to satisfy the increased demands and
reduce CO2 emissions.
• Transmission: Several substations and transmission lines are utilized to transmit the
produced power to consumers.
• Distribution: Distribution domain spreads the electricity to individual customers and
communicates suppliers and users via communication infrastructure.
• Operation: This domain controls and monitors the transmission and distribution domains
to obtain information about the power system’s activities.
• Market: This domain contains all the parties involved in the electricity-trade operation
to sustain the balance between supply and demand.
• Customer: Customers in smart grid not only consume electricity but also generate it by
distributed generators and store the extra power in rechargeable batteries.
• Service Provider: The electricity is provided to customers via service provider that is
responsible for services, such as billing and customer accounts management.
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2.2.2 Smart Grid Layers
According to [3], smart grid is composed of five layers that arrange the involved parties in the
grid:
• Application layer: provides smart grid applications for both customers and utilities.
• Security layer: satisfies the security requirements for all involved parties in smart grid.
• Communication layer: provides a two-way reliable and secure data transmission.
• Power control layer: monitors and controls the power transmission operation using PMUs,
sensors, transformers, meters and storage devices.
• Power system layer: delivers the electricity to customers through power generation, trans-
mission and distribution systems.
2.2.3 Smart Grid Systems
Smart grid differs from traditional power grid in several ways. The most important difference
is that smart grid can exchange electricity and information about the grid conditions between
suppliers and end users in both directions. The main purposes of this communication are to
decrease the total consumption of electricity, preserve the demands for electricity approximately
at the same level all the time, and consequently reduce the overall cost of this service. According
to [1], smart grid is divided into smart infrastructure system, smart management system, and
smart protection system.
2.2.3.1 Smart Infrastructure System
Smart infrastructure system supports the bidirectional flow of data and power; it consists of
three subsystems: smart energy subsystem, smart information subsystem, and smart commu-
nication subsystem.
• Smart energy subsystem controls generation, delivery, and consumption of electricity. In
traditional grids, the electricity is generated in few central huge-size power generators.
Then, generated power is transmitted via transmission grid to substations, finally dis-
tributed to customers through distribution grid. So, it’s a unidirectional process. In
contrast, smart grid is bidirectional; it utilizes DGs, such as solar panels and wind tur-
bines, to enhance the grid consistency. This expansion leads to two new concepts:
Micro-grid, which is a small-scale grid with its own DGs and loads, has self-power suf-
ficiency. Accordingly, micro-grid is able to disconnect from the original grid if any fail-
ure happened; micro-grid considers a small independent grid producing its own power.
However, the communication with the grid did not fully disconnected; micro-grids still
exchange information with the whole grid to decide when to reconnect with it.
The other concept is V2G connection. EVs’ batteries are charged from the grid at low-
demand times and work as electrical storage. Still, the charging operation requires efficient
scheduling techniques for coordinated charging to conserve the optimal power system
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performance and keep the peak power demand at minimum level. The grid restores the
power back from EVs in high-demand periods, i.e., EVs act as DGs and supply electricity
back to the grid.
• Smart information subsystem is responsible for information measurement, grid status
monitoring, and user appliances control. It deploys certain metering and measurement
devices, such as smart meters devices that are part of the automatic metering infrastruc-
ture, which is a technology to collect the energy metering data for analysis and electricity
billing purposes. The main function of smart meter is to compute the total amount of
consumed electricity for a unit, e.g., a house, every specific interval and send the data
to the central control for monitoring and billing purposes. Moreover, smart meter can
control the appliances, i.e., connect or disconnect them, and manage the loads and future
demands to reduce the electricity bill.
In addition, smart monitoring and measurement devices, i.e., sensors and PMUs, are uti-
lized. First, sensors are used to monitor the real-time mechanical and electrical conditions
for power system in addition to analyze the failures if happened. Wireless sensor net-
works are strongly recommended to accomplish this mission because of its effective cost;
however, sensors are low power nodes and vulnerable to attacks or severe environmental
conditions. Second, PMUs are secure measurement devices that are based on measuring
the phase angle of the power model to determine the power system’s state. PMUs are
utilized to forecast any failure before happening. Huge amount of information is gener-
ated from the metering devices; this data should be stored and analyzed to extract best
benefit. Cloud computing is a good candidate for that huge information storage. How-
ever, cloud computing suffer from certain security and privacy threats in addition to the
expensive cost of that service.
• Smart communication subsystem is responsible for exchanging the collected information
among different devices in the grid utilizing both wired and wireless networks. Smart grid
utilizes a combination of networks to guarantee the required QoS and support reliability,
availability, and security and privacy requirements with low installation cost. Several
communication technologies are suggested for smart grid, such as wireless mesh network,
cellular communication system, IEEE 802.15.4-based technologies, satellite communica-
tions, fibre optics communications, and PLC. TCP/IP protocol is strongly candidate for
managing the smart grid’s communication subsystem; however, it should overcome many
challenges related to the used heterogeneous communication networks and find low cost
methods to smoothly upgrade the existing grid to become smart grid.
2.2.3.2 Smart Management System
Smart management system mainly concerns about management and control mechanisms for
the novel applications and services in smart grid. The main functions of this system are energy
efficient usage and cost optimization. Mainly, smart management system aims to smooth the
demand profile shape by shifting and rescheduling the loads. Consequently, energy losses are
minimized, overall generation cost is decreased, and system’s reliability is increased. To satisfy
these objectives, various optimization techniques can be exploited.
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2.2.3.3 Smart Protection System
Smart protection system protects the grid from threats, which could be user errors, equipment
failures, natural disasters, and cyber-attacks, by offering defense mechanisms and preserving
security and privacy of the grid. In smart grid, DGs with their fluctuant and intermittent
renewables resources could threaten the reliability and stability of the grid. Thus, smart grid
uses micro-grids. Micro-grids deployment leads to less power flow within the entire grid, as
loads are served locally within every micro-grid, which consequently reduces the possibility of
cascading failures. Another way to guarantee the grid’s reliability is to assure the consistency
of measurement system by depending on powerful secured measurement devices.
To predict any failure occurrence in the grid, the PMUs’ data is utilized to identify the
stability region and predicates the weak points in the grid to identify the probability of failures
and where they could happen. If the failure happened, the system’s knowledge about topology
and PMUs measurements helps to quickly identify and fix it and prevent cascading events.
In other words, the grid satisfies the self-healing feature, which is the ability to prevent the
spread of failures and quick recovery of the grid. For micro-grid protection, micro-grid can work
in two modes: normal and island modes. In the normal mode, the micro-grid connects and
exchanges electricity with the main grid. However, if any abnormal conditions, such as power
failures, occur, the micro-grid switches to island mode, which isolates the micro-grid and stops
the electrical flow with the main grid to protect the micro-grid customers and prevent cascade
failure. So, micro-grid with the isolation capability improves the self-healing and increases the
grid’s ability to work well during normal times and outages as well.
In addition, cyber security is one of the serious challenges in smart grid. The cyber adver-
saries can compromise the power grid via communication systems to perform malicious actions,
such as obtain user private information, gain access to CC, and alter load conditions to desta-
bilize the grid in addition to new security and privacy issues due to the deployment of smart
meters, sensors, and PMUs. For smart meters security, smart meter is the most vulnerable part
in smart grid; it suffers from many security threats that can falsify the consumed electricity
amount; for example, malicious users can compromise their smart meters to reduce their energy
meter readings and pay lower electricity bills. Moreover, the extensive deployment of smart
meters increases the opportunity for adversaries to inject bad data in the grid. The adversaries’
fabricated readings mislead the electric utility and result wrong decisions about local or regional
usage and capacity. The adversaries also can launch an effective DoS attack by forging many
demand requests for a smart meter that are requesting for a large amount of energy. One of the
severe attacks is to target the electricity supply for a country. In traditional grids, this attack is
very difficult, as it involves various attacks on generation, transmission, and distribution assets,
which are well protected. However, the emergence of millions of smart meters controlled by few
central controllers in the grid will simplify this attack. The adversary only compromises these
controllers and sends the combination of commands to cause supply interruption. As a result,
efficient security techniques to guarantee the confidentiality and integrity of the smart meters’
readings are essential.
According to smart meters privacy, the major benefit of smart grid is collecting huge amount
of readings data for various appliances in the household. However, this advantage could turn
to a privacy concern, as the information about the house energy usage can reveal personal
habits and daily activities for householders. To address the privacy of smart meters, several
protection approaches have been proposed, such as employing homomorphic encryption during
data reading aggregation process, compressing the readings and adding random sequences, or
deploying anonymization schemes to conceal the real identity of smart meters.
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Figure 2.1: Smart grid architecture.1
For monitoring and measurement units security, the efficiency of smart grid depends on the
accuracy of the deployed measurement units and PMUs. The precision of the measurements is
checked by state estimators, which are located in the main CC and used to estimate the power
grid status through analyzing the values of the measurements. Therefore, the evaluation of grid
status is directly affected by the integrity of the measurements. A typical attack to compromise
measurement data integrity is the FDI attack. The invader in this attack can compromise a
bunch of PMUs and measurement units in the grid and exploit them to manipulate the state
estimate without triggering bad-data alarms. To resist these attacks, many researchers focus
on detecting the attacks using efficient state estimators and optimization techniques.
In general, deploying communication networks in power grid not only exposes the grid to
security and privacy issues exist in these networks but also adds new threats due to the power
grid’s nature [1, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16].
2.3 Smart Grid Networks
Four types of communication networks are used in smart grid, which are HANs, NANs, V2G
connections, and WANs; each one of them has different data rate, coverage range and con-
1Original picture Source: Q. Ho and T. Le-Ngoc, Handbook on Green Information and Communication
Systems, ECE Dept., McGill University, Montreal, Canada.
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sequently requires different communication technology. Smart grid utilizes these networks to
exchange information about grid conditions and customers’ demands. Three networks of them
are employed to connect the electricity customers with power utility. First network is HAN,
which connects smart household appliances to the smart meter inside the house. The sec-
ond network utilized is NANs, which is responsible for forwarding the electricity consumption
reports for all HANs in the region to the utility company. In this thesis, we use the term
customer-side networks to refer to HANs, BANs, IANs, and NANs networks. For WAN, it is
utilized by NANs to forward the electricity reports to the main utility center. According to
V2G network, it is utilized to schedule the charging/discharging operations between EVs and
grid. Figure 2.1 shows the power system versus the communication architecture in smart grid.
2.3.1 Home Area Networks (HANs)
HAN is a sort of local area networks; it facilitates the connection between smart devices inside
or close to house; HAN represents the communication network between smart appliances, EVs,
and smart meter. There are two other networks that can be considered HANs: Building Area
Networks (BANs), and Industrial Area Networks (IANs). BAN is a connection between several
HANs within the same residential area while IAN connects some HANs in the same industrial
area [3].
Smart home appliances, such as refrigerators, washing machines, and ovens, are varied in
their communication requirements. For instance, the light bulb sends much less data to smart
meter than the air conditioner (AC) so that ACs require more communication infrastructure
than bulbs. According to their communication needs, smart appliances can be divided into four
categories:
Group 1 consists of small-load appliances, such as light bulbs and phone chargers, where
an appliance does not significantly impact the total electricity load, and only needs to inform
CC whether the appliance is currently connected or disconnected to the grid. Group 2 consists
of large uncontrollable-load appliances, e.g., stoves, which operate according to the consumer
needs, and their usage cannot be delayed to a later time. The appliances in that group need
to send only its power consumption and expected duration of usage to CC. Group 3 consists
of controllable large-load appliances, such as ACs and clothes washers. Before any of these
appliances is switched on, it should send a request to CC via smart meter, including the
appliance’s expected electricity requirement, duration of usage, and possible usage times in a
day. Based on this information, CC can accept or reject the request according to the dynamic
electricity pricing, as well as the agreement between the householder and the utility company.
Finally, Group 4 consists only of EVs, which require extensive exchange of information with
CC in order to schedule the charging/discharging processes [9].
While, smart meter is an improved electrical meter that primarily aggregates the readings of
electricity consumption for a house every specific time interval and forwards the result at least
daily to the power service provider for controlling and billing purposes. Smart meter supports
the two-way communication feature with CC; whether this CC is a local control unit or the
main CC for the utility. HAN/BAN/IANs’ applications, such as industrial energy management
or computing total electricity costs, require small data rate to 100 kbps with short coverage
distance up to 100 m. Thus, technologies, such as ZigBee, PLC, Ethernet, and WiFi, which
are low power, low cost, and secure communication, are widely used [1, 3, 4, 5, 9]. Figure 2.2
shows an example of HAN.
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Figure 2.2: An example of HAN.
2.3.2 Neighbourhood Area Networks (NANs)
NAN is responsible for connecting HANs in a specific area to the main CC. It forwards the
electricity consumption reports for the region to the service provider. In addition, it sends the
electricity payments’ value from the utility to all HANs in the area. NAN’s applications, such
as smart metering and demand response, need higher data rate from 100 kbps to 10 Mbps
and larger coverage distance up to 10 km. Therefore, ZigBee mesh networks, WiFi, PLC, and
cellular can be suitable for NAN [3].
2.3.3 Vehicle-to-Grid (V2G) Connections
As known, the optimal utilization of generated power and reduction of electricity losses is one
of the major objectives of smart grid; this objective requires the presence of storage units that
save the extra electricity in case of high power generation and provide the electricity back to the
grid in case of high power consumption. Many types of energy storage are used as short-term
storage devices, such as fuel cells, flywheels, and EVs (as battery electric vehicles (BEVs) or
plug-in hybrid electric vehicle (PHEV) batteries). EVs’ batteries consider promising storage
media because of the rapid increase in the number of these vehicles in the near future. As well,
the batteries are stable storage units; the losses ratio for the stored power in EVs’ batteries is
low. In addition, the charging and discharging operations for EVs’ batteries are much faster
than increasing or decreasing the generation level of traditional power plants to satisfy the
electricity loads. In other words, the vehicles can work as distributed generation resources;
they can quickly supply electricity to the grid if the consumers’ demands increased, also they
can rapidly store the extra power from the grid if the electrical requirements decreased. As
a result, EVs supply certain services to the electricity grid, such as providing peak power,
spinning reserves, regulation reserves, and storing the renewable energy. Consequently, V2G
networks term is coined to represent the communication between EVs and the power grid. The
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communication between the power grid and EVs is bidirectional; when the power transfers from
the vehicle’s battery to the grid, the connection to manage this operation is called vehicle-to-
grid or V2G connection. While if the power transmits from the grid to the battery of the vehicle,
the connection is called the grid-to-vehicle or G2V connection. In the thesis, the term V2G
connection is used to refer to both connections. V2G connection suffers from some problems
related to scheduling the charging/discharging processes; it also experiences particular security
and privacy threats, such as the disclosure of EV’s owner identity or current location, and DoS
attacks.
• V2G concept: Two types of EVs are utilized in V2G connection. The first one is PHEVs,
which are mainly powered by battery but have a fossil fuel combustion engine too. This
feature increases the vehicle’s capacity. The second type is BEVs, which use the battery as
the only source of energy. Therefore, BEVs’ capacity is less than PHEVs. For simplicity,
we will refer to both PHEVs and BEVs as EVs. In addition, specifying EVs’ driving
pattern is significant for scheduling the charging/discharging operations, because it assists
in determining the optimal charging time and location for each EV to gain the optimal
power price and reduce the wasted electricity [16].
EVs are not only a significant solution for the environmental problems, i.e., CO2 emis-
sions, but also have potential economic benefits. EVs can work as a temporary storage for
the extra electricity. Subsequently, it can guarantee the reliability of the power grid and
reserve the consumed energy. EVs provide four functions to smart grid. The first one is
supplying energy during peak power load. The central power plants generate their peak
power occasionally, thus some of the produced power is lost due to the low demands.
One of the solutions to save the electricity is using several aggregated EVs as storage
for this power; these EVs perform peak power shaving during high-generated electricity
periods by storing the extra power, and they implement valley-filling process during high
consumption periods by restoring the power back to the grid. Accordingly, the load is
smoothed. The second function is spinning reserves; EVs can deliver power to the grid at
faster rate than the power plants do so that the grid operator uses EVs as a power sup-
ply in cases that require fast response. Moreover, EVs offer regulation services to power
grid; they can regulate the energy supply/demand rate under the supervision of the grid
operator. Finally, EVs act as backup storage for electricity derived from the renewable
resources, such as photovoltaic and wind turbines. The main concern about these re-
sources is their intermittent nature. Therefore, usages of EVs overcome the fluctuation
of the renewable resources and conserve the produced power load in a certain level [17].
Although V2G connection can solve the problem of electricity losses and offer a fast
supply/store electricity service to power grid, it provides certain problems related to
the scheduling of charging/discharging processes. Also, it threaten security and pri-
vacy of EVs too. For the charging/discharging operations, the uncoordinated charg-
ing/discharging can lead to unbalance in the electrical load and cause many problems.
So, the management of V2G network attracts the researchers to provide many techniques
to control V2G networks, such as in [18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24].
• V2G architecture: The architecture of V2G connections, as illustrated in many research
works [16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82,
83, 84, 85, 86], consists of clusters of EVs connected to devices called aggregators. The
function of the aggregator is to manage the power exchange operation between the grid
and EVs; there are two main types of aggregators; local and central aggregators. The
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local aggregators are located in the same region with EVs; their functions are collecting
information about EVs, such as their batteries’ state of charge, and forwarding the current
electricity price to the connected EVs. The local aggregator also receives the EVs’ requests
to charge or discharge their batteries, and compute the payment amount for each EV. On
the other hand, the central aggregators work as a link between power grid and EVs; they
receive the grid requests to supply or consume electricity and the current price; they also
control the local aggregators to satisfy the requirements of both power grid and vehicles’
owners. EVs connect to aggregators during their parking time, which is approximately
95% of the day, so that aggregators and charging stations are suggested to be installed in
parking lots; whether these lots are private, such as a residential building or a company
parking lot, or public lots, such as the shopping malls parking. Moreover, V2G connection
equipment can be installed in gas stations to serve PHEVs. In addition, V2G connection
should contain representatives for power grid; their function is to communicate with EVs
via central aggregators in order to store the extra electricity in the EVs’ batteries during
the peak power shaving and restore the power from them during the valley filling. These
processes should take into account the real-time electricity price for the optimal benefits
of both power grid and vehicles’ owners.
Figure 2.3 demonstrates the main architecture of V2G Network. Every cluster of EVs in
the same place, e.g., parking lots, is connected to the local aggregator, which receives their
charging/discharging requests and control the charging station in the lot. The local aggregator
also connects to the central aggregator to report the status of EVs in the lot, e.g., the total free
capacity of storage units or the total amount of electricity to supply from EVs. On the other
hand, the central aggregator communicates with the grid operator to know the grid require-
ments; the total demand of electricity that grid wants to sell/purchase and the corresponding
price. However, V2G networks face various types of attacks; these attacks can threaten EV
owners’ privacy and integrity of the exchanged messages. Accordingly, many research studies
are proposed to detect the attacks and guarantee the security requirements.
2.3.4 Wide Area Networks (WANs)
WAN, which already exists, is utilized by NANs to forward the electricity reports from their
local regions to the main CC in utility company. WAN applications, such as wide-area control,
monitoring and protection, requisite higher data rate from 10 Mbps to 1 Gbps long coverage dis-
tance up to 100 km. Technologies, such as optical fibre communication, cellular, and WiMAX,
are most commonly used between transmission/distribution substations and the utility’s CC
due to their high capacity, low latency, and wide coverage range [3].
2.4 The Power Control System and State Estimation
Fundamentally, power grid is responsible for generation, transmission, and distribution of elec-
tricity to customers. To achieve these functions, the power grid CC should perform certain
auxiliary tasks to guarantee the required quality of service and prevent hazards and disasters,
such as blackouts. One of the major tasks is monitoring the grid status using local sensors or
measurement units. Therefore, CC should assure the accuracy of these measurements by state
estimation operation. The traditional state estimators are based on computing the difference
16
2.4. The Power Control System and State Estimation
Figure 2.3: V2G network architecture.
between observed and expected measurements and comparing the residual by a specific thresh-
old. However, this technique is not realistic for the novel smart grid, as the power grid exposure
to communication networks leads to a new type of attacks that target the infrastructure of the
grid by injecting false measurements; these new attacks are called FDI attacks or stealthy at-
tacks. Accordingly, these FDI attacks can mislead the CC to make wrong decisions for the grid
and consequently cause catastrophic results; for instance, on August 14, 2003, a large area of
United States and Canada experienced an electric power blackout, which affected on about 50
million people and caused economic losses between $4 billion and $10 billion in United States
and $2.3 billion in Canada [25]. In this section, we describe power system components and ser-
vices, and then define power system different models, and traditional state estimation process.
In addition, we introduce FDI attack, its types and its impacts on power grid.
2.4.1 Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) System
Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system, which is the brain of power system,
is a type of industrial control system (ICS). ICS is computer-controlled system that physically
monitors and controls industrial processes. SCADA systems are distinguished from other ICS
systems by being large-scale systems with multiple sites and large distances. SCADA system
consists of certain remote units connected to variety of sensors and actuators, and some master
stations; it operates by sending signals over communication channels to control these remote
equipment. The supervisory operation may be combined with a data acquisition function by
sending signals over communication channels to acquire information about the status of the
remote devices. SCADA system mainly consists of:
• Remote terminal units (RTUs) that connect to sensors or measurement units that spread
in different locations in the grid, convert their signals to digital data, and then send the
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data to the supervisory system. As well, they receive the digital commands from the
supervisory system and forward them to the sensors.
• Telemetry system, which connects the field devices, i.e., RTUs, with CCs via wired or
wireless communication media.
• Data acquisition server that provides some services to the human operator and other
parties and allows them to access the field devices’ data.
• Human machine interface (HMI), which displays the data in interpretable format for
human operator so that he/she monitors and interacts with the grid’s status. The operator
via HMI can request the data from the data acquisition server.
• Historian, which is a software service that records all time-stamped data and events in a
database and utilizes them to graphically show the power trends via HMI.
• Supervisory system, which is the CC, that gathers data about the status of different
parties in the grid, also sends control commands to the system via communication infras-
tructure.
By these subsystems, SCADA acquires the RTUs’ data, and then aggregates and formats
them to ease the supervisory system decisions making operation, e.g., to adjust RTUs.
Data may also be fed to historian to allow trending and other analytical auditing [26].
SCADA system is used since 1970s in power grid but nowadays more devices that provide
more functions are attached to it. The modern grid, smart grid, supports new tasks, such as
automatic generation control and optimal power flow analysis; also new types of sensors, e.g.,
PMUs, are employed for wide-area monitoring and control systems for the grid. In addition,
SCADA communication network is heterogeneous; it consists of fibre optics, satellite, and
microwave connections. Although the traditional SCADA systems are originally designed to be
centralized and closed systems, i.e., original SCADA systems have limited connection with the
open networks like Internet, SCADA system in smart grid becomes distributed and connected
to different networks. As a result, it is exposed to various cyber security threats. Therefore,
SCADA requires protection techniques to provide its services without security risks. Analytical
instruments, such as the state estimators, are significant in the modern SCADA system. The
measurements units that are spread in the grid collect data about the grid’s status and forward
it to SCADA system via RTUs. State estimator is an analytical tool in the SCADA’s CC
that is responsible for checking the accuracy of the received measurements. Consequently,
accurate state estimators are significant for the future smart grid to fulfill its tasks. However,
the state estimation operation is threatened by cyber and physical security threats, because
the exchanged data is often sent without encryption so that malicious attackers exploit that
weakness and launch powerful attacks, such as FDI attacks [27, 28, 29, 30].
2.4.2 Power System Model and State Estimation Process
Any power system consists of a collection of power flow meters, transmission lines, and buses.
Assume we have a power system with n + 1 buses and only consider active power flows Pij,
active power injections Pi, and bus phase angles θi, where i, j = 1, . . . , n+1. Assuming that the
resistance in the transmission line connecting buses i and j is small compared to its reactance
Xij, then the active power flow from bus i to bus j equals:
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sin θi − θj
At each bus i, positive active power Pi is injected from a power generator. While the





, where Ni is the set of all buses connected to bus i.
The active power flow measurements z for any system in general are computed by:
z = P + e = h(x) + e ∈ Rm
, where h(x) is the power-flow model derived from power flow equations, and x ∈ Rm+1 is a
vector of n + 1 unknown bus phase angles, and e = (e1 . . . em)
T ∈ N (0, R), is a noise with
zero mean Gaussian distribution, where R is the diagonal measurement covariance matrix.
Generally, one arbitrary bus phase angle is fixed as reference angle, e.g., θ1 = 0, and the
remaining n angles have to be estimated. The voltage level Vi of each bus is known as well
as the reactance of each transmission line. In other words, the power flow measurements z
depends on the phase angles θi, and the state estimator knows all other parameters. Therefore,
this equation presents a common formulation of state estimation problem for the AC power
flow model, as h(x) is a nonlinear function. However, h(x) function can be linearized, which
means approximating AC system to DC system. Then, the active power flow measurements
equation becomes:
z = Hx+ e
, where x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn)
T ∈ Rn represents the true state vector to be estimated, z =
(z1, z2, . . . , zm)
T ∈ Rm represents the observed sensor measurements, H ∈ Rm×n is an m × n
Jacobian or DC power flow matrix, and e = (e1, e2, . . . , em)
T ∈ Rm is the random measurement
errors (noise) [27, 31, 32, 33, 34, 37].
The main tasks of the state estimator are to check if there is a unique estimate for each
system state and perverse the system’s observability, determine the optimal estimate for each
bus based on the real-time analog measurements, i.e., the state estimation process, and lastly
detect the measurement errors and identifies the bad data injections and eliminates them if
possible; this operation is called bad data detection (BDD) process. To guarantee the system’s
observability, measurement units are spread optimally along the grid; many optimization re-
search works that address the measurement units placement problem in power grid, such as
[35].
According to the state estimation process, Gauss-Newton method [36] is often used to
estimate the unknown bus phase angles from power flows measurements z as follows:
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, where xˆk ∈ Rn is the estimate of the n unknown phase angles, k denotes the iteration
number, Hk is the Jacobian evaluated at xˆ
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Rm×(n+1), H¯k ∈ Rm×n is Hk after removing the corresponding column for the reference angle.
Assume that the phase differences θi−θj in the power network are small; then, the phase-angle
estimate equals
xˆ = (H¯TR−1H¯)−1H¯TR−1z (2.1)
, and the active power flows can be estimated by
zˆ = H¯xˆ = H¯(H¯TR−1H¯)−1H¯TR−1z (2.2)
BDD system in CC calculates the measurement residual r, i.e., the difference between
observed and estimated measurements, as:
r = z − zˆ = P + e− H¯xˆ = (I −K)z (2.3)
, where z = Hx + e. Because of measurement errors e, the residual r does not equal zero.
Accordingly, r is compared with a specific threshold; if r is larger than it, an alarm is triggered
and zi are declared as bad measurements and removed [7, 9, 10].
• State Estimation and Bad Data Detection
Three statistical estimation criteria are commonly used in state estimation process: the
maximum likelihood, the weighted least square, or the minimum variance criteria. As
the measurement error is normally distributed with zero mean, these criteria lead to an
identical estimator. The minimum mean squared error (MMSE) estimator is the state
estimator currently used in the grid by solving the following matrix:
xˆ = (HTWH)−1HTWz
, where W is a diagonal matrix whose elements are reciprocals of variances of units errors,
W = R−1 in equation (2.1); σ
−2
1 . . . . . . 0
... σ−22 . . .
...
0 . . . . . . σ−2m

, where σ−2i is the variance of the i−th unit (1 ≤ i ≤ m).
The normal measurements usually give an estimate of state variables close to their actual
values, while abnormal ones may deviate the estimated state variables away from their
true values. Consequently, MMSE estimator can detect if there are errors or noise in
measurements by calculating r = z − Hxˆ and comparing its 2-Norm ‖ z − Hxˆ ‖ with
a specific threshold τ ; the presence of bad measurements is inferred if ‖ z − Hxˆ ‖> τ .
The state variables are independent and the units errors follow the normal distribution
so that ‖ z − Hxˆ ‖2, denoted as L(x), follows the chi-distribution X 2(v) [40], where v
is the degree of freedom. However, selection of τ is a main issue; it can be determined
through a hypothesis test with a significance level α. In other words, the probability that
L(x) ≤ τ 2 equals α means that L(x) ≤ τ 2 detects the presence of bad measurements with
false alarm probability equals α [31, 33, 34, 37].
• Likelihood Ratio Test (LRT)
Most of traditional state estimators are based on the likelihood ratio test (LRT), which is
successful to detect noise or random errors, but fails to detect planned malicious bad data.
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The simplest detection process is the task of deciding which of two probability models
best matches a set of data. Let X be a random variable and denote the two probability
models as p(x‖H0) and p(x‖H1), where H0 and H1 are the hypothesis 0 and 1 respectively.
The detection problem is simply to decide which model is more appropriate. Assume a
random variable is distributed on H0 : X ∼ p0 or H1 : X ∼ p1; the process of deciding
which distribution best fits an observation of X is called a simple binary hypothesis test,
because the two distributions are precisely known without unknown parameters or other
uncertainties. The decision is made by partitioning the range of X into two disjoint
regions: R0 and R1. Let x denote the observed value of X. If x ∈ Ri, then Hi is decided
to be the best match. There are four possible outcomes for that test: (0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0),
and (1, 1), where the first argument denotes the decision based on R0 or R1 and the second
argument is the true data distribution. To optimize the decisions’ choice, a non-negative
cost c for the decisions is specified; let ci,j be the cost of outcome (i, j), i, j ∈ {0, 1}. The
test aims for decisions with few mistakes so that it is reasonable to assume that c1,0 and


















, where pij = P(Hj is true), j = 0, 1, is the probability that an observation is generated
according to pj.
R0 := {x : c0,0pi0p0(x) + c0,1pi1p1(x) < c1,0pi0p0(x) + c1,1pi1p1(x)
R1 := {x : c0,0pi0p0(x) + c0,1pi1p1(x) > c1,0pi0p0(x) + c1,1pi1p1(x)






The right hand side term is constant that depends on probabilities and costs while the left
hand side term is a ratio of probability densities evaluated at x. The value of probability
density at the observed x is called likelihood of x under that model. Thus, p1(x)
p0(x)
is called




, where γ > 0 is the test threshold. Therefore, LRT with an appropriate threshold is
optimal for error and noise detection [39].
2.4.3 False Data Injection (FDI) Attacks
FDI attack can be launched by inserting fake measurements to the observed measurements
vector. The FDI attacks’ objective is to mislead CC to make wrong decisions, such as redis-
tributing electricity according to that wrong injected information, and consequently cause huge
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damage; i.e., blackouts. The attacker may also aim to gain a financial profit by redistributing
the power loads along the grid to control the electricity price. For example, adversary can
buy the electricity by cheap price from a location in the grid, and then change the loads to
cause higher power price in another location to sell its electricity. The essential condition for
successful FDI attack is to pass the state estimator test and avoid the alarm. In other words,
even with the injected false measurements in the observed measurements vector, r = z − Hxˆ
should still be less than τ . To satisfy this condition, the attacker should have some information
about the Jacobian matrix of power system H, which is determined by the topology and line
impedances of the system. Many research works assume that attackers have full knowledge of
H; this information can be extracted by spying on the grid company or monitoring the grid for
a period of time.
For undetected attack, the attacker forms the false injected measurements a, also called
attack vector, as a function of H, i.e., a = Hc, where c is an arbitrary nonzero vector. Then,
the observed false measurements vector za is represented as za = z+a, where z = (z1, . . . , zm)
T
is the vector of original measurements and a = (a1, . . . , am)
T is the malicious data added to
the original measurements. If i−th element ai is nonzero, then the attacker compromises the
i−th unit, i.e., replaces its original measurement zi with a fake measurement zi + ai. When a
malicious data a = Hc is inserted, the vector of the estimated state variables xˆbad is obtained
from za as:
xˆbad = (H
TWH)−1HTWza = (HTWH)−1HTW (z + a) = xˆ+ (HTWH)−1HTWa
, and the 2-Norm of the measurement residual is
‖ z −Hxˆbad ‖=‖ z + a−H(xˆ+ (HTWH)−1HTWa) ‖=‖ z −Hxˆ+ (a− (HTWH)−1HTWa) ‖
=‖ z −Hxˆ+ (Hc− (HTWH)−1HTWHc) ‖=‖ z −Hxˆ+ (Hc−Hc) ‖=‖ z −Hxˆ ‖≤ τ.
According to their goals, FDI attacks can be divided into random and target FDI attacks.
In random FDI, attackers aim to inject any bad data to cause wrong state estimation in the
state variables. While the target FDI attack is injecting an attack vector that causes a specific
error into certain state variables [7, 13, 14]. [37] studies two attack scenarios, where attackers
are either constrained by compromising specific meters or by their limited resources.
2.5 Smart Grid Security Concerns
Smart grid suffers from security threats that exported from communication networks, such as
falsifying the electricity consumption readings, extracting customers’ private information, or
attacking the availability of the grid’s resources. In addition, smart grid is exposed to the novel
FDI attacks.The security concerns of smart grid can be briefly categorized into three major
groups [1, 4, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16]:
Information privacy is a big concern in smart grid especially for customer-side networks in
houses, residential and industrial buildings. Personal information and daily habits for con-
sumers can be revealed to outsiders from the electricity consumption pattern of the unit.
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Therefore, any eavesdropper, with moderate data analysis tools, can threaten the privacy of
customers. The eavesdropper can extract significant information about householders, such as
when they are in/out the house, or the types of electrical appliances they usually use. According
to industrial institutes, the observer may get important knowledge about the institutions’ pro-
duction from its consumed power and sell this information to the competitors. The electricity
users’ privacy requires efficient security schemes to preserve it by guaranteeing the confiden-
tiality of exchanged messages.
Second, data integrity is a significant concern. Adversaries can attempt to alter or fabricate
the exchanged messages. There are two obvious examples of integrity attacks in smart grid.
First one is when a malicious consumer attempts to forge his/her electricity reading to reduce
the electricity bill. Second attack is FDI attack, in which the adversary compromises several
measurement sensors and exploits them to inject false information about the grid conditions;
this attack misleads CC to wrongly evaluate the grid status and make incorrect decisions. The
consequences of this attack extremely affect all parties in the grid.
Network availability is another concern. Malicious adversaries can target network resources
by DoS attacks. They attempt to block or corrupt the network resources to delay the transmit-
ted information or even to make it unavailable to authorized parties. For instance, attackers
can launch DoS attacks by falsifying a large number of electricity request messages using com-
promised smart meter, and asking for huge amount of energy. Therefore, the utilized networks
in smart grid should be robust to network availability attacks, because the network unavail-
ability could cause severe consequences, such as loss the real-time monitoring of critical power
infrastructures, and subsequently lead to huge blackouts.
In summary, merging communication technologies with power grid introduces novel security
problems to the grid. In general, the main security risks for smart grid are network resources
and information availability, data integrity, and users privacy. In next chapter, we demonstrate
the currently proposed solutions for the three main smart grid communication architectures:
customer-side networks, V2G connections, and power control and state estimation systems.
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Chapter 3
Security and Privacy Concerns in
Smart Grid
This chapter presents the existing research works that proposed to guarantee security and pri-
vacy requirements for different communication architectures in smart grid. First, we begin with
the research studies that are proposed to deal with security concerns in customer-side networks.
Mainly, the current studies are utilizing hardware devices, distorting the message’s contents,
or cryptographic schemes, such as anonymization or homomorphic encryption techniques; the
central target is concealing the confidential data and preserving the messages’ integrity. Sec-
ond, we introduce the efforts to secure the vehicles’ owner privacy and data integrity during
charging and discharging operations in V2G networks. The previous studies are focused on
authentication mechanisms, anonymization techniques, or physical layer security methods. Fi-
nally, the proposed schemes to detect FDI attacks are described. These solutions are ranging
between exploiting alternative estimation tests, distributing the estimators all over the grid,
utilizing various optimization techniques, using cryptographic schemes. Figure 3.1 lists the
previous proposed solutions and related works categories for each architecture.
3.1 Customer-side Networks Security and Privacy Prob-
lems and Related Works
Smart grid technology has to consider many concerns due to network performance and security
requirements. The security concerns for smart grid are varied according to the applications. In
customer-side networks, the aggregation of electricity consumption and transmission of billing
information operations either in individual HAN or among HANs and utility are the main
processes to exchange messages; the major security concerns during these operations are the
privacy of householders as well as the integrity of aggregated information. Another concern
is the restricted-resources devices, i.e., smart meter and smart appliances, in customer-side
networks that cannot perform complex crypto-operations. At a result, the suggested schemes
to handle these security concerns should not only preserve security and privacy requirements,
but also be lightweight due to computation and communication overhead. Several solutions have
been proposed to deal with that problem, which can be divided into three different categories:
• Hardware Equipment: The first category employs hardware devices that are connected to
smart meters to conceal the real electricity consumption [41, 45, 46]. These devices are one
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Figure 3.1: The proposed solutions categories in each architecture.
of two classes; the first class is devices that offer more security for smart meters, such as
temper-resistance devices, so that no attacker can compromise the meters. Furthermore,
the measurement units that spread through the grid to monitor its status can detect any
anomaly behaviours in the grid and can be utilized to resist replay attacks [41]. The second
class is devices that supply the house by electricity, such as electrical batteries [45, 46];
the battery is connected to smart meter to satisfy some of the electricity demand for the
house by self-reliance. Consequently, the requested electricity amount from the grid does
not reveal the real consumption. The main target of these procedures is to not depend
on cryptographic schemes to alleviate the computation and communication complexity.
However, using these expensive devices is not practical, as it is hard to connect a temper-
resistance device or a special electric battery to each smart meter of millions of deployed
smart meters in addition to the necessary maintenance and replacement operations.
• Signal Distortion: Second category distorts the power consumption value before transmis-
sion [47, 48, 49]; this process adds noise to the message at smart meter side and removing
it at CC. This category saves the power and computation abilities for smart meters. For
instance, [49] adds noise to each reading value to further resist the human-factor-aware
differential aggregation attack. However, in these approaches, CC requires complex data
mining techniques, which consumes a lot of time and resources, to reconstruct the original
message from the received one. This method not only impedes the reading aggregation
operation but also produces an approximate value for the received message, while CC
requires the accurate readings for billing purposes.
• Cryptographic Mechanisms: Finally, various existing works have utilized cryptographic
schemes to guarantee information security and customers’ privacy. [50] provides unified
framework to address security and privacy problems in HAN and selects the appropriate
defense mechanisms. In [51], the authors present a complete framework to secure HAN;
the used authentication scheme is based on password. While, jamming attacks can be
countermeasured by hopping between predefined frequencies. Timestamp and sequence
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numbers resists replay attacks. Moreover, keeping a log file for some historical operations
protects from nonrepudiation threats, and directional reception capabilities are used to
limit the interference effect. Asymmetric encryption schemes are utilized to encrypt the
electricity consumption message due to their higher security level. [52] suggests public
key infrastructure (PKI) scheme and applies attestation protocols, firewalls, and mutual
authentication to limit the influence of compromised devices. When a group of users needs
to exchange messages so that no outsiders can decrypt these messages, group signature-
based schemes are utilized to guarantee the security and privacy [53, 54]. [53] employs
the key-policy attribute-based encryption (KP-ABE) scheme for multicasting purposes.
KP-ABE [55] utilizes the key based on specific attributes shared between a group of users
to decrypt the message. [56] ensures the accountability by considering smart appliances
and power generation source in HAN as witnesses to watch the smart meter’s behaviour.
Each witness uses a log file to record all the information at current time and sends it
periodically to service provider.
Homomorphic Public Key Schemes: Several studies exploit the homomorphic features
for some public key schemes to aggregate the electricity consumption for a specific region
without revealing individual consumption values. [57] proposes a full framework to aggre-
gate the electricity readings for customers in a specific region and guarantees the privacy
of customers using additive homomorphic encryption; at the same time, it provides access
control scheme based on attribute-based encryption (ABE) scheme. The homomorphic
hash function [58] is utilized in mutual authentication between smart meters and the main
control server. [59] proposes an efficient privacy-preserving demand response (EPPDR)
scheme to aggregate the electricity demand messages for users in local area. In [60],
the authors propose a new privacy-preserving scheme for aggregating multi-dimensional
metering data using homomorphic encryption scheme (EPPA), which is based on homo-
morphic Paillier crypto-system scheme. While [61] reviews different security threats in
smart grid and suggests intrusion detection system and fast authentication scheme. How-
ever, the applied homomorphic schemes provide high computation and communication
overhead. For instance, EPPA [60] scheme based on homomorphic Paillier encryption
requires time from 100 ms to 220 ms as messages number increases, which considers high
load especially with the increase of smart meters’ number. The proposed homomorphic
schemes are not scalable; their performance degrades, as number of smart meters within
the same cluster increases [11].
Authentication Schemes: Other research works employ authentication schemes to
confirm the authenticity of smart meters during network establishment; also key man-
agement techniques are combined to revoke the compromised keys. [62] proposes a key
management theoretical framework that uses extensible authentication protocol (EAP)
as an authentication protocol. According to [63], the authors propose a key management
scheme that assigns a set of keys for each node in each transmission mode: unicast, mul-
ticast, broadcast. While [64] proposes a lightweight scheme to guarantee the authenticity
of nodes using Diffie-Hellman scheme and assure the integrity of messages by message
authentication code. Merkle tree is utilized for authentication too [65]. [66] proposes
an integrated authentication and confidentiality protocol, which first provides a mutual
authentication between smart meters and the gateway via the authenticator smart me-
ter. Subsequently, the authenticated smart meters are organized as a chain. Each smart
meter encrypts its reading message, checks the received message’s validity, combines it
with it own message, and forward the result to the next node until reach to the collec-
tor node. [67] proposes an authentication scheme based on identity-based cryptography
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scheme (IBC). IBC satisfies the security requirements; it also reduces the PKI overhead
and resists various attacks. Nevertheless, it requires the smart meter to have a unique
identity value, such as IP address or email, to create its own pair of keys. In addition,
the authentication operation generally composes of several steps; it consumes the device’s
computation and communication abilities and increases the overhead; it requires smart
meter to have a secret value before the data aggregation phase. This value could be
implanted in its memory during the manufacture or sent through a secure channel to use
as a seed in authentication key or password generation. The lightweight authentication
scheme based on Diffe-Hellman scheme [64], for example, causes an average delay varied
between 1 to 10 second, as the smart meters’ number increases.
Anonymization Schemes: Other studies employ anonymization schemes to conceal the
real identity of smart meter so that any other unauthorized parties cannot link between
the smart meter’s real identity and its electricity consumption. Anonymity techniques
are based on the presence of a third trusted party, which issues two identities to each
smart meter: real and pseudorandom identities. Only the third party knows the identity
pairs for each smart meter. The third party can also create binding factors to the network
nodes to conceal their identities. [68] proposes a privacy-preserving aggregation scheme,
which protects the user privacy from internal attackers too. The trusted party first
creates a blinding factor for each user, sums all these blinding factors, and then sends
the summation to the aggregator. When the users encrypt their electricity consumption
by RSA, they combine their blinding factors before forward the value to the aggregator,
which aggregates all reading values and adds its blinding factor to cancel the users’
blinding factors and obtains the aggregated reading for all users. While [69] presents a
privacy-preserving aggregation scheme, which utilizes two crypto-systems: shamir secret
sharing (SSS) scheme, and cramer-shoup (CS) crypto-system. SSS divides the secret value
into shares distributed among different parties. To recover the secret, specific number
of shares should be cooperated. On the other hand, CS uses one public key and two
private keys, i.e., weak and strong decryption keys, which decrypt the message in two
different nodes. The collaboration of both nodes is required to recover the plaintext; a
single node cannot obtain it independently. In credential-based anonymization techniques
[70], each smart meter generates enough number of credentials, adds blinding factors to
them, and then sends these credentials to CC for signature. Therefore, smart meter joins
these credentials to its messages to CC, which checks the validity of the credential before
replies by the requested power. At the end of billing period, each user sends the unused
credentials to CC, which computes the used credential for each user and calculates the
user’s bill. The anonymization techniques can guarantee users’ privacy. However, these
techniques involve performing several processes especially during initialization phase; so
they increase the overhead. Also, the third party should be online most of the time.
3.2 V2G Connections Security and Privacy Threats and
Related Works
Several research studies are proposed to conserve the demanded security level and alleviate the
threats impact on V2G connection; these studies attempt to preserve vehicle’s owner privacy,
network resources availability, and exchanged message integrity and confidentiality. Many re-
search works have determined the security requirements and concerns for V2G networks, while
27
3.2. V2G Connections Security and Privacy Threats and Related Works
other researches offer solutions for their security problems. V2G networks face various types
of attacks, which can threaten the vehicle owners’ privacy and the integrity of exchanged mes-
sages, such as impersonating EVs, illegally modifying their messages, launching DoS attacks,
or threatening the owner’s privacy. The security requirements for V2G connections, such as au-
thentication for messages or parties, guaranteeing the connection’s availability, and anonymizing
the EVs owners’ identities and preserving their privacy, should be specified so that the safety
threats on V2G connections are bounded, and their impacts are limited [71].
The significant concern in V2G networks is securing the service provider, i.e., EV, privacy,
also authenticating it to the power grid. Before any charging/discharging or payment opera-
tions, the grid should authenticate the vehicle, and the vehicle requires preserving its private
information from the grid’s operator or any intermediate devices in the connection, such as
aggregators. Several solutions are proposed to resist these threats; they are based on various
procedures, such as different authentication mechanisms, encryption schemes, physical security
methods, and anonymization techniques. For instance, [80] utilizes ECC public key scheme
to provide PKI for a multi-domain architecture V2G network, where each domain contains an
aggregator and some EVs. While, [85] utilizes combination of several cryptography schemes
to propose a new privacy (V2GPriv) scheme to V2G connection. V2GPriv addresses security
and privacy requirements of V2G connections by utilizing some techniques, such as double en-
cryption, which conceals the different parties’ communication relations from eavesdroppers. In
addition, every vehicle’s meter has a unique identifier and public-private key pair for signing
purposes; these secret parameters are assigned to vehicles during the manufacturing and stored
in the meter in a secured module. Symmetric key 128− bit AES encryption scheme is used too.
The k−anonymity service are also utilized so that the pseudonym identity assigned by an aggre-
gator for the gateway is shared with k− 1 other gateways; there are k gateways have the same
pseudonym identity. During the connection establishment, mutual authentication operation is
performed; the gateway challenges the vehicle’s meter by basic challenge-response protocol to
prove that it has not been tampered with. The authors too suggest deploying multiple servers
in series; so the aggregator’s destination address can be hidden from all except the last server.
• Authentication Schemes: Some research studies utilize authentication schemes to guaran-
tee the validity of connected EVs. [72] proposes a unique batch authentication protocol
for vehicle-to-grid (UBAPV2G) communications; the authors employ the batch authenti-
cation to guarantee privacy and integrity of messages between aggregator and EVs. The
main idea is that the aggregator broadcasts a request message to EVs in the range; vehicles
respond by messages with their identification information; the responses are encrypted by
the aggregator’s public key. The aggregator collects the vehicles’ responses during a spe-
cific time interval, and then verifies the authenticity of vehicles by one verification process
using batch authentication. The aggregator then broadcasts one confirmation message to
all vehicles. The batch authentication is better that one-by-one authentication method,
as it saves time and reduces the computation overhead. In addition, it decreases the
communication time, as the number of confirmation messages is reduced to one [73].
However, [74] discovers some security flaws in UBAPV2G scheme that could be launched
by adversaries or dishonest aggregators. An attacker can wait until the time interval,
in which the aggregator collects the vehicles responses, is about to finish and sends his
messages. Consequently, the forged message is stored in the aggregator’s buffer, but the
aggregator cannot check the message’s validity individually, because it will be included
in the batch authentication packet. As a result, a malicious user can be authenticated to
the grid and subsequently establish more severe attacks. Moreover, a malicious aggrega-
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tor can generate multiple forged signatures for innocent vehicles, and they cannot prove
that they were not involved in producing these forged signatures. According to [75], it
divides the EVs into two modes: home and visiting modes. It utilizes Diffie-Hellman key
exchange protocol to perform mutual authentication between EVs and local aggregators.
An extra virtual battery is also used to generate the pseudo-identities for EVs, and the
trusted central authority (CA) performs the mapping between real and pseudo-identities.
The local aggregator exploits the aggregated-proof technique to authenticate a group of
EVs to CA so that any EV can enter or leave the group at any time without effecting on
this operation, because it is updated periodically. [76] too utilizes mutual authentication
to confirm the vehicles’ legitimacy by dividing the battery statuses into: charging, fully
charged, and discharging. At each state, the first step should be the mutual authentica-
tion between EV and aggregator; also, timestamp and identifiers are attached to check
the message’s validity.
• Anonymization Mechanisms: Other studies attempt to preserve privacy of the vehicle’s
owners during V2G connection by anonymizing the vehicle so that the outsiders or even
the grid’s operator and the aggregators cannot extract any distinguishable private infor-
mation, such as owner identity or vehicle location. Several anonymization mechanisms
are proposed; [77] utilizes two aggregators: central and local aggregators. The central
aggregator issues a one-day permit for each EV using the partially blind signature scheme.
The EV then uses the permit and its pseudorandom identity to communicate with the
local aggregator at parking lots. Each EV uses these identity parameters to send periodic
reports about its status to local aggregator, also charging/discharging requests. When
the grid requires supplying or consuming electricity, it sends a public request. The central
aggregators directly make bids, as they know the EVs’ capacities, i.e., from the periodic
reports. If the bid successes, the central aggregator sends to local aggregator to select
some EVs to satisfy the required demand. After the transmission, the local aggregator
sends reward messages to the participated EVs. When any EV wants to leave the lot, it
sends an aggregated reward request to local aggregator to receive its total reward value
for the whole connection period. The EV’s privacy is guaranteed by the partially blind
signature scheme. However, if any EV cheats, the central aggregator can expose its real
identity. A privacy-preserving protocol based on certificate less public key scheme and
partially blind signature is proposed in [78]. The utilized schemes reduces the dependence
on third party, as in certificate less public key scheme, each entity has a partially private
key from trusted party and adds random secret value to it to obtain its private key. [81]
suggests a security framework, where each vehicle acts as an independent agent with an
electrical chip called trusted platform module that provides the cryptographic parameters
to anonymize the vehicle. Also, the authors consider the existence of lateral regional aggre-
gators at the distribution substations to manage electricity-exchange operation. However,
[79] presents an adversary model that the attacker can predict (by some probability) the
identity of EV from charging locations that the vehicle visits and the distance between
them even when EV uses several pseudo identities. Although anonymization techniques
and pseudo identities can alleviate the security and privacy problems, they cannot offer a
definitive solution. In addition, they increase communication and computation overhead
on different parties in the V2G connection.
• Physical Layer Protection Methods: Other category of proposed solutions for V2G con-
nection is based on physical layer protection mechanisms. The seamless connectivity of
vehicular network could threaten the security of EVs. So [82] utilizes the smart grid’s
29
3.3. Power Control System and State Estimation Security Problems and Related Works
devices, e.g., smart meter and smart appliances, in home with G.hn technology, which
manages the householder to connect with any device using any wire in the house, to se-
cure EV by keeping it connected to the house via any base station whatever the location
of it. The authors employ direct-sequence spread spectrum technology and low pass filter
to reduce noise and jamming attacks. Although this method uses smart grid as a tool
to track stolen vehicles, the technique could used also to secure V2G connections. Ac-
cording to [83], the availability of network resources is the most important requirement
that can be threatened by distributed DoS and jamming attacks. So, channel-based key
management approach is used to setup a key between transmitter and receiver. The
two nodes exchange several beacon signals and apply the same error correction scheme
to generate the same key remotely. The authors also suggest employing cognitive radio
network because of the dynamic nature of EVs.
• Other Encryption Schemes: Several other research works study the impact of price in-
formation and propose secure payment management schemes. [84] analyzes the optimal
charging policies for PHEV using Markov chain considering different variables, such as
mobility and real-time price information. Also, the paper explores the impact of DoS and
price manipulation attacks on PHEV charging behaviour. According to [86], it proposes
a payment scheme that organizes charging/discharging operation for V2G connection;
as well, the proposed scheme preserves the user’s privacy, keeps the operation account-
ability, and traces the stolen cars. First, the vehicle’s owner should open an account in
the grid’s operator. Before any charging/discharging operations, the supplier verifies the
balance of the vehicle’s account and its capacity, and then performs the operation if it
satisfies. If the account balance is below the minimum, the supplier sends to the vehi-
cle to top-up its account. In case of stolen car, the user sends its consent to the judge,
which is an independent trusted party, to trace the transactions and reach to the thief.
The used cryptographic scheme is based on bilinear pairing and decisional Diffi-Hellman
assumption to provide public-private keys pairs to different parties. Also, partially blind
signature scheme and zero-proof knowledge are utilized to keep the user privacy during
the connection.
In summary, V2G connection security concerns are confined to vehicle’s owner information
and location privacy, and information integrity and authenticity. Many research works address
these problems and recommend different solutions, such as mutual authentication, pseudo-
identities and anonymity, and physical layer protection methods. Nevertheless, these provided
techniques suffer from certain back-draws, such as high communication and computation bur-
den, and usage of special hardware devices.
3.3 Power Control System and State Estimation Secu-
rity Problems and Related Works
FDI attacks are based on inserting fabricated measurements in the observed measurements
vector to deceive CCs and consequently make wrong decisions. The main target of these
attacks is to cause huge damage to power system, such as large blackout, which has negative
economic and financial impacts. Moreover, FDI attack can assist attackers to steal power by
illegal electricity price manipulation. As a consequence, many researchers attempt to solve the
problem and resist these attacks. The related research works can be divided into five categories:
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First one utilizes powerful alternative state estimation tests; while second category distributes
state estimators all over the grid. according to third category, it approximates the problem
to an optimization problem that attempts to place measurement units and PMUs in optimal
locations in the grid. Fourth category exploits cryptographic schemes to detect any change in
the transmitted measurements. Finally, several research studies addresses load-redistribution
(LR) attacks.
• Alternative Estimation Tests: The traditional MMSE estimator compares the 2-Norm of
measurements residual ‖ z−Hxˆ ‖2 by a specifc threshold; this estimator can successfully
detect any noise or errors that normally distributed with zero mean, but it will not
be able to detect the maliciously inserted bad data with non-zero mean. As a result,
many researchers study other alternatives that can overcome the limitation of traditional
estimators and detect the stealthy FDI attacks, such as generalized likelihood ratio test
(GLRT), Rao test, Kalman filter, CUSUM, and others.
Several studies utilize GLRT-based estimators as an efficient alternative for traditional
estimators [32, 87, 88, 89, 90]. GLRT [91, 92] is a general procedure for composite
testing problems. It is based on comparing the best model in class H1 to the best in
H0 where Hi : X ∼ pi(x‖θi), θi ∈ Θi, i = 0, 1, and an observation x of X equals λˆ(x) =
maxθ1∈Θ1 p1(x‖θ1)
maxθ0∈Θ0p0(x‖θ0)
; then GLRT test is log λˆ(x) ≷H1H0 γ. GLRT is asymptotically optimal,
because it offers the fastest decay rate of miss detection probability in case of multiple
measurements under the same attack vector a. If the detector has many data samples,
the detection performance of GLRT is close to optimal [87]. GLRT detector does not
compute explicitly the residue error, but if there is at most one attacked meter, then
GLRT-based estimator is using the residue error from MMSE estimator [88]. However,
GLRT test is too computationally expensive to implement in practice for fast detection
[90].
Other research works use Rao test [93], because it is a statistical test with a simple
null hypothesis to check if the parameter of interest is equal to some value; it does not
require an estimate of information under alternative hypothesis. [90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95,
96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108] present defense mechanism for
FDI attacks based on Rao test, which is more efficient than GLRT test, as it does not
involve complex computations.
Kalman filter [94] is an algorithm that uses a series of inaccurate noisy measurements
observed over time to produce estimates for unknown variables that tend to be more
precise than those based on a single measurement. It operates recursively on streams of
noisy data to produce a statistically optimal estimate of the underlying system state. The
algorithm estimates the current state variables with their uncertainties, and the outcome
is updated using a weighted average so that more weight is given to the estimates with
higher certainty. Because of these features, Kalman filter estimator is utilized in many
works, such as [95, 96, 97].
CUSUM test (cumulative sum control chart) [98] is a sequential analysis technique
used for change detection. CUSUM determines changes on a parameter of the probability
distribution, e.g., the mean, and according to the results, it decides when to take a
corrective action. [32] introduces a defense strategy to detect any adversary at CC as
quickly as possible utilizing the quickest detection technique, which determines the change
based on real-time observations utilizing CUSUM test that detects a change of unknown
distribution to known/unknown distributions. The strategy also applies Rao test, because
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it is a simple test and does not need to store the observation and re-calculate the unknown
parameter every time interval as GLRT test does.
• Distributed Estimation: Traditionally, the state estimation process is running in the main
CC of SCADA system; the measurement units send their readings to SCADA, which has
the central state estimator. However, a penalty of research studies suggests performing
distributed estimation [99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107]; the main objectives of
distributed estimators are to increase the state estimation process accuracy and reduce
the CC’s computation burden. For instance, [104] divides the power system into several
small systems and apply the state estimation on each subsystem using lower thresholds;
this method improves the accuracy of bad data detection scheme.
• Optimization Techniques: Many research works utilize various optimization techniques to
detect FDI attacks and perform tasks, such as studying the optimal placement for PMUs
and other secured sensors in the grid, or calculating the optimal cost for different protec-
tion schemes [27, 33, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122].
For instance, [27] proposes an algorithm to find the least cost for launching FDI attacks
and proposes three greedy algorithms to obtain perfect and partial protection against
these attacks given limited protection budget. While [33] discusses the optimal num-
ber of protected measurements to prevent FDI attacks. According to [122], it discusses
the bad data attacks that exploit the change in the electricity price to gain financial
benefits; it also introduces a method to protect the real-time electricity pricing based
on game theory; the method treats the attacker and the defender as players and each
one of them chooses a specific strategy; if the two strategies are identical, the defender
can resist the attack. If they share in some parts and differ in other parts, means the
defender can protect some measurements, but the attacker can successfully compromise
other measurements. When the two strategies are different, the defender cannot resist
the attack.
• Cryptographic-based Techniques: Certain studies adopt security solutions to detect FDI
attacks, such as cryptographic techniques or perturbation approach [123, 124, 125, 126,
127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134]. For instance, [123] assumes that the attacker
only possesses a perturbed model for power grid; such model may correspond to a partial
model of the true system, or an outdated model. Also, the authors synthesize stealthy
deceptions attacks in case of linear and nonlinear estimators and utilize the weighted
least square estimator as a bad data detector. [124] introduces an obfuscation method to
save the privacy of electricity users during the state estimation operation by adding noise
to each observed value so that nobody can discover the estimated value. Every billing
cycle, the estimator selects a meter to be the leader; this meter chooses some obfuscation
values for each meter and sends each value to the corresponding meter, which in turn adds
its obfuscation value to its observed measurement before forwarding it to the estimator.
The estimator then computes the total obfuscated observed value and extracts the real
estimated value from it. [125] launches unobservable attack against the AC power flow
equations using only local information, also proposes a probing defense strategy to detect
these attacks by enacting sequences of probes and keeping track of the observed quantities.
The defense approach relies on perturbing power system by leveraging distributed flexible
AC transmission system devices to change the impedance on the chosen lines to create
observable changes in the system that the adversary cannot anticipate. [126] secures
the power grid estimation process by exploiting the oﬄine information about the grid’s
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topology to create all possible attacks scenarios in attack graph template; this graph is
converted to a hidden Markov model that uses the previous knowledge about the system
to detect the possible future attacks. A novel watermarking technique is introduced in
[127] to resist FDI attacks in smart grid. A secret watermark is added to real-time meter
readings and the watermarked data is transmitted through the unsecured network. At
the utility side, the watermarked data can be correlated with original watermark to detect
the presence of injected false data. [131] proposes a filtering scheme for the injected false
data in wireless sensor networks using batch verification of several reports. While [132]
proposes an efficient and secure data aggregation scheme to address impersonation and
FDI attacks in the range of NAN; the scheme uses the hop-by-hop security approach that
allows source and data integrity using pairwise key and message authentication code. [133]
also presents a data aggregation scheme that protects the wireless sensor networks from
FDI attacks. Load altering attacks through Internet by distributed software-intruding
agents are studied in [134]. These attacks compromise direct load control command,
demand side management price, or cloud computation load distribution algorithms to
affect the load at the most crucial locations in the grid to cause circuit overflow or other
malfunctions and damage in the power system equipment.
• Other Techniques and Solutions: Certain studies address other power system cases, such
as using the AC power system model without linearizing it to DC model; [135] introduces
the implications of hidden FDI attack at the RTU level on AC state estimation. The non-
linearity of the power flow equations provides advantages to system operator; attacking
the AC system is more difficult than the DC model, because the attacker needs to know
more parameters than DC model to launch a successful attack. [136] shows that if the
attacker uses the nonlinear FDI version to attack a linear or nonlinear state estimation
system, the attack success and can not be detected. While if the linear FDI attacks
target a nonlinear state estimation system, the residual state estimator can easily detect
it. According to [137], it implements a more practical FDI attack when the attacker has
incomplete information about the power system model.
Furthermore, certain research works study special sort of FDI attack, which is based on
re-distributing the power load to gain financial profits. The electricity market utilizes two
pricing techniques; look-ahead forward market and real-time spot market. Look-ahead
forward market estimates the power price, i.e., locational marginal price (LMP), for the
following day using the price information of the present day; while in the real-time spot
market, the market operations will re-calculate the ex-post LMP utilizing the current state
estimation values. [138] addresses this pricing technique and studies how the attacker can
exploit the virtual bidding and ex-post LMP to gain financial profit. Likewise, [139]
studies the load redistribution (LR) Attack through a max-min attacker-defender model.
The adversary may have one of two goals; immediate or delayed goal. Immediate LR
attacks aim to maximize the operation cost immediately; while, delayed LR attacks aim
to maximize the total operation cost after the outage of overloaded lines. Two conditions
must be satisfied to establish an LR attack: the magnitude of re-distributed load should
be large enough, and the false estimated power flow value should exceed its corresponding
transmission capacity limit. [139] also proposes a protection strategy based on securing
some measurements to detect any attack. Moreover, [141] studies the damaging effect of
LR attacks on power system operation and control, when only load bus power injection
and line power flow measurements are attackable. [140] shows how FDI attacks can exploit
the information from economic dispatch and real-time state estimation in virtual bidding
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operation to gain financial profit during the electricity trading. The attacker can buy the
electricity from low price location and sell it in high price location. To achieve that, the
adversary compromises some units on transmission lines and then indicates some lines
to be congested or non-congested so that prices are changed accordingly; in other words,
adversary manipulates the prices to gain the highest profit. [142] presents undetectable
ramp-induced data attack and addresses its impacts on state estimation and look-ahead
dispatch. This attack manipulates the ramp constraint limits of generators within the
generation capacity without being detected, subsequently makes a profit in the real-time
power market. While, [143] proposes a distributed control mechanism to protect the
power system from anomalous actions that use load-shedding techniques.
In summary, most of the proposed works focus on detecting FDI attacks; they analyze
different attack models and propose several protection models and control mechanisms, which
are mainly based on optimization techniques. Only few works exploit cryptographic schemes
to resist these attacks; the reasons could be the limited computation capabilities field devices,
which mainly work as measurement tools and hard to preform complex cryptographic opera-
tions. Another reason could be the measurement units’ locations; they are located in sparse
places and hostile environment that eases the attacker’s function to compromise the devices
while complicates the defender’s task to protect them.
In this chapter, we have presented the related proposed works to security and privacy de-
mands for different communication architectures in smart grid. First, the research studies that
are proposed to deal with security concerns in customer-side networks are utilizing hardware
devices, distorting the message’s contents, or using cryptographic schemes to conceal the con-
fidential data and preserving the messages’ integrity. Second, we have explained the proposed
techniques to secure the vehicles’ owner privacy and data integrity during (dis)charging op-
erations in V2G networks, such as authentication mechanisms, anonymization techniques, or
physical layer security methods. Lastly, the FDI attacks detection schemes, such as exploit-
ing alternative estimation tests, distributing the estimators to local areas, utilizing various
optimization techniques, using cryptographic schemes, are described.
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Chapter 4
Lightweight Security and Privacy
Preserving Scheme for Smart Grid
Customer-side Networks
Information security and customers’ privacy in smart grid are significant concerns. Existing
security and privacy preserving schemes consider that the consumption reports for electricity
consumption aggregation and billing purposes are sent periodically. These periodic messages
increase the computation and communication burden on restricted-capabilities smart meters.
In this chapter, we propose a lightweight security and privacy preserving scheme that is based
on forecasting the electricity demand for a cluster of houses in the same residential area; it limits
the cluster’s connection with electricity utility only when the cluster needs to adjust its total
demand. The scheme efficiently satisfies the security and privacy requirements in customer-
side networks, i.e., communication between customers and power utility. At the same time,
it significantly reduce the communication and computation overhead. Moreover, the proposed
scheme utilizes NTRU crypto-system to further reduce the computation complexity [144, 145].
The remaining of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.1 introduces our system model,
security parameters, and design goals. Section 4.2 reviews lattice-based NTRU scheme and
its signing NSS scheme. In Section 4.3, we present our proposed scheme. Section 4.4 gives
security analysis, while Section 4.5 evaluates the performance of our scheme. Finally, Section
4.6 summarize the work.
4.1 System Model
4.1.1 Network Model
Our system model is shown in Figure 4.1. Specifically, we consider a residential area that
consists of a number of BANs ={BAN1, BAN2, . . . , BANm} connected with the main CC via
NAN network, which only forwards the messages between BANs in the region and CC without
performing any operations. CC is located in the main center for the utility company, and the
communication between CC and NAN is through a secured wired connection.
Each BAN has a server with reasonable memory and processing unit, also it has a gateway
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Figure 4.1: System model.
the batteries of EVs owned by some of householders in the area. BAN consists of a cluster
of HANs ={HAN1, HAN2, . . . , HANn}; we assume that each BAN has up to 100 HANs to
further reduce the overhead on BAN’s server. HAN could be a house or a unit in a building;
each HAN has a smart meter to estimate its electricity consumption. The communication
between BAN gateways and their HANs is through the inexpensive WiFi technology. Both CC
and BAN gateways have public keys provided by a trusted authority (TA). Each smart meter
has a unique ID issued by TA and stored in a secured place in its memory. CC considers each
BAN as one unit and does not know details about the involved HANs in each BAN.
4.1.2 Adversary Model and Security Requirements
We consider that both CC and BANs are honest but curious, i.e., they will not attempt to tam-
per HANs’ data, but they are curious to know the detailed consumption pattern for each user.
However, an adversary A in the region may try to eavesdrop the exchanged messages between
different parties or launch some active attacks, such as falsifying the intercepted messages, or
36
4.2. Preliminaries
beginning a replay attack. Moreover, A can launch a DoS attack to make the server unavail-
able to authorized users. To prevent A ’s malicious actions, the following security requirements
should be satisfied:
- Customers Privacy: Users’ private information are not revealed to outsiders; A cannot
gain any knowledge about individual consumers in the cluster. Also, CC does not need to know
the details of individual user’s consumption; it considers only total consumption and total bill
for each BAN, as it deals with each cluster as a one unit.
- Confidentiality and Messages Integrity: Users’ electricity consumption and billing amounts
are protected from any adversary. Even if A eavesdrops any message, he/she cannot extract
any information from it. Additionally, integrity should be guaranteed. If A attempts to
resend/modify a message, this malicious action should be detected. In addition, the BAN’s
database should be secured against any unauthorized access or modification so that any A
cannot intrude or falsify its records.
- Availability: BAN’s server should be available to authorized parties all the time, i.e., DoS
attacks are prevented.
4.1.3 Design Goals
The objective of the proposed scheme is to preserve the consumers’ privacy and information
confidentiality in addition to alleviate computation and communication overhead on limited-
capabilities smart meters. These objectives can be divided into two folds:
- The proposed scheme should guarantee security requirements for different parties in the
network. Customers’ privacy should be secured in addition to assure information integrity and
confidentiality. Furthermore, the availability of network’s resources should be preserved.
- It also should be efficient and lightweight communication and computation overhead so
that it is applicable for restricted-capabilities smart meters.
4.2 Preliminaries
Our proposed scheme exploits NTRU crypto-system [146, 147], which is a lattice-based alter-
native for RSA and ECC public key schemes. In NTRU scheme, encryption and decryption
processes are simple polynomial multiplication operations so that NTRU is simple for imple-
mentation and very fast compared to other asymmetric schemes. In addition, NTRU scheme is
efficiently secured against powerful attacks, such as lattice-basis reduction attacks and attacks
through quantum computers.
4.2.1 NTRU Cryptographic Scheme
NTRU utilizes the hardness of shortest vector problem (SVP) [151] and learning with error
(LWE) [152] problem. We utilize the revised version of NTRU [148] that exploits the worst-





Let n be a power of 2, Φ = xn + 1, R = Z[x]/Φ, q is a prime number that Φ has n linear




i≤n(x − Φi)mod q,Rq = R/qR = Z[x]q/Φ,
and R×q is the set of invertible elements of Rq.
• Key Generation
Let n, q ∈ Z, p ∈ R×q , and σ ∈ R. The pair (sk, pk) ∈ R×R×q is generated by sampling value
f´ from the discrete Gaussian distribution DZn,σ, where σ > Poly(n) · q1/2+ for an arbitrary
 > 0, compute the secret key f by:
f = p · f´ + 1, (4.1)
where (f mod q) ∈ R×q , and f = 1 mod p, and sample secret value g from DZn,σ where
(g mod q) ∈ R×q . Finally, return secret key sk = f and public key pk = h, where:
h = pg/f ∈ R×q (4.2)
• Encryption
To encrypt a message M , sender S generates two random values s, e ← Υα and computes
ciphertext as:
C = hs+ pe+M ∈ Rq (4.3)
• Decryption
Receiver R decrypts C by secret key f as:
C´ = f · C ∈ Rq (4.4)
M = C´ mod p (4.5)
4.2.1.2 NTRU Signature Scheme (NSS)





Given a prime dimension N , a modulus q, a key size d, and a verification bound parameter
NB, there are two polynomials f and g that are invertible modulo q and satisfy that d + 1 of
their coefficients equal 1, d coefficients equal −1, and the remaining equal 0. These parameters
are used to compute public key for all users:
h = f−1 ∗ g(mod q). (4.6)
Then compute the small polynomials (F,G) satisfying:
f ∗G− g ∗ F = q (4.7)
• Key Generation
For user i, a random polynomial ri ∈ Rq is selected to set:
fi = f ∗ ri, gi = g ∗ ri (4.8)
Fi = F ∗ r−1i (4.9)
Gi = G ∗ r−1i (4.10)
Then the output Ski = (fi, gi, Fi, Gi)
• Signing Process
Signer S hashes the message M to create a random vector (m1,m2)(mod q) and writes
m1,m2 in:
Gi ∗m1 − Fi ∗m2 = Ai + q ∗Bi (4.11)
− gi ∗m1 + fi ∗m2 = ai + q ∗ bi (4.12)
Then, the signature on M is the polynomial si given by
si = fi ∗Bi + Fi ∗ bi(mod q) (4.13)
• Verification
The verifier V hashes the message M to create the random vector (m1,m2), and then
computes the value:
ti = si ∗ h(mod q) (4.14)
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Afterward, V verifies that if the following condition holds:
‖ si −m1 ‖2 + ‖ ti −m2 ‖2≤ NB (4.15)
Then, the signature is valid. Two pairs of keys are used in our proposed scheme to provide
higher security level; the first pair is used for encryption while the other one is utilized in singing
process.
4.3 The Proposed Scheme
Our proposed scheme is divided into two phases. The first phase is initialization phase, which is
responsible for establishing the connection among different parties and initializing the electricity
supply agreement. The second phase is message exchange phase, which organizes the electricity
consumption operation in BAN’s region.
4.3.1 Phase 1. Initialization
1) Key generation
TA generates two pairs of keys for CC and BAN gateway as follows.
- Encryption keys
TA computes CC’s secret key fcc as:
fcc = p · f´cc + 1
, where (fcc mod q) ∈ R×q and
fcc = 1mod p
and samples gcc from DZn,σ so that gcc mod q ∈ R×q .
Then, TA computes
hcc = pgcc/fcc ∈ R×q .
So, the pair (hcc, fcc) is CC’s encryption public and private keys respectively.
For BAN gateway, TA computes its secret key fban as:
fban = p · f´ban + 1
, where (fban mod q) ∈ R×q and
fban = 1mod p
. Then, samples gban from DZn,σ so that gban mod q ∈ R×q .
Next, TA computes
hban = p gban/fban ∈ R×q .
Then, the pair (hban, fban) is BAN’s public and private keys.
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- Signing keys
TA chooses polynomials f and g that are invertible modulo q. f and g satisfy that d+ 1 of
their coefficients equal 1, d coefficients equal −1, and the remaining equal 0. TA then computes
public key for all users:
h = f−1 ∗ g (mod q).
TA computes small polynomials (F,G), where f ∗G− g ∗ F = q.
To generate signing key for CC, TA selects a random polynomial rcc ∈ Rq and sets
fccs = f ∗ rcc, gccs = g ∗ rcc.
Then, TA computes
Fcc = F ∗ r−1cc , Gcc = G ∗ r−1cc .
Therefore, CC’s signing key is Skcc = (fccs, gccs, Fcc, Gcc).
To generate signing key for BAN gateway, TA selects a random polynomial rban ∈ Rq and
sets
fbans = f ∗ rban, gbans = g ∗ rban.
Then, TA computes
Fban = F ∗ r−1ban, Gban = G ∗ r−1ban.
Therefore, BAN’s signing key is Skban = (fbans, gbans, Fban, Gban).
- IDs generation
TA assigns a unique secret ID for each smart meter in the BAN’s range ID1, ID2, . . . , IDn,
where n is the number of HANs within the cluster. TA then sends each ID to the corresponding
smart meter. It also forwards all IDs to the BAN gateway, which stores them in the protected
BAN’s database. Every fixed time period, both BAN gateway and each smart meter apply a
specific hash function on the meter’s ID to obtain new ID for it. IDnew = h(IDold)
2) Demand forecast
The approximate requirement of electricity for each HAN in the range is computed by a
forecasting function, g(), from the historical consumption levels of the HAN during a specific
time period. For example, g() could be the average electricity consumption every month for the
HAN in last 5 years. Applying g(), the average electricity consumption value is calculated for
all HANs in BAN’s cluster so that HAN1, HAN2, . . . , HANn have the amounts x1, x2, . . . , xn
respectively, where xi = g(HANi) and n is the number of HANs in BAN region. BAN is
responsible for applying g() to obtain the expected electricity share for each HAN. BAN stores
the ID for each HAN and the corresponding pair of electricity demand and current price in its
database, IDi, xi, pc. BAN then aggregates the total demand for all smart meters in the cluster
and computes the total required energy amount for BAN for the whole billing period:
x =
∑
(x1, x2, . . . , xn) + , (4.16)
where  is an extra amount of electricity used as backup.
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- Backup Value Calculation
After applying g(), BAN needs to set a value for  as:
Each BAN gateway connects to a fixed number of HANs m, which runs from 1 to 100 HANs.
Also, BAN can predict the expected number of EVs in the area NEV−expected. Assume that the
available capacity for EVi to store electricity is Ci, which is known for each EV. So, BAN can





where i run from 1 to NEV−expected. Then,  is calculated as a ratio of CEV :
 = r ∗ CEV ,
where 0 < r ≤ 1 is a scaling factor. The value of r increases when the number of involved HANs
m increases, because more HANs in the cluster requires more backup value for emergency cases.
So, as the number of HANs increases,  increases.
During initialization phase, BAN needs to select the optimal number of EVs to work as a






Ci(m), i ∈ {1, . . . , Ncurrent(m)}
NEV (m) ≤ Ncurrent(m), Ncurrent(m) ∈ {1, . . . , NMax(m)},
and m ∈ {1, . . . , 100} (4.17)
NEV is the optimal number of EVs to store ; (m) is the total required electricity backup
value for the cluster when the number of HANs equals m, where m can run from 1 to 100
HANs within the same cluster; Ci(m) is the available capacity storage for electricity in EVi;
i = 1, . . . , Ncurrent, where Ncurrent is the number of EVs that are currently available in the
cluster’s region from the total number of EVs in the cluster NMax. This optimization model
computes the optimal (minimum) number of EVs to store  for BAN’s cluster in the case of
different number of HANs.  is stored in BAN’s storage unit, i.e., number of EVs owned by
householders, for emergency. If HANs require more electricity than the assigned share and
BAN gateway cannot satisfy the extra share, it supplies the extra electricity from . However,
these cases rarely happen, because the electricity share for each HAN is predefined via accurate
forecasting function, and any increase/decrease in the demand is expected to be within a limited
range. In certain situations, when one HAN asks for increasing its share, another one may want
to decrease the share; so, BAN transfers electricity between them without using . Generally,
if all HANs want to increase their shares, the increase is expected to be within . But, if the
total share’s increase is beyond , a specific procedure is activated to satisfy it.
4) Electricity agreement
BAN considers x as its fixed demand per month. BAN gateway is responsible now for
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accomplishing an agreement with CC to supply the connected HANs with their electrical needs
per month. CC deals with BAN as a one unit; it has no information about individual HANs
in BAN’s range.
- The Agreement Request Message
- At BAN gateway
BAN gateway establishes the connection by sending an agreement request message ma to
CC; BAN signs the electricity amount x, and encrypts it by CC’s public key to provide ma.
First, BAN hashes x to create (x1, x2)(mod q) and writes:
Gban ∗ x1 − Fban ∗ x2 = Aban1 + q ∗Bban1
−gbans ∗ x1 + fbans ∗ x2 = aban1 + q ∗ bban1
The signature on x is the polynomial sban1 given by:
sban1 = fbans ∗Bban1 + Fban ∗ bban1(mod q).
The result is (x, sban1). Then, BAN computes m1 = x‖sban1‖Ts1‖k1, where Ts1 is time stamp
and k1 is a random nonce; they are used to prevent replay attacks. Next, BAN encrypts the
message m1 by CC’s public key. BAN sets two random values s1, e1 ← Υα, and uses hcc to
obtain the cipher text, ma = hccs1 + pe1 + m1 ∈ Rq. Subsequently, BAN gateway sends the
agreement request message ma to CC.
- At CC
CC decrypts the received message by its private key. First, CC calculates m´1 = fcc ma ∈
Rq, then m1 = m´1 mod p. Second, CC verifies BAN’s signature sban1 on the message m1 =
x‖sban1‖Ts1||k1; CC hashes the message x to create a random vector (x1, x2)(mod q), computes
tban1 = sban1 ∗ h(mod q), and verifies that ‖ sban1 − x1 ‖2 + ‖ tban1 − x2 ‖2≤ NB. If this
condition holds, then the signature is valid. Subsequently, CC checks the validity of timestamp
Ts1 and nonce k1, and accepts the message if they are acceptable. CC receives many agreement
requests from different BANs; it compares the expected total electricity demand for the area
with the expected electricity supply and attempts to balance between them. CC should have
enough power generation resources to satisfy the electricity requirement for all BANs in the
region during the billing period, i.e., one month.
- The Agreement Response Message
- At CC
If CC accepts the BAN’s request, it encrypts the value y, y = (x, pe), which contains the
assigned electricity amount x and the expected price pe, to obtain the agreement response
message mr. Then, it sends mr to BAN.
- At BAN
BAN receives mr and decrypts it using its private key and verifies CC’s signature. Then,
BAN checks the timestamp and nonce validity. Now, BAN guarantees the electricity share x
from CC during the whole billing period and knows approximately the expected bill. Figure
4.2 shows the initialization phase.
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Fig. .3.  Initialization phase. 
Figure 4.2: Initialization phase.
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4.3.2 Phase 2: Exchange Message
At the beginning, BAN gateway supplies each HAN by its electricity share based on the
previously calculated amount. BAN computes the current payment bi for each HANi by:
bi = xi ∗ p ∗ Tj, where xi is the electricity share for HANi, p is the current electricity price,
and Tj is the time period that the HANi consumes its share xi by the price p. BAN gateway




If HAN wants to change (increase/decrease) the current share to a new share xi−new, it sends
a demand message md to BAN gateway. First, a timestamp Ts3 and nonce k3 are attached to md
to prevent replay attacks; m3 = xi−new‖Idi‖Ts3‖k3, where Idi is the ID for HANi. Next, HANi
encrypts the message m3 by BAN’s public key. HANi sets two random values s3, e3 ← Υα;
using hban, it obtains: md = hbans3 + pe3 + m3 ∈ Rq. Subsequently, HANi sends demand
message md to BAN.
- At BAN
BAN gateway decrypts the message md. First, BAN calculates: m´3 = fban ·md ∈ Rq, and
then computes m3 = m´3 mod p. Note that the demand message sends only when the power
demand for HAN is altered. Thus, the communication overhead is light. BAN supplies HAN
with the new share and computes the corresponding new payment for it: bi−new = xi−new∗p∗Tj.
BAN encrypts bi−new, and then stores it with pervious payment values in the HAN’s record in
BAN’s database.
2) Price change
When the electricity price changes, BAN receives a price message from CC with the new
price pnew; this message is broadcasted to all connected BANs. pnew = pn‖Ts3‖k3, where pn
is the new price, Ts3 is a timestamp and k3 is a random nonce. The price message is sent in
plaintext because it is not confidential information; it is only signed by CC’s public key. CC
hash pnew to create (pnew1, pnew2)(mod q), and write:
Gcc ∗ pnew1 − Fcc ∗ pnew2 = Acc2 + q ∗Bcc2
−gccs ∗ pnew1 + fccs ∗ pnew2 = acc2 + q ∗ bcc2
The signature on pnew is the polynomial scc2 = fccs ∗Bcc2 + Fcc ∗ bcc2(mod q). The result is the
pair (pnew, scc2).
- At BAN
When BAN receives (pnew, scc2), it checks the validity of CC’s signature scc2 on pnew =
pn‖Ts3‖k3: BAN hashes the message pnew to create a random vector (pnew1, pnew2)(modq), then
computes tcc2 = scc2 ∗ h(mod q), and verify that ‖ scc2 − pnew1 ‖2 + ‖ tcc2 − pnew2 ‖2≤ NB. If
this condition holds, then the signature is valid. Next, BAN checks the validity of Ts3 and k3;
if they are valid, BAN gateway ensures that the message is legitimate. But, HANs in BAN’s
range has no connection with CC; they only trust the BAN gateway. So, BAN signs pnew by
its signing key and then forwards the pair (pnew, sban2) to the connected HANs.
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- At HAN
When HAN receives (pnew, sban2), it checks BAN’s signature sban2 validity: HAN hashes
message pnew to create a random vector (pnew1, pnew2)(mod q), and compute the value tban2 =
sban2 ∗ h(mod q). Verify that ‖ sban2 − pnew1 ‖2 + ‖ tban2 − pnew2 ‖2≤ NB. If this condition
holds, then the signature is valid. Next step, HAN checks the validity of Ts4 and k4; if they are
valid, HAN gateway ensures that the message is legitimate. Notice that the message is sent
only when the electricity price changes. If any HAN needs to alter its electricity consumption
considering the new price, then it sends a demand message md to BAN gateway asking for a
new electricity share xi−new. The demand message is sent only when HAN wants to update its
electricity share, i.e., the consumed electricity in HAN is increased/decreased. BAN gateway
still supplies HAN by the last requested amount of electricity until HAN sends new md. Figure
4.3 shows the details of the exchange messages phase.
3) Billing Process
BAN gateway computes the payment values for each HAN by multiplying consumed amount
by current electricity price and accumulates it with previous values, and saves the result in
HAN’s record in the database. These records help in tracking the payment amounts for HANs
during the billing period to assure accountability. At the end of billing period, BAN computes
the total bill for each HAN Bi(Bi =
∑
l bl), and aggregates the region’s total bill S(S =
∑
iBi).
The billing message S is signed by BAN’s private key and encrypted using CC’s public key:
BAN hashes S to create (S1, S2)(mod q) and writes:
Gban ∗ S1 − Fban ∗ S2 = Aban3 + q ∗Bban3
−gbans ∗ S1 + fbans ∗ S2 = aban3 + q ∗ bban3
The signature on S is sban3 = fbans ∗ Bban3 + Fban ∗ bban3(mod q). The result is (S, sban3).
Then, BAN computes m5 = S‖sban3‖Ts5‖k5. Next, BAN encrypts m5. BAN sets two random
values s5, e5 ← Υα, and uses hcc to obtain: mb = hccs5 + pe5 + m5 ∈ Rq. Subsequently, BAN
gateway sends the billing message mb to CC.
- At CC
CC uses fcc to decrypt mb. CC then verifies BAN’s signature sban3 , and checks the validity
of timestamp and nonce, and accepts the message if they are acceptable. Figure 4.4 shows the
billing process.
C) Electricity Share Adjustment Procedure
Electricity share adjustment procedure is a procedure to handle the case when the fixed
assigned share for BAN (x) does not fit the current electricity requirements (y). As in algorithm
1, there are four different cases:
• Case 1: If x is slightly larger than y, then the extra electricity is stored in EVs’ batteries.
• Case 2: If x is slightly smaller than y, then remaining demand of electricity is consumed
from stored power in EVs.
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Figure 4.3: Exchange messages phase.
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Figure 4.4: Billing phase.
• Case 3: If x is much smaller than y and EVs’ batteries cannot cover the remaining
demand, BAN gateway asks for more electricity from CC.
• Case 4: If x is much larger than y and EVs’ batteries doesn’t have a room for the
remaining demand of electricity, BAN gateway sells the extra power to CC.
As the accuracy of employed forecasting function increases, the probability for cases 3 and
4 to occur decreases. However, if case 3 or 4 is repeated, BAN will ask CC to change its fixed
value x in the agreement to y.
For further illustration, suppose a network as in Figure 4.5. CC is connected to an BAN via
the local NAN, and the BAN includes three HANs. During the initialization phase, the BAN
gateway computes the HANs electricity demand from the historical consumed electricity for
each HAN. For instance, HAN1, HAN2, and HAN3 consume 100, 200, 300KWH respectively.
Mainly, the demand for each of HANs is expected to remain within these levels most of time.
The gateway computes the total demand for the month = [100 + 200 + 300] ∗ 24 ∗ 30 =
432000KWH. Accordingly, the BAN gateway asks CC for 435000KHW ; the remaining amount
 = 3000KWH will be stored in the EV battery if the BAN urgently needs extra electricity
and cannot wait until the CC sends more electricity. If the HANs’ demands change, they can
exchange the electricity within each other; the HAN with low needs, which has extra power,
sends power to the one with large needs. If the exchanged power does not satisfy its need, it
consumes the remaining power from the storage units, ie., EVs. So, the BAN cluster rarely
needs to ask for more electricity from CC.
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Algorithm 1 BAN Electricity Share Adjustment Procedure
1: BAN Electricity Share Adjustment Procedure
2: x: The fixed demand for BAN
y: The current actual demand for BAN
z: The EV remaining capacity
β : β = ‖x− y‖ The difference between x and y
3: if
(
x > y & β < z
)
then
4: β → EVbattery
5: else if
(
x < y & β < z
)
then
6: β ← EVbattery
7: else if
(
x < y & β > z
)
then
8: β − z ← CC
9: else if
(
x < y & β > z
)
then
10: β − z → CC
11: end if




The proposed scheme is expected to preserve customers’ privacy in the cluster. In addition,
it guarantees the security requirements: confidentiality, integrity, availability, authenticity, and
accountability. This section analyzes the security characteristics of our proposed scheme.
Customers privacy is preserved. Private information that clearly identifies the customers’
habits or life style is preserved in the proposed scheme. CC does not know the electricity
consumption for each customer in BAN; instead, it receives the bill for the whole BAN S as a
one unit. In other words, the individual bills bis are not exposed to any party outside BAN even
the utility. Consequently, any outsider cannot obtain any information about each customer’s
bill. Moreover, the outsider adversaries cannot know the total bill S, because the billing
message is encrypted by CC’s public key and CC only can decrypt it. For the adversaries who
attempt to compromise the exchanged messages between BAN gateway and different parties,
they cannot reveal any information since the exchanged messages between BAN and CC are
encrypted using BAN and CC’s public keys. Similarly, the messages from HANs to BAN are
encrypted by BAN’s public key. As a result, no unauthorized party can decrypt these messages
For instance, an adversary A intercepts the demand request sent from HANi to BAN, and
tries to detect its share xi, A cannot acquire any knowledge about xi, because the demand
message is encrypted by hban, and only BAN gateway has the decryption key fban. It is an NP-
hard problem to extract fban from hban. Even if A has unlimited computation resources, more
powerful than quantum computers, and could compromise fban, and detect xi, then he/she also
cannot extract any private information about HANi, because xi is HANi’s share in a relatively
large time period and does not reveal the detailed user’s consumption pattern. According to
BAN’s database, it is located in a secured place; no attacker can reach to it. However, if an
attacker attempts to compromise the database, he/she needs to discover the applied encryption
key to decrypt its contents. Suppose A succeed to obtain the record for a specific customer
from the database, A knows only the electricity needs for this customer for a long period
of time (from one month to 6 hours) and cannot acquire any detailed information about the
real-time electricity consumption pattern for that consumer.
Messages’ confidentiality is guaranteed. The confidentiality of exchanged messages is guar-
anteed in the proposed scheme; the agreement messages between CC and BAN are confidential
because of using public keys for CC and BANs. Also, the messages from HANs to BAN are
encrypted using BAN’s public key. If A tries to impersonate a smart meter to compromise its
messages, he/she fails because the smart meter’s ID is secured, and A cannot obtain it. As a
result, no impersonation attacks succeed. According to price message, if A intercepts it, it is
not a concern, because he/she can only know the current price of electricity, which is not secret,
but cannot modify the message, as it is signed by CC and then BAN’s signing keys. Moreover,
the message cannot be resend again by A because of the involved timestamp and nonce val-
ues. No man in the middle (MITM) attacks success. If A only eavesdrops the messages as in
passive MITM attack, he/she cannot decrypt the messages. While in active MITM attack, if
A attempts to modify/falsify the message, the attack is detected; as A cannot mimic BAN’s
signature or discover the secret IDs for smart meters.
Messages’ integrity is assured. The messages from CC/BAN are hashed and signed using its
signing key. While the messages from smart meters contain the hashed value of their secret IDs;
only BAN can check the validity of smart meter’s ID by comparing it with the corresponding
ID stored in its database. The integrity of the stored data in the database is assured too; if
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any attacker attempts to modify the stored data, BAN’s operator detects the attack, because
the stored data are encrypted by a secret key known only to the operator.
Authenticity for different parties is guaranteed. Both CC and BAN are authenticated by
their public keys. Therefore, the messages encrypted/signed by them are authenticated. As
well, the attached unique IDs authenticate smart meters’ demand messages.
Availability of resources is confirmed. BAN gateway is always available and no DoS attacks
succeed. DoS attack may be launched by a malicious node that sends a huge number of
messages to the server until it goes down. In each BAN, there is a specific number of HANs
that provides a limited number of messages, and BAN’s server capabilities are prepared to
deal with that number; this expected number of received messages cannot cause overflow or
congestion. Consequently, if BAN notes that the number of messages is larger than expected or
an individual HAN sends a huge number of messages, BAN does not response to these requests
and isolates the malicious HAN. For instance, consider a BAN’s cluster with 80 HANs and the
price is expected to change three times a day. Then, BAN gateway assumes that all HANs
will send a demand change message for every price change (e.g., three demand messages per
HAN per day). Therefore, the maximum number of demand messages that BAN gateway can
receive when the price changes is 80, and the total number of demand messages during the
day is around 240. Accordingly, if BAN gateway receives larger number of messages in a short
period of time, it discards the messages and blocks the malicious HAN
Accountability and tracking historical processes are guaranteed. If any householder wants to
validate the bill’s value, he/she can check his/her monthly record in BAN’s database. HAN’s
record indicates the amount of consumed electricity and the corresponding price. These records
assure the correctness of payment amount for each HAN in the BAN cluster.
The limited number of transmitted messages enhances security and customer’s privacy and
reduces adversary’s chance to acquire any knowledge about the system. In addition, the de-
ployed NTRU crypto-system prevents attackers from extracting any knowledge about private
keys from the corresponding public keys or any intercepted message. Suppose an A with rea-
sonable computation capabilities captures a message exchanged between BAN gateway and CC
or between BAN and one of the HANs, such as the billing message mb sent from BAN to CC. A
cannot extract any information from the message, becauseA needs to know CC’s private key fcc
to decrypt mb and obtains m5(m5 = m´5modp, and m´5 = fcc ·mb ∈ Rq). In addition, A cannot
modify the message, as he/she requires BAN’s private signing key parameters (fbans, gbans) to
forge its signature on the message. A also cannot resend the message, as it contains a timestamp
and nonce number. CC and BANs’ secret parameters (fcc, gcc, fccs, gccs, fban, gban, fbans, gbans) are
designated exploiting the hardness of SVP and LWE problems. If A attempts to compromise
CC’s private key fcc, he/she requires to check all the non-zero vectors in R × Rq field, and
according to SVP, if a lattice L with norm N and a basis of a vector space V are given, it is an
NP-hard problem to find the shortest non-zero vector υ in V , given that N (υ) = λ(L), even
by the powerful lattice basis reduction algorithms. Even if A manages to formulate a number
of approximate equations n to determine fcc, the problem will be converted to LWE problem
as:
〈fcc, a1〉 ≈χ b1(mod p),
〈fcc, a2〉 ≈χ b2(mod p),
........,
〈fcc, an〉 ≈χ bn(mod p),
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Then, A requires 2O(n) equations/time using best known algorithm to solve LWE problem to
obtain fcc value, which is an NP-hard problem [152, 153]. Consequently, A cannot compromise
the secret key fcc even via a quantum computer. As a result, the data confidentiality and
integrity are guaranteed. In addition, the authenticity of different parties is confirmed.
In conclusion, our proposed scheme preserves customers’ privacy and fulfills different security
requirements for the involved parties in customer-side network.
4.5 Performance Evaluation
This section studies communication and computation complexity for our scheme.
4.5.1 Communication overhead
The number of exchanged messages between different parties (CC, BAN, and HANs) is very
small. During initialization phase, CC and each BAN are exchanging two messages to setup
the electricity-share agreement, but HANs do not participate in this phase. In second phase,
HANs send demand messages only if they require altering their electricity share due to change
in HANs’ consumption or in electricity price. Note that HAN’s electricity share may remain the
same during the whole billing period; therefore, no demand messages are sent. Furthermore,
two price messages are disseminated only in case of price modification; first one is broadcasted
from CC to connected BANs; and second message is forwarded from BAN to its HANs. In
addition, BAN should send one billing message to CC indicating the payment amount for whole
BAN. However, this message is sent once at the end of billing period, i.e., every month.
Consequently, the total number of messages is changed from three messages (two agreement
messages, and one billing message) to d+3 messages, where d is the number of demand messages
during the month. Therefore, d is a small number as the electricity share for each HAN is not
expected to change frequently. Since the electricity share is predefined for each HAN, we assume
that HAN updates its share when electricity price changes only. If Time-Of-Use pricing plan
[154] is used, there are three different prices during the day known as off-peak, mid-peak and
on-peak prices. Therefore, we consider that the maximum number of demand messages is three
demand messages per HAN every day. While in the traditional periodic-pattern schemes, each
HAN sends its reading message every one hour or 15 minutes.
Figure 4.6 shows communication overhead for our proposed scheme versus a periodic-pattern
scheme in terms of different number of connected HANs. As shown, our proposed scheme saves
a significant number of messages compared with the traditional periodic schemes. In a cluster
of 100 HANs, our scheme requires at maximum 300 demand messages per day, while periodic
schemes need 2400 messages (if demand messages are sent every hour).
Figure 4.7 shows the variation in communication burden for our proposed scheme at different
number of demand messages. The figure includes six different scenarios: Case 1: only portion of
HANs send one demand message a day, while the remaining does not send any messages. Case
2: all HANs send one demand message per day. Case 3: number of HANs send two messages,
other group of HANs send one message, and the remaining does not send any. Case 4: all
HANs send two demand messages per day. Case 5: group of HANs send three messages, other
number of HANs send two messages, some HANs send one message, and the remaining does not
send any messages. Case 6: all HANs send three demand messages every day. Axiomatically,
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Figure 4.6: Communication overhead
Traditional .vs. Proposed scheme.
the communication complexity grows as number of demand messages increases but within a
limited value. The number of messages rises from one message when the cluster has only one
HAN to maximally 300 messages when the cluster has 100 HANs. Thus, the maximum number
of messages is no more than 300 messages per month, which is a trivial communication overhead
for the network.
4.5.2 Computation complexity
Suppose that computation time for encryption, decryption, signing, and verification operations
are Te, Td, Ts, and Tv respectively. During initialization phase in our scheme, CC and each
BAN exchange agreement request and agreement response messages. Thus, both CC and
BAN need to perform one encryption, one decryption, one signing and one verification process.
Accordingly, the computation time for this phase is 2∗(Te+Td+Ts+Tv) units. In second phase,
if HAN’s share changes, HAN preforms one encryption operation per each demand message,
while BAN decrypts the message. Thus, we have (Te+Td) units per message. In case of modified
price, two price messages are sent from CC to BANs and from each BAN to its connected HANs.
As a consequent, both CC and BAN sign the price message once; as well, BAN and HAN verify
the message once. Hence, the computation time for price message is 2 ∗ (Ts + Tv) units. So,
the total computation operations in this phase equals m ∗ (Te + Td) + (2 ∗ Ts + (m + 1) ∗ Tv),
where m is the number of HANs in the cluster. During payment process, only billing message is
sent from BAN to CC; it requires one encryption, one decryption, one sign and one verification
process. The computation time for this message is (Te + Td + Ts + Tv) units. While, the
performed operations on BAN’s database, i.e., computing electricity shares and bills, are trivial
computation loads and can be neglected.
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Figure 4.7: Communication overhead for proposed scheme
different cases.
We exploit the moderate security mode for public key NTRU crypto-system with private key
= 530 bits, public key = 1169 bits, and plaintext size = 187 bits. For NSS signing parameters,
the used private key = 502 bits, public key = 1757 bits, and signature size = 1757 bits. We
expect three demand messages per HAN every day in our scenario; each demand message
requires two operations: one encryption and one decryption. Also, three price messages are
applied; each one requires two signing and two verification operations. BAN also requires three
signing and three verification operations every day for the first send of the price message from
CC to BAN. Moreover, the second price message from BAN to each HAN requires three signing
and three verification operations per day. So, the operations for one HAN per day are three
encryption, three decryption, three signing and three verification operations.
On the other hand, each HAN sends its reading message every hour in the periodic-pattern
schemes. Each reading message necessitates four processes: one encryption, one decryption,
one signing and one verification operation. In addition, CC should reply by control message;
if we assume these control messages are sent as price changes. Thus, there are three control
messages per day for each HAN. As result, each HAN needs 27 encryption, 27 decryption, 27
signing and 27 verification operations per day. TABLE 4.1 demonstrates the total computation
overhead for our proposed scheme versus a periodic-pattern scheme for each HAN per month.
As the number of HANs in the cluster increases, the computation overhead increases. Con-
sequently, the total computation operations for the whole cluster in our proposed scheme per
month equal [2 ∗ (Te +Td +Ts +Tv)] + 30 ∗ ([3 ∗m ∗ (Te +Td)] + [6 ∗ (Ts) + 3 ∗ (m+ 1) ∗ (Tv)]) +
[(Te+Td+Ts+Tv)] = [(90∗m+ 3)∗ (Te+Td)] + 183∗Ts+ [(90∗m+ 93)∗Tv] operations, where
m is the number of HANs in the BAN cluster. While, the periodic-pattern scheme computes
810 ∗ n ∗ (Te + Td + Ts + Tv) operations per month, where n is the number of connected HANs
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Table 4.1: Total computation overhead per HAN per month
Traditional .vs. Proposed scheme
Computation Overhead
Traditional 810 ∗ TE + 810 ∗ TD + 810 ∗ TS + 810 ∗ TV
Proposed 90 ∗ TE + 90 ∗ TD + 90 ∗ TS + 90 ∗ TV






















Figure 4.8: Computation overhead
Traditional .vs. Proposed scheme.
(we assume that m and n have the same value. However, n value could be much greater that
m).
Figure 4.8 shows the total computation time of our proposed scheme implementing NTRU
as encryption scheme and NSS as signing scheme versus a traditional periodic scheme imple-
menting RSA for encryption and signing operations. As indicated in the figure, when the
number of HANs increases, the increase in computation time in the proposed scheme is signif-
icantly less than the one in traditional scheme. In the proposed scheme, the computation time
increases from 161.82 to 7557.12 msec per month. While the traditional scheme computation
time increases from 14960 to 1496070 msec per month. In other words, our proposed scheme
notably reduces the overall computation time and saves the limited resources of the network.
We evaluate the performance of our proposed scheme versus the traditional periodic scheme
when both schemes exploit NTRU crypto-system as encryption scheme and NSS as signing
scheme. Figure 4.9 compares the worst case of our proposed scheme, when all HANs in the
cluster send their maximum number of demand messages, with the moderate case of the tra-
ditional scheme, when every HAN sends periodic demand message every hour. It can be seen
that there is significant difference in computation overhead between the two schemes; our pro-
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Figure 4.9: Computation overhead
Traditional .vs. Proposed scheme.
posed scheme consumes much less computation time than the traditional one, especially as the
number of HANs increases. In the proposed scheme, the computation delay increases from 8.7
to 255.21 ms per day as the number of HANs increases from one to one hundred. While the
traditional scheme computation time increases from 410 to 3486.2 ms per day. Consequently,
our proposed scheme remarkably decreases the overall computation time.
If the number of demand messages varies from zero (when the HAN does not want to change
its share during the day) to the maximum number of messages (e.g. three messages a day), the
total computation operations for the whole cluster in our proposed scheme per month equals
[2∗(Te+Td+Ts+Tv)]+30∗([d∗m∗(Te+Td)]+[6∗(Ts)+3∗(m+1)∗(Tv)])+[(Te+Td+Ts+Tv)] =
[(30 ∗ d ∗m+ 3) ∗ (Te + Td)] + 183 ∗ Ts + [(90 ∗m+ 93) ∗ Tv] operations, where m is the number
of HANs in the BAN cluster, and d is the number of demand messages, d ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}.
Figure 4.10 shows the impact of demand messages’ number on the computation time in
our proposed scheme (Figure 4.10 includes the same six cases as in Figure 4.7). Although
computation complexity rises as number of demand messages increases, this increase is not a
heavy computation overhead on the network’s resources. For instance, computation time per
day increases from 7.14 ms when the cluster has only one HAN to 225.21 ms as maximum when
the cluster has 100 HANs. In conclusion, our proposed scheme not only guarantees security


































Figure 4.10: Computation overhead for proposed scheme
different cases.
4.6 Summary
Consumers privacy and information confidentiality are major concerns for customer-side net-
works in smart grid. In contrary to the existing solutions, we have proposed a lightweight
security and privacy preserving scheme based on predicting the expected electricity demand
for a cluster of HANs. The proposed scheme guarantees the electricity customers’ privacy in
addition to assure the confidentiality and integrity of the exchanged electricity consumption
messages. It also restricts the connection with the electricity provider only when the total
cluster’s demand needs to be adjusted. Security analysis and simulation results demonstrate
that the proposed scheme satisfies security and privacy requirements for householders, at the





Aggregation Scheme for Smart Grid
As previously mentioned, consumers privacy and their consumption information confidential-
ity and integrity are the main security concerns for smart grid connection with the residential
electricity consumers. Only few research works attempt to conserve consumers’ privacy during
appliances’ readings collection, i.e., before smart meter sends house’s consumption to the local
CC. [155] proposes a secure in-network data aggregation utilizing an orthogonal chip code and
circuit shifting operation to guarantee the confidentiality and anonymity of APs’ information.
However, this scheme requires sharing the chip code with APs and performing mutual authen-
tication. In addition, SM can reconstruct the original reading for each AP from the mixed
data. In our work [156, 157], we propose a lightweight lattice-based homomorphic privacy-
preserving electricity consumption aggregation scheme, in which smart household appliances
aggregate their readings without involving the related smart meter. Although smart meters or
the intermediate base station cannot decrypt this aggregated consumption, they can validate
the message’s authenticity. The proposed scheme also investigates the impact of different types
of smart appliances on the HAN overhead. The total communication and computation load for
the proposed scheme is trivial and tolerable by different parties in the connection, i.e., smart
appliances, smart meters, and the base station. In addition, the deployed crypto-system, which
depends on simple arithmetic operations, can further reduce the computation duty for smart
appliances. Simulation results and security analysis show that our proposed scheme guarantees
consumers privacy and messages authenticity and integrity with lightweight communication
and computation complexity. The remaining of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 5.1
describes the system model and security requirements. Sections 5.2 reviews the lattice-based
homomorphic encryption scheme. Sections 5.3 presents our proposed scheme. The security
analysis and performance evaluation are illustrated in Sections 5.4 and 5.5 respectively. Fi-





Consider a residential area that consists of the main CC for service provider, i.e., utility
company, that is connected to a number of base stations (BSs) located in different areas
BSs = {BS1, BS2, . . . , BSh}. Each BS is responsible for a cluster of HANs in its local
region HANs = {HAN1, HAN2, . . . , HANm}. HAN could be a townhouse or a unit in a
building; each HAN has a smart meter (SM) that connects to the house’s appliances (APs);
APs = {AP1, AP2, . . . , APn}. APs also can communicate to each other directly without in-
volving SM. The communication inside HAN is through inexpensive short coverage distance
technology, such as Bluetooth or ZigBee. While, the connection between HANs and the cor-
responding BS is through inexpensive WiFi technology. CC, BSs, and SMs have public keys
provided by an independent TA. Each AP has a unique ID that issued to it by TA and stored
in a secured memory. Figure 5.1 shows the system model.
5.1.2 Adversary Model and Security Requirements
We consider that CC, BSs, and SMs are honest but curious. However, an adversary A can
eavesdrop the exchanged messages between different parties, i.e., the messages among APs and
between them and SM, also the forwarded messages from SMs to BS, to extract consumers’
personal information. A may establish some active attacks, e.g., falsify the captured messages
or begin a replay attack; also, A may compromise SMs. Thus, we should thwart A ’s malicious
actions by guaranteeing:
- Consumers’ Privacy: assure that any attacker could not gain any knowledge about HAN’s
consumption. In addition, CC should not know the detailed consumption pattern for each
customer in the region.
- Authenticity and Data Integrity: guarantee the confidentiality and authenticity of cus-
tomers’ consumption; even if A already intercepts a message, he/she cannot extract any knowl-
edge. Likewise, we should ensure messages’ integrity; suppose A attempts to resend/modify a
message, we should detect these malicious actions.
5.1.3 Design Goals
The main objective of the proposed scheme is fulfilling the security requirements for the network;
it should guarantee consumers’ privacy. It also should prevent any illegal access/modification
of messages/devices in addition to be efficient and lightweight in terms of communication and
computation overhead.
5.2 Preliminaries
Lattice-based Homomorphic Encryption Scheme
Our scheme exploits the lightweight lattice-based homomorphic encryption scheme [158],


















Figure 5.1: System model.
messages’ security with low computation complexity, as it mainly performs simple addition and
multiplication operations in vector space.
Key Generation:
The scheme defines five global integer parameters:
N is the number of coordinates of plaintext vectors,
r is the characteristic of the ring over which they are constructed,
l is the maximum number of homomorphic operations that can be done,
n is the number of softly disturbed matrices in the public key,
and εmax is an upper bound for the coordinates of random vectors used to insert noise.
Let l0 = n × N × εmax + (N − 1) × r, q = 2 × l0 × (2l + 1), and p = q × r + ε is a prime
number, ε < l0. Then, generate two random N ×N matrices over GF (p): A and B, where A
is invertible and M = [A | B]. Also, generate a random scrambling matrix 4, which is an
N ×N diagonal invertible matrix over GF (p). Compute M¨i = [Ai | Bi] by multiplying M
to the left of a random invertible matrix Pi. Subsequently, generate a soft noise matrix Di,
a random N × N matrix over {−1, 1}, for each i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. Next, compute softly
distributed matrix M˙i = [Ai | Bi + Di4]. Similarly, compute a hard noise matrix D0 by
generating a soft noise matrix then replacing the diagonal values by q. Then, compute the
hardly distributed matrix M˙0 = [A0 | B0 + D04]. Next, choose a permutation operation
P(.), and compute Mi = P(M˙i),i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}.
Finally, the n+ 1 matrices {M0,M1, . . . ,Mn} are the public key. While the private key
consists of the permutation P(.), the hidden matrix M , and the scrambling matrix 4.
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Encryption:
First, the plaintext message is constructed as a message vector m in ZNr . Then, m multi-
plies by the hard noise matrix M0. The result is disturbed by adding mM0 to the summation
of n soft noise vectors
∑
i ri ∗Mi, where ri are n random vectors with coordinates smaller
than εmax. Then, the ciphertext is





The decryption operation is based on filtering the added noise. First, the permutation is
reversed as
c˙ = P−1(c) (5.2)
, where c ∈ GF (p)2N is the ciphertext. Then, the receiver computes the scrambled noise
e = ˙cD − ˙cUA−1B (5.3)
, where ˙cD, ˙cU are the undisturbed and disturbed halves of c˙. Then the unscrambled noise is
e˙ = e4−1. (5.4)
For each e˙j in e˙ = [e˙1 . . . ˙eN ], get




e˙j mod q e˙j mod q <
q
2
(e˙j mod q)− q otherwise.
mj = e¨j q
−1 (5.6)
, where i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}. Lastly, return the original plaintext:
m = (m1, . . . ,mN) (5.7)
This crypto-system resists lattice-based and chosen plaintext attacks so that it assures data
security. The system is suitable for APs with limited capabilities because of its low computation
complexity.
5.3 The Proposed Scheme
Our proposed scheme has two phases: initialization phase, which sets-up the secure connec-
tion between APs and CC via SMs and BSs. While reading aggregation phase organizes the
aggregation operation of electricity consumption readings.
5.3.1 Initialization Phase:
TA assigns a pair of public private keys for CC, each BS and each connected SM.
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- For CC, its public key parameters are {Mcc0,Mcc1, . . . ,Mccn}, where Mcc0 is the hard
noise matrix, and {Mcc1, . . . ,Mccn} are the n soft noise matrices. APs use this key to encrypt
their readings. The CC’s private key parameters are Pcc(.),Mcc,4cc.
- For each BS, the public key is {Mbs0,Mbs1, . . . ,Mbsa}, where Mbs0 is the hard noise
matrix, and {Mbs1, . . . ,Mbsa} are the a soft noise matrices. Its private key parameters are
Pbs(.),Mbs,4bs.
- According to each SM, its public key is {Msm0,Msm1, . . . ,Msmi}, and the private key
is Psm(.),Msm,4sm.
- Each AP has a unique ID issued by TA, {AP1, . . . , APm}, where m is the total number
of APs in HAN. APs are arranged in a fixed order according to their IDs. The aggregator,
APs, for each aggregation round is known to SM and APs. This order is fixed and securely
sent to all APs in the HAN so that each one automatically knows its turn to be the aggregator.
For instance, if there are five APs in the house, AP1, AP2, AP3, AP4, and AP5, then SM
arranges them so that AP1 is the aggregator for first round, AP2 is the aggregator for second
round,. . ., AP5 is the aggregator for fifth round, and then AP1 is the aggregator for sixth
round, and so on.
- Each AP stores its encrypted ID IDj−enc in a secured place.




The ID is encrypted by SM’s public key, because AP needs to prove its identity to SM when it
becomes the aggregator during the aggregation phase.
Moreover, TA assigns certain extra number of IDs for each HAN in the area, e.g., TA sets
20 IDs per HAN so that HAN can have 20 APs at maximum. Then, if the customer needs to
add or remove APs, the following procedure is applied:
- If a new extra AP is added to the network, the customer selects one ID for the new AP
from the assigned range of IDs for that house (i.e, the IDs are assigned by TA).
- If an old AP is replaced by a new same AP, such as an old AC is replaced by a new AC,
then the new AP uses the same ID as the old one.
- If an AP is removed from the network, no procedure is required. As other APs in HAN still
can aggregate their readings utilizing the homoromphic feature of the applied crypto-system.
5.3.2 Reading Aggregation Phase:
1) Inside Home Area Networks (HANs)
- At the beginning of each readings’ aggregation round, each APj in HAN encrypts its
reading vector mj = (m1, . . . ,mw) using CC’s public key.
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- APs attaches its encrypted ID (IDs−enc) to the aggregated message and then forwards
the message to SM.
APs
c, IDs−enc−−−−−−→ SM
- After checking the validity of APs’s ID, SM attaches timestamp Tv and nonce f vectors,
and then signs the received message using Psm(.),Msm,4sm:
x = c‖Tv‖f (5.11)
x˙ = P−1sm(x) (5.12)
e = x˙D − x˙UA−1smBsm (5.13)
e˙ = e4−1sm = [e˙1, . . . , ˙eN ] (5.14)
For each e˙j , i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}, SM computes
e¨j = e˙j − µ (5.15)
, where µ =
{
e˙j mod q e˙j mod q <
q
2
(e˙j mod q)− q else
yj = e¨j q
−1, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N} (5.16)
Y = (y1, . . . , yN) (5.17)
SM then forwards Y to the local BS.
SM
Y−→ BS
2) At Local Base Station (BS)
- BS first verifies each SM’s signature and obtains its message (x = c | Tv | f):




Also, it checks the validity of timestamp Tv and nonce f .






, where k is the number of connected HANs to local BS.
- Next, BS signs the total consumption of the area by its private key Pbs(.),Mbs,4bs:
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g = C‖Tu‖q (5.20)
g˙ = P−1bs (g) (5.21)
w = ˙gD − g˙UA−1bs Bbs (5.22)
w˙ = w4−1bs = [w˙1, . . . , w˙N ] (5.23)
For each w˙j , i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}, BS computes
w¨j = w˙j − µ (5.24)
, where µ =
{
w˙j mod q w˙j mod q <
q
2
(w˙j mod q)− q else
dj = w¨j q
−1, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N} (5.25)
D = (d1, . . . , dN) (5.26)
BS then forwards the aggregated D to CC as an electricity reading message for one unit,
i.e., CC deals with BS and its connected cluster of HANs as one HAN.
- CC verifies BS’s signature on D and then decrypts C using its private key parameters:
c˙ = P−1cc (C) (5.27)
s = ˙cD − ˙cUA−1cc Bcc (5.28)
s˙ = s4−1cc = [s˙1 . . . ˙sN ] (5.29)
For each s˙k, k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}, CC computes
s¨k = s˙k − µ0 (5.30)
, where µ0 =
{
s˙kmod q s˙kmod q <
q
2
(s˙kmod q)− q else
mk = s¨k q
−1, k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N} (5.31)
m = (m1, . . . ,mN) (5.32)
CC now obtains the total aggregated consumption for BS’s area in plaintext m.
3) Control Messages
- If any AP from group 3 or 4 needs to send a request to CC, e.g., to change its load, or
duration of usage, it can directly send its request to CC via SM and BS and does not wait for
the new aggregation round. These messages are called control messages.
For instance, if APj wants to send a request R, it first adds a timestamp Td and random
nonce L to R, concatenates its ID (IDj−enc), nj = R‖IDj−enc‖Td‖L, and then encrypts
nj by CC’s public key:




- APj then sends control message zj to SM, which signs the message and forwards it to CC
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via BS, i.e., BS verifies SM’s signature and signs zj again before forwards it to CC.
5.4 Security Analysis
The main objective of the proposed scheme is to preserve the privacy of HAN’s customers and
does not expose daily habits and lifestyle of houses’ owners from their electricity consumptions.
In addition, our scheme aims to satisfy basic security requirements, such as confidentiality and
messages’ integrity.
Privacy: The electricity consumption for HAN can reveal the daily behaviours of house-
holders so that preserving their privacy is a major concern. The proposed scheme guarantees
that no party even SM or BS knows the individual reading for each AP. APs cannot analyze
the daily life pattern for householders too, as the received individual readings are encrypted;
in addition, the aggregator is different for each reading round. Although we assume that APs’
secret IDs are protected, A will not gain a lot of information if he/she manages to compromise
one of the APs, i.e., he/she can only know the reading for that AP and cannot analyze the
private life for householders by that data only. Furthermore, if the compromised AP by chance
is the aggregator APs, A cannot extract any data, as the messages sent to APs are encrypted
and only CC has the decryption key. However, we assume that A cannot compromise APs and
cannot obtain their secure IDs, because if A can physically compromise APs, e.g., A can enter
the house, he/she can easily obtain the readings for APs by him/herself and does not need to
snoop/modify and analyze the messages. The same happens when A attempts to compromise
SM. Since SM is just a relay node, it only forwards the received encrypted messages. According
to BS, it receives the total house’s consumption, but this received message is encrypted so that
BS cannot extract any knowledge about electricity consumption for householders. While, CC
receives the total aggregated consumption for the whole area so that it cannot extract any
private data about real-time consumption pattern of a specific house/customer.
Authenticity and Messages’ Confidentiality and Integrity: Only authorized parties have ac-
cess to messages’ contents. APs’ readings cannot be revealed to anybody even APs, which
receives only the encrypted version of these readings. According to the total aggregated con-
sumption for HAN, neither APs nor related SM can decrypt it, only CC can. As well, BS
cannot extract any knowledge from the total consumption of the whole area, as it processes the
messages in their encrypted versions. Moreover, messages integrity and confidentiality are also
guaranteed. The proposed scheme guarantees the data confidentiality, as none of the partici-
pated parties can know the reading of each AP; only the authorized party, CC, can decrypt the
total aggregated consumption for the whole area. Furthermore, the message is protected against
different attacks. If A successes to compromise SM, he/she cannot interpret the message’s con-
tents, as SM does not own the decryption key. The same happens if A is powerful enough to
compromise the BS (BS is more protected and can resist attacks more than SM). Therefore,
any eavesdropping attack does not succeed. In addition, the proposed scheme assures that
no illegal party can modify/access the exchanged messages. A cannot forge the transmitted
messages from HANs to the connected BS, as A does not know SM’s private key to falsify
its signature. In addition, A does not have access to BS’s private key so that he/she cannot
mimic its signature. Replay attacks do not succeed too, because of the attached timestamps
and nonce values.
Security of utilized crypto-system is guaranteed by the hardness of hidden lattice problem
(HLP) [159] that is based on disorganizing the lattice in a way so that no party can extract the
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original lattice from its disturbed version, i.e., HLP disturbs lattice l by a specified technique to
be l¯ so that A cannot extract l from l¯. Lattice-based homomorphic encryption scheme exploits
HLP to select the private key parameters: the hidden lattice M , the scrambling matrix 4
and the permutation P(.). Accordingly, to break the system, A should obtain the secret
permutation and then retrieve the disturbed columns’ indexes to solve the corresponding HLP.
To guarantee the security and robustness of the system against attacks specially chosen plaintext
and lattice-based attacks, the main four parameters of the crypto-system, i.e., l, r, N , and
p, must be chosen carefully so that the cost of non-disturbed columns searching operation is




) ≈ 2100. In
addition, choosing a high-dimension lattice, e.g., 600, can further increase the hardness of HLP
problem. Following these constraints during parameters’ selection can enhance the proposed
scheme’s resistance to attacks [159].
5.5 Performance Evaluation
This section analyzes the performance of the proposed scheme in terms of communication and
computation overhead.
5.5.1 Communication Overhead
The number of exchanged messages between different parties every readings’ aggregation round
is too small. The number of messages that should be sent by the limited-capability devices SM
and APs is trivial. During each readings’ aggregation round, each AP sends only one reading
message. As well, APs just sends the aggregated message. According to SM, it only forwards
the total aggregated readings message for the house to BS, which in turn forwards the total
aggregated readings message for the whole area to CC. According to control messages, APs
from group 3 and 4 only need to send their requests to CC. These messages are sent directly
to SM, which forwards them to CC via BS. Generally, the house could contain two or three of
these APs, e.g., a house includes one EV, one AC, and one clothes washer. Assume that each
HAN has three of these APs for maximum; that means three control messages. These messages
are sent occasionally; assume that each AP needs to send one or two control messages per day
so that the maximum number of control messages per day for one HAN is six messages. In
summary, the total communication burden for BS, SM, and for each AP is one message per
reading round, which considers insignificant load.
Figure 5.2 shows the communication overhead inside HAN for every reading round. It can
be seen that the communication delay is increased from 2 messages in two-appliances case to
20 messages in twenty-appliances case. Although the communication overhead is expected to
increase as the number of APs increases, its growth is limited and affordable by the restricted-
resources devices in the house. Figure 5.3 shows the total communication delay for the area per
day, after adding the control messages overhead, as the number of APs in the house and HANs
in the area increases. Although the APs’ number increases, each AP, SM, and BS still have to
send one message only per round, which means a fixed number of messages are sent from each
HAN in the area per day. According to number of HANs, the total communication overhead for
the area is increased as the number of connected HANs increases. However, the communication
load is affordable by different parties in the network; in other words, the proposed scheme
provides light communication overhead.
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Figure 5.2: Communication overhead per reading round.




Each AP in the HAN has to perform one encryption process per round for its reading except
APs, which also has to perform simple neglected summation operation. The total number of
encryption operation per HAN is n, where n is the number of APs in the HAN. These encryption
processes do not require high computation capabilities, because the deployed cryptographic
scheme is lightweight scheme especially for encryption; it only consists of simple addition and
multiplication operations. Next, SM signs the received aggregated message from APs before
forwarding it to CC via BS. That means one signing process for each HAN per round. Then, BS
aggregates the received readings from the connected cluster, signs the result, and then sends it
to CC. So, if the total number of HANs in BS’s area is m, then the total computation overhead
for the area equals [m ∗ (n ∗ Te + Ts + Tv)] + Ts + Tv + Td, where Te is the computation
time for one encryption process, Td is the time for one decryption process, Ts is the time for
one signing process, and Tv is the time for one verification process.
In addition, If HANs have group 3 or 4 APs, then control messages have to be encrypted
by these APs and sent to CC via SM and BS. Assume that each house has up to three group
3 or 4 APs, then six control messages are sent from HAN per day that need six encryption
operation maximally. SM, i.e., also BS, needs to sign these control messages. However, these
messages will not impact on the total computation duty for different parties per day, because
they are few and sent occasionally. Table 5.1 presents the number of operations per reading
round and per day for each AP and SM, where h is the number of rounds per day.
Table 5.1: The number of operations for smart devices.
Number of Operations Per Round Per Day
APs(Group− 1&2) 1 ∗ Te h ∗ Te
APs(Group− 3&4) 1 ∗ Te (h+ 2) ∗ Te
SM 1 ∗ Ts (h+ 6) ∗ Ts
Assume that the hidden lattice dimension is 600 to resist the lattice-based attack, n =
9, r = 2, p ≈ 260, εmax = 1024, l0 ≈ 219, and q = 221.238. The size of the public param-
eters is 2N2(n+1)Log2(p). The speed of one encryption/verification operation is the cost of
(n+ 1).N addition processes of vectors of lengths 2N and Log2(p) bits plus the cost of mul-
tiplying two random vectors with length Log2(εmax) bits. While the decryption/signing speed
is the cost of twoN×N matrix multiplication inGF (p), which equals 2N2.Log2(p)2. Using
a MATLAB simulator on a 3.20 GHz-processor with 6.00GB RAM, we study the computation
delay for our proposed scheme.
Figure 5.4 presents the computation load for each AP and for SM every reading round. It
can be noticed that the computation overhead for each AP is the same and does not affected by
the number of APs in the house. Moreover, the load of SM does not change, which is expected,
as it requires to perform one signing process regardless the number of messages included. Figure
5.5 points out the total computation load for the whole cluster per day as numbers of APs and
HANs increase. As indicated, the computation overhead increases by the increase of APs and
HANs’ numbers, but still within a bounded limit; the total computation delay for a cluster of
100 HANs that each one of them has 20 APs is around 90 second per day.
Practically speaking, our proposed scheme is feasible for the restricted-computation ca-
pabilities APs. Considering the Smart Grid Smart City data set provided by the Australian
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Figure 5.4: Computation delay per reading round.
Figure 5.5: Computation delay per day.
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Figure 5.6: Computation delay per reading round.
Department of Industry, Innovation and Science [160], for instance, which includes a data set of
different household APs’ readings at different times per one HAN in Sydney, e.g., at November
16 - 2013, almost at 3:12 pm, the current APs’ readings for customer 11178213 are measured
as: television 388.68, computer 124.799, stove 44.474, AC 1.711, and light 11.474 kWh,
it can be seen that the APs readings’ range is limited by the maximum value 731625 kWh.
So, the readings’ values do not require a significant storage memory. In addition, encrypting
the APs’ readings does not provide high computation burden on the AP, as the encryption
operation consists of generating a fixed series of random numbers and then computing trivial
summation and multiplication operations. Consequently, simple cheap processing device em-
bedded on the APs, such as Raspberry PI [161], is enough to implement that light encryption
process.
The existing privacy schemes cannot be applied on APs, since they have to perform com-
plex crypto-operations, such as exponentiation and pairing, which require high computation
capabilities not owned by APs. Although the current crypto-systems are not applicable in
these restricted-resources APs, we compare the performance of the proposed scheme with a
traditional homomorphic Paillier-based scheme, as several privacy-preserving schemes in the
literature utilize Paillier crypto-system because of its additive homomorphic feature, also it is
robust against privacy attacks.
In Figure 5.6, we compare the total computation time per HAN for the proposed scheme
versus the traditional one per round, as the number of APs at house increases. Clearly, the
computation delay for the proposed scheme is much less than the traditional one, especially at
the high number of APs in the house. The computation delay goes from 6.3 to 33.3 ms for the
proposed scheme while the traditional scheme’s delay increases from 23.8 to 164.2 ms, when
the number of APs increases from 2 to 20 APs.
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While Figure 5.7 shows the total computation delay for the whole BS’s connected area per
day and presents the effect of the increase in APs’ number also the increase in the number of
HANs in the BS’s cluster. It is shown that our scheme takes less computation time compared
to the Paillier-based schemes, especially as numbers of APs and HANs increase. Although the
computation overhead increases in our scheme, the resulted computation delay is limited and
affordable by APs. The computation delay per day for a cluster of 100 HANs with 20 APs
each is around 90 second for proposed scheme versus 450 second for traditional schemes. In
conclusion, the proposed scheme guarantees privacy and security requirements for the residential
consumers with low computation and communication overhead even for limited-computation
capabilities APs.
5.6 Conclusion
In this work, we have proposed a lightweight lattice-based homomorphic security and privacy-
preserving scheme that secures the electricity consumption aggregation operation for HANs in
residential areas. The proposed scheme depends on house’s APs to aggregate their consumption
among themselves without involving the connected SM utilizing the lightweight lattice-based
homomorphic crypto-system to secure their readings. However, SMs and the intermediate BS
can validate the messages’ authenticity without decrypting them. The security analysis and
simulation results show that the proposed scheme guarantees consumers’ privacy and messages’
confidentiality and integrity, at the same time, ascertains lightweight communication and com-



























Privacy-Preserving Scheme for V2G
Connections
V2G connection allows two-way electricity transmission between EVs and power grid for achiev-
ing many known benefits. However, V2G connections suffer from certain security threats,
such as EV’s privacy and authenticating it to the grid. In our work [165, 166], we propose
a lightweight secure and privacy-preserving V2G connection scheme, in which the power grid
assures the confidentiality and integrity of exchanged information during (dis)charging elec-
tricity sessions and overcomes EVs’ authentication problem. The proposed scheme guarantees
the financial profits of the grid and prevents EVs from acting maliciously. Meanwhile, EVs
preserve their private information by generating their own pseudonym identities. In addition,
the scheme keeps the accountability for the electricity-exchange trade. Furthermore, the pro-
posed scheme provides these security requirements by lightweight overhead; as it diminishes the
number of exchanged messages during (dis)charging sessions. Simulation results demonstrate
that the proposed scheme significantly reduces the total communication and computation load
for V2G connection especially for EVs. The remaining of the chapter is organized as follows.
Section 6.1 introduces our system model, security parameters, and design goals. Section 6.2 re-
views BlueJay ultra-lightweight hybrid crypto-system. In Section 6.3, we present our proposed
scheme. Section 6.4 gives security analysis, while Section 6.5 evaluates the performance of our
scheme. Finally, Section 6.6 summarizes the work.
6.1 System Model
6.1.1 Network Model
Our V2G network consists of the CC that belongs to the utility company. CC is connected
to several local aggregators (LAs), which are owned by independent private service provider
companies. They are located at power lines or buses in the neighbour region. Each LA
connects to fleets of EVs, which are located in different parking lots in the area; LAs =
{LA1, LA2, . . . , LAm}, where m is the number of power lines. CC communicates with
LAs through wired connection, e.g., Internet. In each parking lot, there is a cluster of EVs;
EVs = {EV1, EV2, . . . , EVn}, where n is the number of EVs in the cluster, so n could be
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Figure 6.1: System model.
different for each lot. The EVs’ cluster is connected to LA via an access point (AP), which
works as a relay node to forward the exchanged messages between LA and EVs through WiFi
connection. LA connects to several CSs wirelessly via APs too. CSs may locate in the parking
lots or specific charging places; CSs = {CS1, CS2, . . . , CSj}, where j is the number of CSs
controlled by LA. Keying parameters are provided to different parties by independent TA. V2G
system model is shown in Figure 6.1.
6.1.2 Adversary Model and Security Requirements
CC and LAs are honest but curious. They will not try to act maliciously toward EVs, but they
may attempt to extract EVs’ private information from exchanged messages. According to EVs,
they are non-trusted parties. Some EVs may act selfishly to gain a benefit or prevent other
EVs from obtaining advantages; also, malicious EVs may try to impersonate innocent EVs.
In addition, malicious adversaries threaten V2G connection; adversary A can eavesdrop the
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exchanged messages between LA and EVs. Moreover, A may establish some active attacks;
such as attempting to fabricate the captured messages, or begin a replay attack. Moreover,
A may try to impersonate an honest EV to seize its connection with LA. To thwart these
malicious actions, our proposed scheme will fulfill the following security requirements:
- Authentication: secure LA’s messages against any unauthorized action, i.e., prevent any
illegal parties from accessing or modifying LA’s messages.
- EV’s Privacy: assure that the private information of EV is not revealed to other parties
and guarantee that nobody can link between EV’s location and its owner’s identity. Neither
attackers nor CC and LAs can gain any distinguishable knowledge about a particular EV. So,
they cannot link EV’s battery status or location with the owner’s identity.
- Confidentiality and Messages Integrity: guarantee that EVs’ (dis)charging and service
payment messages are confidential; they are only accessible by legitimate parties, e.g., LA and
related EV. The messages’ integrity should also be guaranteed. Even if A already intercepts
the message, he/she has no access to the decryption key. Additionally, A cannot resend a
message or modify its contents.
- Accountability: previous electricity trade sessions should be traceable; CC guarantees the
accuracy of former processes. No malicious LAs or EVs can forge previous bills to increase
their profits.
6.1.3 Design Goals
The main objectives of our proposed scheme can be divided into two folds:
- It should guarantee the security requirements for V2G connection. EVs owners’ and lo-
cation privacy should be preserved, and information confidentiality and integrity should be
assured. Likewise, authentication of different parties should be guaranteed. Finally, account-
ability of the electricity trade operation should also assured.
- The proposed scheme also should be efficient and lightweight due to communication and
computation overhead.
6.2 Preliminaries
We utilize BlueJay ultra-lightweight hybrid crypto-system [167], which is a lightweight fast
crypto-system especially in its encryption process. BlueJay combines PASSERINE public key
crypto-system [168] and Hummingbird-2 lightweight symmetric scheme [169].
6.2.1 PASSERINE crypto-system
PASSERINE scheme is a lightweight version of Rabin public-key scheme [170] that has two ad-





Generate two large random distinct primes p and q, with roughly the same size, as private key
parameters. Then, compute the public key n = pq.
6.2.1.2 Encryption




bi. Encrypt the plaintext m as:
C0 ≡ m2 + Y n(mod b0),
C1 ≡ m2 + Y n(mod b1),
..........,
Cm ≡ m2 + Y n(mod bm).
6.2.1.3 Decryption
















Compute mp = (c
((p+1)/4)mod p).q.q−1p , and mq = (c
((q+1)/4)mod q).p.p−1q . Select the
right root from m = {mp + mq,mp − mq,−mp + mq,−mp − mq} (mod n) as the
plaintext message.
6.2.1.4 Signing
We utilize Rabin signature algorithm [170], where H is a collision-resistant hash function
H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}k, The public key is n, and the private key is the pair (p, q). To sign
a message m, pick random padding U and calculate H(mU) so that H(mU) is a square
modulo n, x2 = H(mU)mod n. The signature on m is the pair (U, x).
6.2.1.5 Verification
Given m and (U, x), calculate x2 and H(mU). Then verify if x2 = H(mU)mod n.
BlueJay is a combination of Hummingbird-2 lightweight authenticated encryption scheme
and PASSERINE crypto-system optimized for a 1024-bit public modulus n and 32-bit register
size.
The proposed scheme also utilizes AKARI-2 [171], a lightweight pseudorandom number
generator, to generate pseudonym IDs (PIDs) and symmetric keys. AKARI-2 is simple and
easy to implement; it is appropriate for limited-computation devices, e.g., radio frequency
identification, and sensors.
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6.3 The Proposed Scheme
Our proposed scheme has three phases: the first one is the initialization phase, which setups
the system components and generates the keys and security parameters; the second phase is
the operation phase, which is responsible for electricity-trade operation; and the final phase is
the billing phase to pay the electricity expenses.
6.3.1 Initialization Phase
The initialization phase establishes the network and defines the required security parameters.
First, TA issues two pairs of public-private keys to both CC and LAs as follows:
- For CC, TA generates CC’s private key pair {pcc, qcc} and corresponding public key
ncc(ncc = pcc qcc).
TA
ncc, pcc, qcc−−−−−−→ CC.
- For each LA, TA generates LA’s private key pair {pla, qla} and public key nla(nla =
pla qla).
TA
nla, pla, qla−−−−−−→ LA.
- Also, TA assigns a secret ID {Lcs} and secret session key {kcs} for each CS; the station
includes its secret ID in its messages to LA to proof its identity. Thus, this ID should be stored
in a secured memory module.
TA
Lcsj ,kcsj−−−−−→ CSj .
- Each EV generates a PID utilizing AKARI-2, EVi = AKARI(x0, x1), where x0, x1
are initial seeds. Each EV changes its ID from time to time for more anonymity, e.g., a different
PID for each connection session.
- In addition, EVs generate symmetric keys to secure the connection sessions with LA.
ki = AKARI(h0, h1), where h0, h1 are initial seeds. This key is changed frequently so
that the probability of compromising it is diminished. Then, the messages’ confidentiality is
enhanced.
6.3.2 Operation Phase
The operation phase is responsible for the electricity trade operation; it organizes the tasks
between different participants during the power purchase. First, we need to define a type of
messages called request messages, which are utilized to manage the electricity exchange process.
The request message is a request to buy/sell electrical power; it consists of the required amount
of electricity and the current price. The request message could be sent from EVs to LA to
(dis)charge their batteries or from CC to LA to supply electricity to EVs or consume electricity
from them. There are four request messages: the first one is the CC supply request message,
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which is a request from CC to sell a share of its electricity. The second type is the CC consume
request message, which is a request from CC to purchase an amount of electricity from EVs.
The third message is the EV charge request message, which is a request from an EV to charge
its battery, i.e., the EV wants to buy a portion of power from the grid. Last request message
is the EV discharge request message, which is a request from an EV to discharge its battery;
that means the EV wants to sell some of its stored energy to the grid. It can be inferred that
there are four cases of electricity transfer operations:
6.3.2.1 Case 1. The CC Supply Request
In this case, CC wants to sell a portion of grid’s electricity to EVs. Consequently, CC should
follow a specific procedure:
- CC first sends the CC supply request message to the connected LAs; the message Ms
should indicate the amount of sold electricity A and the price that the grid asked for x (the
price is in form x cents/KWH), Ms = (A, x).
- CC only signs the message by its private key to authenticate it, as the contents of that
message are not confidential. First, a timestamp and a nonce are involved to the message to
prevent replay attacks, ms = (Ms‖Ts1‖L1). Then, CC picks a random padding U1 and cal-
culates H(msU1) so that H(msU1) is a square modulo ncc, x
2
1 = H(msU1)modncc. The
signature onms is the pair (U1, x1). Consequently, CC sends the signed message (ms, U1, x1)
to the connected LAs.
- When LA receives the CC supply request message, it checks the validity of CC’s signature
by recalculating (x1, U1) and checks if x
2
1 = H(msU1) mod ncc is hold. Then, LA verifies
the timestamp Ts1 and nonce L1 values. Subsequently, LA signs Ms by its private key to
authenticate it to its connected EVs. The message also involves a timestamp and a nonce,
ms1 = (Ms |Ts2 |L2). Using a random padding U2, LA computes x22 = H(ms1U2)modnla.
Then, it forwards (ms1, U2, x2) to the existing EVs via APs.
- If an EV wants to participate in that session and charge electricity from the grid, it verifies
the signature of LA by calculating (U2, x2) and checking if the x
2
2 = H(ms1U2)modnla is
hold and then verifying the validity of timestamp Ts2 and nonce L2. Then, it checks the
message’s contents. While if it does not want to charge its battery, it simply discards/ignores
the message.
- If one or more EVs are satisfied by the current price and want to purchase the offered
electricity from CC, they response to LA by the EV charge request message, which contains
the desired amount of electricity to buy. When EV responses to LA, it means an implicit
acceptance for the offered price; only EVs that are interested to buy by the offered price will
reply while the remaining EVs do not reply. EVs encrypt their charge requests by LA’s public
key. In addition to the required amount of power, the message includes the EV’s PID and a
secret session key. If the EV, with current PID EVi, wants to purchase W amount of power
by the price X, then it generates a secret key ki. Next, EV combines the required amount W ,
its current PID EVi, and the secret key ki and includes timestamp Ts3 and nonce L3 values,
Mc = W |EVi |ki |Ts3 |L3. Subsequently, it encrypts the result Mc using nla:
EV generates a set of co-prime numbers b1, b2, . . . , bj , and a random value Y1 and then
encrypts Mc to obtain:
mc1 ≡M2c + Y1 nla(mod b0),
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mc2 ≡M2c + Y1 nla(mod b1),
..........,
mcj ≡M2c + Y1 nla(mod bj).
mc = {mc1,mc2, . . . ,mcj}.
Afterward, it sends mc to LA via the connected AP.
- If a particular EV is chosen for the current charging session, LA uses its suggested secret
key to encrypt the messages to EV. LA sends the acceptance messages to the selected EVs
encrypted by the previously shared session keys; each message includes the charge/discharge
order (i.e., charge order in this case), the location of target CS, and the payment approach.
For instance, if LA chooses the EV with current PID EVi, then LA encrypts the acceptance
message with its session key ki; Ma = Eki(charge, Lcs, cash/token), where Lcs is the
location of target CS, and cash/token determines the payment way. The used symmetric
encryption scheme is the lightweight Hummingbird-2 crypto-system that further reduces the
computation overhead.
- LA selects a number of EVs that satisfies the offered power from the grid. EV’s selection
depends on the number of responses and the location of the replied EVs. If the amount of
electricity from responses is more than the offered amount, LA selects certain number of EVs
that satisfies the supply and nearer to the CSs.
- The payment approach determines the way that EVs should follow to pay the electricity
expenses. EVs pay by either cash or coupons (tokens). The coupons are anonymous authen-
ticated tokens that the grid gives to the EV as a payment for a previous discharging session.
The token only shows its financial value without any information about its holder; for instance,
EV1 discharges 300 KW of electricity to the grid via CS3, and the grid’s operator pays to
EV1 the price, which equals 100 dollar, by a 100-dollar token. The token shows only its value,
the 100 dollar, but no data about the process details or involved parties is included.
- EV first pays the required price to LA via a payment messageMp,Mp = Eki(cash/token).
Then, LA sends a confirmation message to the assigned CS to charge EV’s battery. The confir-
mation message Mf contains the assigned power to that EV and its current PID. The message
also involves CS’s ID Lcs and timestamp and nonce values mf = (Mf |Lcs |Ts4 |L4), then
mf is encrypted by the pre-shared symmetric key between CS and LA kcs,MF = Ekcs(mf).
After CS checks the message’s validity, it charges the EV by the approved amount of electricity.
In other words, EV pays the declared price to LA first before receiving any electricity.
At the end of the current supply round, LA only stores the total amount of supplied elec-
tricity A and the corresponding total profit for this round X; it keeps this information in its
database to calculate the total bill for the whole month later. At the same time, CC saves the
same data in its record; this step conserves the accountability and guarantees the correctness
of LA’s total bill. As LA calculates the total bill at the end of the month and sends it to CC,
which checks its correctness by comparing it with the corresponding value in its record. Figure
6.2 shows the CC Supply Request Case.
6.3.2.2 Case 2. The CC Consume Request
When CC wants to purchase a portion of electricity from the existing EVs, it should follow a
specific procedure:
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Figure 6.2: The CC supply request case.
- CC first sends the CC consume request message to the connected LAs; the message
Mn should indicate the amount of required electricity C and the price that the grid offers
y cents/KWH, Mn = (C, y). CC only signs the message to authenticate it. The message also
involves a timestamp and a nonce to prevent replay attacks, mn = Mn |Ts5 |L5. CC picks
a random padding U4 and calculates H(mnU4) so that H(mnU4) is a square modulo ncc,
x24 = H(mnU4)modncc. The signature on mn is the pair (U4, x4). Therefore, CC sends
the signed message (mn, U4, x4) to LAs.
- When LA receives the CC consume request message, it checks the validity of the signature
by recalculating the values (U4, x4), checks if the x
2
4 = H(mnU4)modncc is hold, and then
verifies timestamp Ts5 and nonce k5 values. Next, LA signs the message to authenticate it
to EVs. The message also involves a timestamp Ts6 and nonce k6 to prevent replay attacks,
mn1 = (Mn |Ts6 |K6), and then LA signs the message as: using the random padding U5, LA
computes x25 = H(mn1U5)modnla. Then, it forwards the signed message (mn1, U5, x5) to
the existing EVs.
- If one or more EVs want to sell their stored electricity to CC, they first verify the signature
of LA by computing (U5, x5), checking if the x
2
5 = H(mn1U5)modnla is hold, and then
verifying the timestamp Ts6 and nonce k6 values. While the other uninterested EVs ignore the
request message from the first place.
- The interested EVs then response to LA by the EV discharge request message, which
contains the desired amount of power to sell. EVs encrypt their discharge requests by LA’s
public key. In addition to the amount of sold power, the messages include the EVs’ PID and
the secret session keys. If the EV, which currently has the PID EVr, wants to sell D amount
of power to the grid by the price y, then it generates a secret key kr. Next, the EV combines
the required amount D, its current PID EVr, and the secret key kr, includes the timestamp
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Ts7 and nonce K7 values, Md = D |EVr |kr |Ts7 |K7, and then encrypts the result Md
using nla:
EV generates a set of co-prime numbers a1, a2, . . . , ae and a random value Y2 and then
encrypts Md by LA’s public key as follows:
md1 ≡M2d + Y2 nla(mod a0),
md2 ≡M2d + Y2 nla(mod a1),
..........,
mde ≡M2d + Y2 nla(mod ae).
md = {md1,md2, . . . ,mde}.
Afterward, EV sends the encrypted message md to LA.
- If a particular EV is chosen for the current discharging session, LA uses its suggested
secret key to encrypt the messages to the selected EV. For instance, if LA chooses the EV
with current PID EVr, then LA encrypts the acceptance message with the session key kr; the
LA’s acceptance message to EV contains the discharge order, the CS’s location Lcs, and the
payment order, Ma1 = Ekr(discharge, Lcs, cash/token).
- EV discharges the agreed amount of electricity to the assigned station first, and then CS
sends a confirmation message Mf1 to LA. CS also involves its ID Lcs and timestamp and
nonce values, mf1 = (Mf1 |Lcs |Ts8 |K8), before encrypts the message using the pre-shared
symmetric key kcs1, i.e., MF1 = Ekcs1(mf1). Then, LA pays the price of sold power to EV
at the moment via a payment message Mp1 (e.g., Mp1 = Ekr(token) is a token payment
message to EVr). In other words, EV first transfers the contracted electricity to the grid, and
then LA directly pays the obligated price to it.
At the end of the current consume round, LA, CC as well, only stores the total amount of
sold electricity C and the corresponding total price for the round Y . Figure 6.3 shows the CC
Consume Request Case.
6.3.2.3 Case 3. The EV Charge Request
In this case, EV asks for electricity from the grid, i.e., wants to purchase a portion of electricity
from the grid. So, EV follows a specific procedure:
- EV first sends the EV charge request message to LA; the message should indicate the
amount of required electricity S and the price z that EV can afford. EV encrypts the message
by LA’s public key; it attaches its current PID and a secret session key to the request. The
message also involves a timestamp and a nonce to prevent replay attacks. If the EV, which
currently has the PID EVq, wants to sell E amount of power to the grid by the price w, then
it generates a secret key kq. Next, EV combines the required amount E, the suggested price
w, its current PID EVq, and the secret key kq, includes timestamp Ts9 and nonce K9 values,
Mcr = E |w |EVq |kq |Ts9 |K9, and then encrypts the result Mcr using the connected LA’s
public key nla:
EV generates a set of co-prime numbers d1, d2, . . . , dv and a random value Y3 and then
encrypts the Mcr by LA’s public key to obtain a series of cipher texts:
mcr1 ≡M2cr + Y3 nla(mod b0),
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Figure 6.3: The CC consume request case.
mcr2 ≡M2cr + Y3 nla(mod b1),
..........,
mcrv ≡M2cr + Y3 nla(mod bj).
mcr = {mcr1,mcr2, . . . ,mcrv}.
Afterward, EV sends mcr to LA.
- When LA receives the EV charge request message, it decrypts the message and verifies
the attached timestamp and nonce values. Then, LA aggregates the total amount of requested
electricity from all EVs in the connected clusters. Q =
∑
EVcharge
SEVcharge , where EVcharge
is the total number of EVs that ask to charge their batteries in LA’s connected clusters. LA
then sends a request message by the total demanded power to CC. The request also includes
the different suggested prices by EVs. The message should involve timestamp Ts10 and nonce
K10 to prevent replay attacks; mt = Q |Ts10 |K10. Then, it is signed by LA’s private key
and encrypted by CC’s public key. LA picks a random padding U6 and calculates H(mnU6)
so that H(mnU6) is a square modulo nla, x
2
6 = H(mnU6)modnla. The signature on mt is
the pair (U6, x6). Therefore, the signed message MT = (mt, U6, x6) is encrypted by ncc.
LA generates a set of co-prime numbers c1, c2, . . . , ch and a random value Y4 and then
encrypts the MT by CC’s public key to obtain a series of cipher texts:
mT1 ≡M2T + Y4 ncc(mod c0),
mT2 ≡M2T + Y4 ncc(mod c1),
..........,
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mTh ≡M2T + Y4 ncc(mod ch).
mT = {mT1,mT2, . . . ,mTh}.
Afterward, LA sends the message mT to CC.
- CC decrypts the message and verifies the signature of LA and then checks validity of
timestamp and nonce, then it checks if its resources can cover the required amount of electricity.
It also verifies the offered prices from different EVs and set the final price for its sold power.
CC then sends a confirmation message to each LA; this message contains the final price and the
location of CSs for each region. This message is signed by CC’s private key and then encrypted
using LA’s public key.
- LA sends an order message to each EV; the order message contains the location of target
CS and the corresponding price. LA encrypts the order message to EV by the previously
shared session key; also, the message includes EV’s PID. For example, if LA chooses the EV
with current PID EVq, then LA encrypts the order message with its shared secret key kq;
Mo = Ekq(charge, Lcs, cash/token), where Lcs is the location of target CS.
- EV first pays the required price to LA; it sends the price in a payment message, e.g., EVq
pays to LA by Mp2 = Ekq(cash/token). Next, LA sends a confirmation message to CS.
The confirmation message Mf2 contains the assigned power to that EV and its current PID
EVq. The message involves a timestamp and nonce values mf2 = (Mf2 |Lcs |Ts11 |K11). LA
then encrypts mf2 by the pre-shared secret key between CS and LA kcs, MF1 = Ekcs(mf2).
Consequently, CS charges the agreed amount of electricity to EV after checking the message’s
validity. In other words, EV pays to LA before charging its battery.
At the end of the current charging round, LA only stores the total amount of sold electricity
Q and the corresponding total profits H for this round. LA keeps this information to calculate
the total bill for the month. CC does the same calculations and saves the results in its record
too. Figure 6.4 shows the EV Charge Request Case.
6.3.2.4 Case 4. The EV Discharge Request
In this case, EV wants to discharge its battery to the grid, i.e., sell a portion of its electricity
to the grid. Then, EV follows a specific procedure:
- EV first sends the EV discharge request message to LA; the message should indicate the
amount of sold electricity Wt and the price that EV offers l. EV encrypts the message by nla;
it attaches to the request its current PID and the suggested secret session key.
- LA aggregates the total offered electricity amount from the interesting EVs and sends a
request message by the total amount to CC. The message is signed by LA’s private key and
encrypted by CC’s public key. CC computes the current needs of the grid and estimates the
suitable corresponding price. It then sends confirmation messages to LAs; the confirmation
message contains the electricity amount, the price, and the location of CSs in LA’s region.
- Next, LA sends order messages to EVs that are interested to discharge their batteries to
the grid; each order message contains the location of target CS and the price for discharging
power. LA encrypts the order message by the previously shared session key with that EV.
- EV first discharges the agreed amount of electricity to the required CS, which sends a
confirmation message to LA. Then, LA pays to EV the price of sold power at the moment via
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Figure 6.4: The EV charge request case
a payment message. In other words, EV discharges the assigned electricity first, and then LA
directly pays the corresponding price to it.
At the end of the current discharge round, LA (also CC) only stores the total amount of
sold electricity Qc and the corresponding total price L. Figure 6.5 shows the EV Discharge
Request Case.
6.3.3 Billing phase
First, both of LA and CC compute the total amount of exchanged power and the corresponding
price or profit for different cases for the whole month. For the CC Supply Request Case, the total
sold electricity is Aall =
∑
bs
Abs and the corresponding profit Xall =
∑
bs
Xbs , where bs is
the total number of the CC Supply Request sessions per month. According to the CC Consume
Request case, the total purchased electricityCall =
∑
bc




where bc is the total number of the CC Consume Request rounds for the month. In the EV




the corresponding profit Hall =
∑
bh
Hbh , where bh is the total number of the EV Charge
Request sessions per month. For the EV Discharge Request case, the total amount of discharged
electricity equals Qcall =
∑
bd
Qcbd and the corresponding profit Lall =
∑
bd
Lbd , where bd
is the total number of the EV Discharge Request sessions per month. Next, they compute the
total sold electricity ES = Aall + Qall and the corresponding profit PF = Xall +Hall, and
the total purchased electricity EU = Call +Qcall and its total price PR = yall +Lall. Then,
LA signs the billing information mB = (ES, PF , EU , PR) by its private key, i.e., after adding
timestamp and random nonce values, and then encrypts it by CC’s public key. Next, LA sends
the resulted bill message B to CC.
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Figure 6.5: The EV discharge request case
LA
B−→ CC.
After decrypting the message and checking LA’s signature, CC compares LA message with its
computed information. Subsequently, CC computes the net price and pays to LA via a payment
message MP , which is signed by (pcc, qcc) and encrypted by nla.
CC
MP−−→ LA.
It is obvious that EVs deal only with the related LA and have no connection with CC.
Moreover, LA communicates with EVs via their PIDs, which are changing frequently. EV may
use different PID for each communication session with LA. Furthermore, EV should take action
first in all cases, because it is the untrusted party. When CC needs to supply power or EV
wants to discharge its battery, EV transmits the electricity to grid first, and then receives the
payment from LA. Accordingly, EV should pay the electricity price first before charging its
battery. In addition, LA does not even need to save the various PIDs for different connected
EVs; it only saves the total amount of traded power and the corresponding total price/profit
for each round, e.g., if LA connects with 50 EVs in a CC supply request case, it stores the total
power sold to the 50 EVs and the corresponding total profit. As a result, the privacy of EVs
is preserved; EV’s real ID, exact location and personal information are protected. At the same
time, LAs and CC assure their profits and overcomes the trust problem, i.e., avoid malicious




The proposed scheme attempts to guarantee several security requirements for V2G connections
simultaneously: EVs’ privacy (i.e., owner identity and vehicle location), confidentiality and
messages integrity, and overcomes EVs’ authenticity problem and achieves the power trade
accountability.
EVs’ Privacy. The proposed scheme guarantees EV’s privacy by preserving EV’s real iden-
tity from being exposed to any party, i.e., adversaries, aggregators, or even grid’s operator. Our
scheme allows each EV to generate its own PIDs; these PIDs can be changed per session or
just from time to time. This frequent change assists in preserving EV’s private information so
that no party can link between the EV and a specific location or ID. For instance, EVi needs
to charge its battery by the value x at time t1. So, EVi selects a pseudo identity PID1 and
new secret session key k1 for this session. At time t2, EVi wants to sell a certain electricity
amount y to the grid; then, it chooses another pseudo identity PID2 and secret session key k2
to that new session. Therefore, no party can link between these two sessions and EVi, as EVi
has finished all the related processes including payment during the session. In the charging
session, it pays for x amount, and then charges its battery. While in the discharging session,
EVi injects y to the grid before receiving the payment. No need to store information about
different PIDs and session keys for EVi in LA or grid’s records, as it is not useful for LA or
CC after the sessions end. As a result, neither LA nor CC can link between EVi, i.e., its real
identity or pseudo ones, and these sessions.
In addition, if an adversary A could extract certain messages from the two sessions, A
cannot discover that the involved EV in the two sessions is the same vehicle. In other words,
A cannot link between the EV and its activities. Furthermore, grid’s operator and associated
LAs do not need to know the real identities of EVs; they guarantee grid’s profit without tracing
EVs’ real identities. So, they will not ever ask for EV’s real identity. Then, if an EV receives
any request to expose its real identity, it knows that the requester is an adversary and blocks
that malicious request. Suppose A compromises the legal LAi and contacts with its EVs. A
may try to obtain information about EVs’ real identities to seize certain financial gain. In that
case, EVs know that LAi is compromised. So, they ignore its request and report to the grid’s
operator about that LA. The operator verifies LA’s status after receiving a certain number of
bad reports about it.
Authenticity. The signatures of CC and LA authenticate their messages. For example, the
CC supply request message is authenticated by CC’s signature; no malicious party can forge it.
On the other hand, grid’s operator guarantees that the involved EVs operate honestly, because
they have to take action first by paying the electricity expenses before charging their batteries
or discharging to the grid before receiving the payment, consequently the operator assures
the financial profits of the grid. In addition, EV’s current PID and shared key authenticate
its messages during the running session. The proposed scheme forces EVs to follow a specific
procedure to prevent them from acting maliciously, i.e., EV has no chance to misbehave, because
it has to finish its part first, and then receive the corresponding action from the grid. Even if
A impersonates an EV, he/she cannot seize its benefits, because A has to follow the procedure
by accomplishing the EV’s part in the electricity exchange operation first. Consequently, A is
forced to behave honest to receive the electricity or the price. In summary, the scheme overcome
EVs’ authentication problem and guarantees the grid’s financial profit.
Confidentiality and Messages Integrity. The proposed scheme assures confidentiality and
integrity of the exchanged messages using a combination of public and symmetric key schemes.
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In the CC Supply Request case, for instance, before CC sends the CC supply request message
Ms, CC authenticates it by its signature. No party can modify its contents, but they can access
it. In addition, no replay attacks can success, as the message contains timestamp Tsi and nonce
Li. Similarly, when LA forwards that message to EVs. When interested EVs response to LA
by charge request messages Mc. They encrypt it by nla. So, confidentiality and integrity of
their messages are guaranteed. For the acceptance message Ma, LA encrypts it by the secret
key suggested by EV. So, this message is secured against confidentiality and integrity attacks.
For instance, if LA chooses EV with PIDi, and encrypts Ma by its session key ki, then any
A cannot extract information, such as the target CS’s identity, from the message. As well, the
confirmation message Mf is encrypted by CS secret key so that its confidentiality and integrity
is assured too. In addition, the used secret keys are frequently changed so that the probability
to compromise them is limited.
The proposed scheme utilizes the efficient BlueJay ultra-lightweight crypto-system, which is
a combination of lightweight public key PASSERINE scheme and Hummingbird-2 lightweight
symmetric encryption scheme.
The lightweight public key PASSERINE scheme that used to encrypt the exchanged mes-
sages during the establishment of the secured sessions between the LA and EVs, such as EV
(dis)charging request messages, is an enhanced lightweight version of Rabin cryptosystem. It
has been practically proven that Rabin-based crypto-systems hardness problem is equivalent
to the integer factorization problem.
Theorem 1. Let N = pq, where p ≡ q ≡ 3(mod 4) are primes, and define SN,l = {1 ≤
x < N : gcd(x,N) = 1, 2l | (x + 1)}, where x ∈ Z∗N − SN,l, then the probability that
there exists y ∈ SN,l with x 6= y but x2 ≡ y2(modN) equals 1/2l−1. Then breaking the
one-wanness security property of Rabin-based crypto-systems (i.e., factoring N into p and q)
is in polynomial time if the redundancy bits in the ciphertext is l = O(log(log(N))).
Proof. Let O be an oracle that takes the public key N and a ciphertext message c (with l
redundant bits) as input and returns either the corresponding plaintext m or an invalid value
Null.
Choose a random x ∈ Z∗N such that neither x nor N − x satisfy the redundancy scheme
(i.e., the l least significant bits are not all 1) and set the ciphertext c = x2(modN) as input
for O. According to theorem’s assumption, if the probability that one of the two unknown
square roots of c mod N has the correct l least significant bits equals 1/2l−1, then O can
output the plaintext m from c, where x´ = 2lm+(2l−1), then we have (x´)2 ≡ x2(modN)
and x´ 6≡ ±x(mod N). Hence gcd(x´− x,N) will split N .
So, if l = O(log(log(N))), then it is required approximately 2l−1 trials to factor N in
polynomial time. As a result, factoringN is NP-hard problem when l 6= O(log(log(N))).
While the lightweight symmetric encryption scheme Hummingbird-2, with an innovative
hybrid structure of block cipher and stream cipher, is utilized to encrypt the exchanged messages
during the (dis)charging sessions, such as acceptance or payment messages. Hummingbird-2
with its four optimal 4-bit S-Boxes belongs to a group of lightweight symmetric schemes that
are proven to be resistible to differential, linear and algebraic attacks [172]. Moreover, the used
secret keys to encrypt the exchanged messages during (dis)charging sessions are frequently
changed, i.e., a new key for each session. For instance, EVt needs to charge its battery at time
t1. So, it selects a pseudo identity PIDw and new secret session key kw for this session. At
time t2, EVt wants to sell a certain electricity to the grid so that it chooses another pseudo
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identity PIDv and new secret session key kv to that new session. The key is used to encrypt
only two messages during the session; consequently, the probability of compromising the session
key is diminished.
Accountability. Some previous works attempt to achieve the accountability and traceability.
They require saving the detailed information about previous sessions for each EV, and most of
time, they need to reveal EV’s real identity by the end of the connection. While our proposed
scheme guarantees the operation’s accountability without revealing any private information
about EVs. EVs’ real identities are concealed and never revealed to any party neither during
connection sessions nor during the tracing operation. Also, grid’s operator does not need to
maintain all the detailed information about numerous previous power trade sessions for tracing
purposes. Therefore, the proposed scheme saves the storage capacity of both LA and CC.
They just need to keep the total amount of purchased/sold electricity and the corresponding
price/profit for each session.
6.5 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed scheme in terms of communication
overhead and computation complexity.
6.5.1 Communication Complexity
The proposed scheme assures security and privacy demands for different parties in V2G connec-
tion with low communication overhead. During the initialization phase, TA sends only three
messages to the parties: CC, LAs, and CSs. This process considers a trivial communication load
for the high-capabilities TA. In addition, EVs, i.e., the restricted-capabilities parties, do not
participate in this phase. Then, the communication overhead for that phase can be neglected.
According to the operation phase, the number of exchanged messages per session does not
exceed six messages if only one EV is participated. Only one or two messages are sent by EV,
which remains a minor communication duty for it. In the CC supply request case, CC sends
one message to the connected LAs, and they forward this message to the involved EVs. Next,
LA and the interested EV exchange three messages. Typically, EV receives three messages
from LA and replies by one message. Also, LA receives one message related to this EV from
the assigned CS. This process is repeated for all participated EVs in the session. Suppose the
number of participated EVs per session is q, then the total number of exchanged messages in
that case equals [2 + (4 ∗ q)] messages. Other three cases have also the same total overhead.
In summary, the total communication overhead for each case is [2 + (4 ∗ q)] messages most of
them handled by CC and LAs. While, the maximum communication overhead for each EV is
constant and equals sending one or two messages per session. According to LA, its overhead
is linearly increased, as the number of involved EVs increased. Thus, the total communication
load increases linearly with the increase in the number of selected EVs. However, the increase
in the total communication load is bounded by the maximum number of EVs in the parking
lot, which can be roughly determined. Figure 6.6 shows the communication load for each EV
and the total overhead for each (dis)charging session. As shown, the communication overhead
for EV is constant and very low. Although the total communication burden, most of it is
handled by LA, is linearly increasing with the increase in EVs’ number, it is still lightweight
and bearable by the connection because of the limited number of participated EVs per session.
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Figure 6.6: Communication complexity per session.
The total communication complexity for (dis)charging sessions per month equals N =
([bs + bc + bh + bd] ∗ [2 + (4 ∗ q)]). In billing phase, CC and LA exchange two messages.
Then, the total communication overhead per month equals ([bs+bc+bh+bd]∗[2+(4∗q)])+2
messages. Figure 6.7 illustrates the impact of EVs’ number, also the effect of different number of
electricity sessions on the total communication overhead per month. The overhead is increased
by the increase of participated EVs’ number. Also, the load is increased, if large number of
sessions is performed during the month. However, the increase in communication complexity is
limited and tolerable by different parties. As a result, our proposed scheme requires lightweight
communication duty and suits the limited-capabilities EVs.
In addition to guarantee the security requirements for V2G connection, such as EVs’ owners
and location privacy, the electricity trade information confidentiality and integrity, and the
involved parties authentication, our proposed scheme offers more lightweight communication
and computation overhead. We compare our proposed scheme with the scheme [77], which
is an efficient authentication scheme in the literature that also preserves EVs’ real identities.
Before the electricity (dis)charging operations begin, the central authority (CA), which is a
third trusted party, issues a one-day permit for each EV so that EV can authenticate itself
to LA by this permit, while it uses a PID to preserve its privacy. EV and LA then exchange
several messages to authenticate EV and create the required symmetric key for that session.
Each EV is obligated to send periodic reports about its status to the connected LA during the
session, i.e., we assume that each session lasts for one hour and EV sends its periodic report
every minute. At the end of the (dis)charging session, LA sends a signed reward message to EV,
which uses it to claim its profit from CA. On the other hand, our scheme does not require the
different parties to have pre-shared secret parameters, also it does not need the presence of the
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Figure 6.7: Total communication complexity.
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Figure 6.8: Communication complexity per session
Proposed .vs. Traditional Scheme.
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third party during the operation phase. In addition, our scheme requires to exchange only six
messages per session. Figure 6.8 shows the comparison between one session for the CC supply
request case in our proposed scheme versus one charging session for [77]. The total number
of exchanged messages during the charging session for [77] equals (164 + 4 ∗ q) messages,
while the total exchanged messages’ number in the CC supply request cases equals (2 + 4 ∗ q)
messages. It can be seen that our proposed scheme tends to have less communication load
than scheme [77] especially for the load on EVs. As a result, the proposed scheme saves the
communication overhead for EVs and LAs; specifically when the number of connected EVs
increased. In conclusion, our proposed scheme requires lightweight communication duty and
suits the limited-capabilities EVs.
6.5.2 Computation complexity
EVs require lightweight crypto-systems because of their limited-computation capabilities. The
proposed scheme guarantees that feature by reducing the number of exchanged messages, i.e.,
limited number of messages to be encrypted, in addition to use a combination of lightweight
public and symmetric key schemes. Assume that Ts, Tv, TEp, TDp, TEs, and TDs are signing,
verification, public key encryption, public key decryption, symmetric key encryption, and sym-
metric key decryption computation times in ms, respectively. During the initialization phase,
TA provides the secret parameters to CC and LAs, while EVs are not involved in that opera-
tion. They only require to generate PIDs using the tiny-overhead AKRI-2 scheme. Thus, the
computation overhead for that phase can be neglected.
According to the operation phase, CC, LAs, and EVs should perform few crypto operations:
certain processes are public key while the remaining are symmetric key operations. Only three
messages per session are encrypted using the lightweight public key Passerine crypto-system
while the remaining messages are ciphered by the symmetric key Hummingbird-2 system. EVs
are only burdened by trivial computation load. In the CC supply request case, CC sends the
CC supply request message to the connected LAs; this message is signed using its private key.
LA first verifies CC’s signature and signs the message before forwarding it to the connected
EVs. Next, the interested EV encrypts a charge request message by nla and replies to LA.
So, LA has to perform a public key decryption process for that message. After that, the
shared symmetric key is used to encrypt the remaining messages, i.e., three messages, for
that session. Typically, EV receives three messages from LA and replies by one message.
Consequently, the total computation time for the CC supply request case per EV is Tsupply =
[(2 ∗ Ts) + (2 ∗ Tv) + (1 ∗ TEp) + (1 ∗ TDp) + (3 ∗ TEs) + (3 ∗ TDs)] ms. The EV’s
share from that load is TEVsupply = [(1 ∗ Tv) + (1 ∗ TEp) + (1 ∗ TEs) + (1 ∗ TDs)] ms.
While, the total computation time for the CC supply request case for q participated EVs is
Tsupplyall = [(2∗Ts)+[(q+1)∗Tv]+(q∗TEp)+(q∗TDp)+(3∗q∗TEs)+(3∗q∗TDs)] ms. The
CC consume request case has the same total computation overhead per EV as the supply case
Tconsume = Tsupply = [(2∗Ts)+(2∗Tv)+(1∗TEp)+(1∗TDp)+(3∗TEs)+(3∗TDs)] ms.
While, the EV’s share in that load is different TEVconsume = [(1∗Tv)+(1∗TEp)+(2∗TDs)]
ms. However, the total computation time for the CC consume request case for q participated
EVs is the same as Tsupplyall ; Tconsumeall = [(2 ∗ Ts) + [(q + 1) ∗ Tv] + (q ∗ TEp) + (q ∗
TDp) + (3 ∗ q ∗ TEs) + (3 ∗ q ∗ TDs)] ms.
According to the EV charge request case, EV first sends the EV charge request message to
LA; this message is encrypted by LA’s public key. LA decrypts it, and then sends a request
message by the total request from all EVs that are interested in purchasing electricity from CC.
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The message is signed by LA’s private key and encrypted by CC’s public key. CC decrypts the
message, verifies the signature of LA, and then sends a confirmation to LA; the confirmation
message is signed by CC’s signing key and encrypted using LA’s public key. LA sends an order
message to each EV, which is encrypted by the previously shared session key. EV then pays
the assigned price to LA by a payment message, which is encrypted by the given symmetric
key too. LA then sends a confirmation message to the assigned CS; that message is encrypted
by the pre-shared key between LA and CS. In this case, the total number of crypto operations
per EV is two signing and two verification processes in addition to three encryption and three
decryption public key processes and three encryption and three decryption symmetric key
processes. Tcharge = [(2 ∗ Ts) + (2 ∗ Tv) + (3 ∗ TEp) + (3 ∗ TDp) + (3 ∗ TEs) + (3 ∗ TDs)]
ms, where Tcharge is the total computation time for the EV charge request case per EV.
The computation overhead for each charged EV TEVcharge is one public key encryption, one
symmetric key encryption, and two symmetric key decryption processes. TEVcharge = [(1 ∗
TEp) + (1 ∗ TEs) + (1 ∗ TDs)] ms. While, the total computation time for the EV charge
request case for q EVs equals Tchargeall = [(2 ∗ Ts) + (2 ∗ Tv) + [(q + 2) ∗ TEp] + [(q +
2) ∗ TDp] + (3 ∗ q ∗ TEs) + (3 ∗ q ∗ TDs)] ms. Finally, in the EV discharge request case,
the involved parties follow almost the same procedure as in the EV charge request case but
for discharging EVs. So, the total number of operations per EV Tdischarge during that case is
the same as the EV charge request case Tdischarge = Tcharge = [(2 ∗ Ts) + (2 ∗ Tv) + (3 ∗
TEp) + (3 ∗ TDp) + (3 ∗ TEs) + (3 ∗ TDs)] ms. The computation overhead of discharging EV
TEVdischarge is a little different from TEVcharge ; it includes one public key encryption, and two
symmetric key decryption processes. TEVdischarge = [(1 ∗ TEp) + (2 ∗ TDs)] ms. While, the
total computation time for the EV discharge request case for q EVs is the same as Tchargeall ;
Tdischargeall = [(2∗Ts)+(2∗Tv)+[(q+2)∗TEp]+[(q+2)∗TDp]+(3∗q∗TEs)+(3∗q∗TDs)]
ms.
The total computation time for the operation phase per month equals Top = [(bs ∗
Tsupplyall) + (bc ∗ Tconsumeall) + (bh ∗ Tchargeall) + (bd ∗ Tdischargeall)]. In billing phase, LA
sends a billing message to CC, and CC replies by a payment message. Then, the computation
load for billing phase is Tbill = 2∗ [Ts+Tv +TEp+TDp]. In summary, the total computation
overhead per month equals T = Top+Tbill = ([bs+bc+bh+bd]∗ [(2∗Ts)+[(q+1)∗Tv]+
(q∗TEp)+(q∗TDp)+(3∗q∗TEs)+(3∗q∗TDs)])+(2∗ [Ts+Tv+TEp+TDp]) ms. Most
of the computation load is performed by LAs and CC, and this load is insignificant for their
capabilities. While EVs’ computation operations are mainly tiny symmetric crypto-operations.
The performance of our proposed scheme has been analyzed and evaluated deploying a
hardware implementation of BlueJay crypto-system with a 1024 − bit public modulus n
and 32 − bit register size. It runs on a Cortex M0 platform, i.e., simple and fast, cheap,
low power, and smallest ARM processor, which is embedded on different parties in the V2G
connection. Figure 6.9 shows the computation time per EV versus the total computation time
per (dis)charging session. Clearly, each EV performs a small fixed number of crypto operations;
while, the remaining computation load are handled by LA. Although the computation load for
LA is linearly increased by the increase in EVs’ number, its load is bounded and manageable.
While Figure 6.10 shows the impact of different number of EVs and sessions on the total
computation overhead per month. The total overhead is increased by the increase in EVs’
number as well as the increase in the charging sessions’ number. However, the increase in
computation load is limited and tolerable by different parties. The proposed scheme saves
the computation time and preserves the processing abilities for the participated parties in the
electricity trade operation especially EVs.
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Figure 6.9: Computation complexity per session.
Figure 6.10: Total computation complexity.
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Figure 6.11: Computation complexity per session
Proposed .vs. Traditional Scheme.
In Figure 6.11, we compare between the proposed scheme and the scheme in [77]. As shown,
there is a big gap between the total computation delay in two schemes for the benefit of our
scheme. The total delay increases from 18023.03 to 613560.64 msec for the proposed scheme
versus 625558.87 to 1815078.95 msec in [77] for the whole session. However, there is no
huge difference in the computation delay per EV in both schemes; 15.18 msec for the proposed
scheme versus 20.52 msec for the traditional one; still, the computation load for EVs is tiny
and tolerable by them. Then, our scheme saves the total computation time and preserves the
processing abilities for the participated parties in electricity trade operation.
In summary, the proposed scheme not only guarantees the security requirements for all in-
volved parties, i.e., CC, LAs, and EVs, but also provides light computation and communication
overhead.
6.6 Summary
In this work, we have proposed a lightweight security and privacy-preserving scheme for V2G
connection. The proposed scheme can guarantee several security requirements of V2G connec-
tions simultaneously. It preserves EV’s owners and location privacy, diminishes the impact of
malicious EVs, and overcomes EV’s frequent authentication concern; it also assures confiden-
tiality and integrity of the exchanged electricity trade messages. Moreover, the scheme keeps
accountability and electricity-exchange operations traceability. Simulation results demonstrate
that the proposed scheme reduces the overall communication and computation overhead for
V2G connection, as it decreases the number of exchanged messages between different parties;
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especially the messages sent by EVs. In addition, using a combination of symmetric key and
lightweight public key schemes is further reducing the computation complexity. Thus, the pro-




Efficient Prevention Technique for
False Data Injection Attack in Smart
Grid
Power grid status is monitored by many measurement units spread all over the grid; these units
periodically send their measurements to the grid’s CC, which utilizes them to make the right
decisions for the grid. FDI attack, which is one of the severe attacks that threatens the smart
grid’s efficiency and reliability, inserts fake measurements among the correct ones to mislead
CC to make wrong decisions and consequently impact on the grid’s performance. Several works
are proposed to only detect FDI attack utilizing various estimation tests and optimization tech-
niques. In our work [173], we propose an FDI attack prevention technique that protects the
integrity and availability of the measurements at measurement units and during their transmis-
sion to the CC, even with the existence of compromised units. The proposed scheme alleviates
the negative impacts of FDI attack on grid’s performance. Security analysis and performance
evaluation show that our scheme guarantees the integrity and availability of the measurements
with lightweight overhead, especially on the restricted-capabilities measurement units. The
remaining of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 7.1 introduces our system model,
security parameters, and design goals. Section 7.2 reviews McEliece cryptosystem. In Section
7.3, we present our proposed scheme. Section 7.4 gives security analysis, while Section 7.5
evaluates the performance of our scheme. Section 7.6 presents a case study that applying the
proposed scheme on IEEE -14 bus system. Finally, Section 7.7 concludes the work.
7.1 System Model
7.1.1 Network Model
Our model divides the power grid’s distribution and consumption subsystems into small ar-
eas. Each area consists of a local substation (LS) that is responsible for collecting the read-
ings of the measurement units in the area and guarantees their accuracy/integrity. LS =
{LS1, LS2, . . . , LSm}, where m is the number of the local substations in the grid. Each LS
connects to a large cluster of the measurement units that spreads all over the area to monitor
its status. LS connects to these units via a wired connection, such as fiber optics, or wireless
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Figure 7.1: System model.
distribution subsystems, which has big industrial institutions and large factories. While, the
cheap wireless connections are used in the consumption areas that have diverse consumers.
MU = {MU1,MU2, . . . ,MUn}, where n is the total number of measurement units in the
area.
In each cluster, LS divides the connected units into groups; G = {G1, G2, . . . , Gh}, where
h is the number of the groups connected to the LS. Each group contains a specific number of
measurement units that are responsible for calculating a specific measurement value; in other
words, all the units in the group monitor the same value; Gi = {MU1,MU2, . . . ,MUj},
where j is the number of the measurement units in the group Gi, j is different for each
group. For example, G1 may include 50 units {MU1,MU2, . . . ,MU50} to monitor the
same measurement, while G2 may have 60 units {MU1,MU2, . . . ,MU60}, . . ., and etc.
However, the units that are belonged to the same group are not conjugated, they are spread
over the whole area. Only the related LS knows the number and the locations of units in
each group. The number of measurement units in each group is different according to several
parameters, such as the importance and nature of measurement, the location of units, and the
surrounding environment status. Therefore, LS is the only party that can link between the
measurement units and its task. Each LS has also an efficient SE that filters out the error or
noise from the measurements. On the other hand, each LS sends the resulted measurements
to the main CC of the grid via a secured wired connection. Finally, the model has a TA to





In FDI attack, adversaries threaten the measurements’ integrity and availability by compromis-
ing the measurement units or intercepting the transmitted measurements and then negatively
impact on the grid’s stability and efficiency. The CC and LSs in power grid belong to the utility
company and located in protected places. They are trusted parties; they will not attempt to
falsify the received measurements.
The measurement units are non-trusted parties because of their location in hostile environ-
ment. The attacker A can compromise and impersonate the measurement units to inject false
measurements, also can intercept and block the units’ measurements. In addition, A can begin
a replay attack, or attempt to intercept and forge the transmitted messages. However, A has
limited resources; he/she cannot compromise all measurement units in the area; only a limited
number of them.
7.1.3 Security Requirements and Design Goals
The proposed scheme aims to prevent the FDI attack from happening in the first place by
guaranteeing the measurements’ integrity and availability at units and during their transmission
to CC. Accordingly, our scheme should give the first priority to the measurements’ integrity; it
needs to guarantee the accuracy of the measurements.
In addition, the scheme should assure the measurements’ availability and prevents delaying
or blocking them. Furthermore, the proposed scheme needs to be lightweight in terms of




McEliece cryptosystem [174, 175] is an asymmetric encryption algorithm that is based on the
hardness of decoding a general linear code, i.e., an NP-hard problem. The McEliece cryp-
tosystem has fast encryption and decryption operations, also it is immune to many attacks
so that it is a candidate for the post-quantum cryptography. However, the key sizes of the
original McEliece cryptosystem are too large. So, we utilize in our work an improved version
of McEliece cryptosystem with smaller keys [177, 178].
7.2.1.1 Notions
A binary linear [n, k] error-correcting code C of length n is a subspace of Fn2 of dimension k
and co-dimension r = n − k. Code C can be defined either by a generator matrix or by a
parity-check matrix. The generator matrix G ∈ Fk×n2 defines C = {mG ∈ Fn2 | m ∈ Fk2}
and the parity-check matrix H ∈ Fr×n2 defines C = {c ∈ Fn2 | cHT = 0r}. The syndrome
s ∈ Fr2 of a vector x ∈ Fn2 is defined as s = HxT . It follows that if x ∈ C, then s = 0r, and
otherwise s 6= 0r.
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If there exists some integer n0 such that every cyclic shift of a codeword c ∈ C by n0
positions results another codeword c´ ∈ C, then code C is called quasi-cyclic. If n = n0p
for some integer p, then both the generator and the parity-check matrix are composed of
p× p circulant blocks. It suffices to store one row (usually the first) of each circulant block to
completely describe the matrices.
(n, r, w)-MDPC code is a binary linear [n, k] code defined by a parity-check matrix with
constant row weight w, and (n, r, w)-QC-MDPC code is an (n, r, w)-MDPC code that is
quasi-cyclic with n = n0r.
7.2.1.2 Key generation
To generate an (n, r, w)-QC-MDPC code with n = n0r, select the first rows h0, . . . , hn0−1 ∈




uniformly at random. The parity-check matrix blocks H0, . . . ,Hn0−1 are then generated by
r − 1 quasi-cyclic shifts of h0, . . . , hn0−1 . The parity-check matrix H is formed by concate-
nating H0, . . . ,Hn0−1 .
Generator matrix G = [Ik | Q] is computed from H in row reduced echelon form by











Since both matrices are quasi-cyclic, it suffices to store their first rows instead of the full
matrices.
The public key is the generator matrix G and the secret key is the parity-check matrix H .
7.2.1.3 Encryption
To encrypt a message m ∈ Fk2, generate an error vector e ∈ Fn2 with at most t set bits
uniformly at random and compute x = mG⊕ e.
7.2.1.4 Decryption
To decrypt a ciphertext x ∈ Fn2 , compute mG ← ΨH(x). Since G is of systematic form,
extract m from the first k positions of mG.
7.3 The Proposed Scheme
Our proposed scheme attempts to prevent FDI attack by guaranteeing the measurements’
integrity and availability at measurement units (during measuring and sensing operation) and
during measurements’ transmission to LS and then to CC. So, the scheme can be divided into
the following two phases:
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7.3.1 Initialization phase
The initialization phase is responsible for establishing the network and defining the required
security parameters.
TA provides the keying parameters for each party in the connection. TA issues a public
private key pair for CC. The public key is Gcc while the private key is Hcc. For each LS, TA
provides Gls as a public key and Hls as a private key.
Each measurement unit in the LS’s cluster has a unique ID issued by the TA, e.g., unit 1
in the first group in the LS’s area has the ID MU1. The units’ secret IDs are signed by LS so
that each unit can use its ID to prove its identity during measurements’ transmission. These
IDs are also sent securely to the LS, which stored them in its powerful memory.
LS is connected to all measurement units in its local area; it divides the connected units
into groups; each group is responsible for measuring a specific measurement, i.e., all units in
the group compute the same value. LS is the only party that knows ID, location, function, and
the group that each unit belongs to.
7.3.2 Operation phase
The operation phase is responsible for guaranteeing the integrity and availability of the measure-
ments. So, it performs two functions: The first one is operation for transmission to guarantee
the measurements’ integrity and availability during the transmission from units to CC. The
second function is operation for compromised measurement units to protect the accuracy and
correctness of the received measurements if a number of units in the area is compromised.
7.3.2.1 Operation for transmission
The first function guarantees that the measurements will not be tampered with during their
transmission to CC by utilizing the efficient improved McEliece public key crypto-system. The
measurements are encrypted so that no party can modify them; only the connected LS decrypts
them.
Every reading round, each unit measures the required value MSi, attaches its ID MUi,
adds timestamp Ts1 and nonce value q1, msi = MSi‖MUi‖Ts1‖q1 and then encrypts the
result by LS’s public key; Xi = msiGls ⊕ e1.
Next, it sends the encrypted message to LS via unsecured network connection.
LS first decrypts the received message Xi by computing msiGls ← ΨHls(x) using a t-
error correcting (QC-)MDPC decoder Hls. Since Gls is on systematic form, LS extracts msi
from the first k positions of msiGls. It then checks the validity of the attached timestamp
and random nonce.
7.3.2.2 Operation for compromised units
When the LS receives all the measurements from all units in the associated group; MGx =
{ms1,ms2, . . . ,msj}, where j is the number of the measurement units in group Gx, it
first compares between the received measurements to check if some values are deviated so
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far from the majority of measurements. Then, LS discards these deviated measurements
{ms1,ms2, . . . ,msc}, and marks the related units {MU1,MU2, . . . ,MUc} as suspicious
nodes.
LS adds the suspicious units to a specific list called the black list. It also maintains another
list for the units with delayed values {MU1,MU2, . . . ,MUd}, which is called the gray list.
It contains the units that do not send their measurements to LS at the assigned time.
LS keeps an activity record for each unit in the local area that contains the previous mea-
surements’ transmission for the unit. These records assist to easily detect and replace the
malicious nodes. These suspicious units are kept in the black/gray list until they exceed a
predefined threshold tp of sending malicious/delayed messages, then the LS physically replaces
them by new honest units. These two lists are important to help guaranteeing measurements’
integrity and availability.
The accepted number of deviated measurements that considers minority is different from one
group to another; it depends on the importance of the measured data, the channel conditions
and the environment around the sensors. It can be calculated as h = j
2
− i, where j is
the total number of measurement units in the group, and i runs from j
2
down to 1. The
value of i is different for each group. If the number of deviated measurements is more than
the accepted threshold, then LS discards the whole measurements of the group. While if the
number of deviated measurements is a minority, the remaining measurements, the majority, are
considered the correct measurements. Consequently, LS computes the average value of them














R = Ravg ±∆Ravg
, where l ≤ j is the number of the accurate measurements in group Gj , σ is the uncertainty
in a single measurement value, ∆Ravg is the uncertainty in the mean Ravg, and R is the
accurate average value of the collected measurements.
For example, suppose LSw’s connected area is divided into 1000 groups; each group is re-
sponsible for measuring one measurement value: group G1’s units are monitoring the value x1,
group G2’s units are monitoring the value x2,. . ., group G1000’s units are monitoring the value
x1000. Suppose that groupGi in the area has 50 measurement units {MU1,MU2, . . . ,MU50},
then these units are spread over the area in a specific way known only by LSw. When LSw
receives a measurement from a unit in a specific group, it saves the value in the allocated
memory for that group in its database. After LSw receives all the 50 measurements, it first
check if one measurement or a few number of measurements are deviated far from the majority
of the received 50 measurements, say 6 measurements are deviated. LSw then discards them
and adds the corresponding sensors {MU1,MU2, . . . ,MU6} to the black list, i.e., the units
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that exceed the threshold for sending malicious readings will be physically replaced by honest
units. LSw then computes the average value of the remaining 44 measurements (the majority)














Ri = Ri−avg ±∆Ri−avg
, where the number of accurate measurements in group Gi is 44 and Ri is the average value
of these measurements.
7.3.2.3 Operation for state estimation
At the end of the reading round, LS has a set of accurate measurements that represents the
status of the area, i.e., the accurate observed measurements vector for that part of the grid
S . To guarantee that FDI attack does not exist and filter out all error and noise, LS also
applies an efficient estimation test based on cosine similarity matching on the set of estimated
measurements. Cosine similarity [176] is a measure of similarity between two vectors using the
inner product space that measures the cosine of the angle between them, i.e., cosine similarity
metric computes how similar two vectors of data are; if both vectors are identical, the cosine
similarity value equals one. The provided cosine similarity based SE detects the existing of any
deviation between the measured data vector
−→
S from the units and the expected data vector−→ˆ
S that is derived from the previous measurements.
















S , and ‖ −→S ‖‖
−→ˆ
S ‖
denotes the product of their Euclidean lengths.
When LS runs the cosine similarity test Λ, the result could have one of three values:
Λ =

1 the two vectors are identical
> 0 and < 1 the two vectors have some differences
0 the two vectors are totally different.
Case 1: when Λ equals 1; the collected measurements from the units in the grid are exactly
the same as expected measurements. So, LS accepts this set of measurements as a correct
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representation for the grid’s current status and marks the set as a fully-guaranteed accuracy
measurements.
Case 2: when Λ equals 0; the collected measurements from the units in the grid are totally
different than the expected measurements. So, LS rejects this set of measurements and marks
it as false measurements. LS physically check the corresponding measurement units; it also
reports to CC about the situation.
Case 3: when Λ value is between 0 and 1; LS determines the accuracy level of the collected
measurements according to the exact value of Λ. For instance, if Λ value is close to 1, such
as 0.9, then LS can accept that set of measurements as partially-guaranteed accuracy mea-
surements. While if Λ value approaching 0, e.g., 0.2, then LS rejects this set of measurements
and checks the measurement units to detect the place for that error. However, because of the
applied security scheme, the probability of case 2 and 3 occurrence is diminished.
Finally, LS contains the resulted measurements for the area in a message MT . Afterward,
LS attaches a timestamp Ts2 and random nonce q2 to the message; mT = MT‖Ts2‖q2 and
then encrypts it by CC’s public key; Tls = mTGcc ⊕ e2. The received information from the
connected LSs assists CC to make the right decisions for each area and for the whole grid.
7.4 Security Analysis
The main security concerns for that type of connection are the integrity and availability of
measurements at measurement units and during their transmission to CC.
Integrity : The measurements’ integrity is the major concern, as the injected false measure-
ments can mislead CC to make wrong decisions and consequently impact severely on the grid’s
stability and reliability.
- Compromised measurement units’ case. Certain number of measurement units send the
same measurement to LS. Only LS knows how these units are spread and where are their exact
locations, i.e., this helps to guarantee the accuracy of the measurements values. When the
LS receives two different sets of values for the same measurement, it accepts the majority.
However, if the number of measurement units in the two sets is close, CC rejects the two values
and physically checks the units to detect which set is compromised. The probability that the
attacker compromises a large number of measurement units from the same group is low, as they
are distributed all over the local area, i.e., it is not necessary that the units close to each other
in location measure the same value. LS only knows the measurement units included in each
group and their exact locations.
- Intercepted measurements case. Adversaries cannot falsify the measurements during their
transmission to CC, as the values are encrypted by the powerful McEliece cryptosystem. If
adversary A manages to intercept the measurement Xi, he/she can not modify its value,
because A does not have the decryption key Hls and consequently cannot extract the plaintext
measurement msi from Xi. According to the final measurements matrix MT , it is sent from
each LS to CC encrypted by CC’s public key so that no party except CC can decrypt the
message or has any information about MT . Moreover, the message contains a timestamp and
random nonce to prevent the replay attack. So, A cannot interpret/modify the message’s
content or begin a replay attack.
Availability : To resist FDI attack and guarantee the grid’s efficiency and reliability, the
measurements should be available to LS, i.e., and consequently to CC, whenever they asked to.
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The proposed scheme allows redundancy in the measurements, as several measurement
units measure the same value and send their versions of data to the LS. So, if some units
in the same group are not available, the remaining still send their measurements to the LS.
If A compromises a certain number of units, LS still can guarantee the correctness of each
measurement value by receiving redundant values for the same measurement from other units.
Moreover, LS reduces the probability of attack by eliminating the suspicious units. If the LS
does not receive the expected periodic reports from certain units, it declares them as suspicious
nodes, i.e., adds them to the gray list, and sends a report to CC about the problem. On
the other hand, LS’s computation resources are ready to manage a large number of received
measurements, as it expects to receive periodic reports from all measurement units in the
connected area. Then, if the LS receives a huge number of reports, more than the expected,
from one measurement unit or a group of units, then LS blocks them and declares them as
malicious units; it also reports to CC to check them.
Confidentiality : Although confidentiality is not a high-priority security concern for that
type of connection, it is still an important requirement for the grid’s stability. Our proposed
scheme guarantees the confidentiality of measurements during their transmission to LS and
then to CC. No party can extract the contents of the transmitted measurements because of the
powerful McEliece cryptosystem that is utilized to secure them. If adversary A manages to
intercept measurement Xi, A cannot obtain any information about the plaintext measurement
msi, because A does not have the decryption key Hls and consequently cannot decrypt Xi.
Even if A manages to compromise some units and captures/falsifies their messages or
prevents them from sending to LS, LS still can have the same measurement from other mea-
surement units in the group so that compromising measurement units or blocking messages
does not have a significant impact on the final measurement value.
7.5 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed scheme in terms of communication
overhead and computation complexity. Also, we study the impact of the included SE on the
performance of the proposed scheme.
7.5.1 Communication Complexity
To guarantee the accuracy of the gird’s decisions, information about the grid’s current status
need to be sent periodically from measurement units to CC. So, the communication duty for each
measurement unit is sending one message every reading period, which is an affordable burden
for the limited-capability units. Although our proposed scheme follows the standard technique,
i.e., sending periodic reports, it saves more communication load for units, as it guarantees
the integrity and availability of the measurements, which consequently reduces the probability
of measurements’ retransmission due to error or malicious attacks. On the other hand, in
traditional grid, the measurements are sent in plaintext so that they are more prone to be
compromised by adversaries, and most probably the measurements require to be retransmitted
several times. In addition, the adversary can know which units are the responsible for estimating
a specific measurement and consequently compromise all of them. In that case, CC cannot
distinguish fabricated measurements from the right ones and may need to replace all the units.
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Figure 7.2: Communication overhead.
Figure 7.2 shows the communication overhead for our proposed scheme versus the tradi-
tional case. Figure 7.2(a) shows the number of retransmission for each measurement unit in
the proposed scheme versus the traditional case per round; the unit in the proposed scheme
case needs to send the measurement for one time only so that the communication overhead per
unit is fixed and trivial overhead. While, in traditional scheme, the unit has to keep resending
the message until a correct accurate version of the measurement reach to the LS. The number
of retransmitted messages is varied according to the probability of error, noise, and attacks’
occurrence in the communication channel. According to Figure 7.2(b), it demonstrates the
total communication overhead for the cluster in the local area. As shown, the total commu-
nication load for the proposed scheme is linearly increased as the number of the connected
units is increased; however, the overhead is limited by the maximum number of the units per
cluster. In the traditional scheme, the communication overhead is higher than the proposed
scheme load and increased but in random pattern because of the unforeseen number of re-
transmission for the measurements. In summary, the proposed scheme significantly reduces the
probability of measurements’ retransmission and consequently the communication overhead for
each unit. In contrary, in the traditional case, the measurements are exposed to outsiders; any
party can intercept/modify their values, which leads to unexpected number of measurements’
retransmission and consequently increases the communication overhead.
7.5.2 Computation complexity
The limited-computation capabilities of the measurement units prevents them from performing
complex cryptographic operations. So, our proposed scheme utilizes a lightweight version of
McEliece cryptosystem [177, 178] in addition to implement low-cost hardware platform on the
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measurement units to guarantee the security requirements without increasing the computation
overhead on the units. Another feature for that lightweight version of McEliece cryptosystem
is that its encryption operation requires less computation time than decryption process so that
it saves more computation overhead on the measurement units, as they have to perform the
encryption process only. For LS, it has more powerful processing unit so that the decryption
process on LS does not provide much computation burden too. While, in traditional connection,
the measurements are sent in plaintext and the units do not have to perform any cryptographic
operations, then the computation overhead on units is tiny. However, they are exposed to
various attacks that can block the measurements or insert bad data and force units to remeasure
and retransmit the values. Although our proposed scheme increases the computation overhead
a little bit, it guarantees the integrity and correctness of the measurements that decreases the
possibility of receiving bad data and consequently reduces the probability of measurements’
retransmission. In addition, the computation overhead of the proposed scheme is trivial and
does not consider a big load on the limited-capability units.
Figure 7.3 shows the computation overhead for our proposed scheme versus traditional
unsecured case. The computation overhead per round for every measurement unit is shown in
Figure 7.3(a); the overhead for the proposed scheme is fixed tiny delay, i.e., a little bit more
than 3 msec, while the computation complexity for the traditional unsecured connection is
fluctuated between 1 and 5 msec according to the number of measurements’ re-estimation and
retransmission, which is effected by the quality of the communication channel and the presence
of adversaries. Mostly the computation burden on the units in the unsecured case is less
than the overhead in the proposed scheme case. Figure 7.3(b) presents the total computation
overhead for the cluster; it can be seen that the total load for the proposed scheme case is
linearly increased by the increase in the units’ number in the cluster, whereas the unsecured
case total overhead is oscillated according to the number of messages’ retransmission, i.e.,
the overhead is varied because of the unpredictable number of messages’ retransmission. As
expected, the computation overhead for unsecured case is less than the proposed scheme’s
overhead, but the computation burden for the proposed scheme is still small and tolerable by
the measurement units; that overhead considers a good price for more reliable and efficient
connection and consequently more accurate and integral measurements.
7.5.3 State Estimator Performance Evaluation
The proposed scheme utilizes a cosine similarity-based SE to further improve the process of
preventing FDI attacks. As indicated in the proposed scheme, the cosine similarity-based SEs
are distributed at different LSs of the grid; they are used to determine the acceptance level of
the received measurements. According to the result of the SE test, LS decides to accept the
received set of measurements or reject and re-measure it again. In other words, that test works
as final filter for the bad injected data.
In this section, we study the performance of the grid in its traditional case, the grid with
cosine similarity-based SEs only, versus the proposed scheme case. The grid in its traditional
case has no protection from FDI attacks at all, i.e., does not apply any attacks’ protection or
detection techniques. The measurement units are not protected; also, the measurements are
transmitted in plaintext. So any adversary can compromise any number of units or intercept
and falsify any number of transmitted measurements. These attacks have significant negative
impact on the CC’s decision and consequently on the grid’s stability and efficiency.
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Figure 7.3: Computation overhead.
While the grid with applied cosine similarity-based SE only is in better condition than
traditional case. Generally, the efficiency of detection process depends on the applied SE;
the cosine similarity-based SE is more efficient than other utilized SE. Thus, the grid in that
case is more protected than the traditional case or the regular applied SE [179]. However,
the FDI attacks detection is not the most efficient solution for the grid especially for the
communication and computation load, as if a FDI attack is detected, the CC should ask for
new accurate measurements and that means more communication and computation operations,
i.e., measurement units should re-estimate and re-send the value again. In addition, we cannot
guarantee the accuracy for the new measurements, i.e., false alarm, as the corresponding units
may be compromised.
Thus, our proposed scheme solves these concerns by preventing the FDI attacks from hap-
pening and guarantee the accuracy of the received measurements matrix utilizing several tech-
niques. The proposed scheme protects the measurement units at their locations, also guards
the measurements during their transmission to LS. LS then applies accuracy technique and
cosine similarity-based SE to guarantee that is the most accurate set of measurements for the
area before forwarding an encrypted version of that set to CC. At the same time, the proposed
scheme conserves the communication and computation capabilities for different parties in the
grid especially measurement units.
We assume that the number of FDI attacks that targets the grid is random but increased
as number of measurement units in the grid increased. Figure 7.4 demonstrates the number
of successful FDI attacks in the three cases. For traditional case, it has been seen that all
the FDI attacks are successful, i.e., no filter at all. As shown, the curve is generally increased
but fluctuated; the number of successful FDI attacks are changed, i.e., increased or decreased,
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Figure 7.4: Probability of successful FDI attacks.
according to the existence of adversaries and the number of compromised units in the grid.
According to the cosine similarity-based SE case, the utilized SE can detect a portion of FDI
attacks. However, the number of successful FDI attacks is increased as number of units in-
creased, because the probability of attack is increased, i.e, the number of compromised units
increased. Moreover, when SE detects false measurements, it rejects these measurements and
asks for re-measurement and re-transmission, which increases the total overhead. For the pro-
posed scheme, the successful FDI attacks number is diminished, as shown, even if the number
of attacks is increased. The reason is the different filtering levels that the measurements have
to go through before being accepted by LS as an accurate/correct measurement.
7.6 Case Study
The proposed scheme divides the power grid’s distribution and consumption subsystems into
small areas. We represent each area as an IEEE-14 bus system. The local area consists of one
LS, LSv, which collects the readings of the measurement units in the area and guarantees their
accuracy/integrity. The total number of measurements that can guarantee the observability for
IEEE-14 bus network equals 54 measurements [27]. However, LSv connects to larger cluster
of units that spreads all over the area, i.e., 54 groups of measurement units, as we utilize the
measurements’ redundancy to guarantee the integrity and availably of the measurements.
The cluster is divided into 54 groups; G = {G1, G2, . . . , G54}, where the number of the
groups connected to the LS is 54. Each group contains a specific number of measurement units





Figure 7.5: Case study.
the number of the measurement units in the group Gi. The number of measurement units in
each group j is different according to several parameters, such as the importance and nature
of measurement, the location of units, and the surrounded environment (several related work
propose techniques for the optimal redundancy for the measurements, such as [180]). Only LS
knows the number and the locations of units in each group. Therefore, LS is the only party that
can link between the measurement units and its task. Figure 7.5 demonstrates the architecture
of one area in the grid, where G refers to generators, C for synchronous compensators, and
for measurement units.
Each measurement unit MUy, e.g., from Gw that has u measurement units and is re-
sponsible for measuring the values of power flow parameters for line 1 − 2, estimates the
current active power in its location, P1−2(y), attaches its ID MUy, adds timestamp Ts5 and
nonce value q5, msy = MSy‖MUy‖Ts5‖q5 and then encrypts the result by LS’s public key;
Xy = msyGlsv ⊕ e5. Then, MUy sends its encrypted periodic report Xy to LSv via un-
secured connection. LSv checks the validity of the message before including the measurement
to the pool of measurements from group Gw. Then, LSv filters out the deviated measure-
ments and uses the remaining measurements, the majority, to get the final measurement for














P1−2 = P1−2(avg) ±∆P1−2(avg)
, where ls ≤ u is the number of the accurate measurements in group Gw, σ is the uncertainty
in a single measurement value, ∆P1−2(avg) is the uncertainty in the mean P1−2(avg), and P1−2
is the accurate average value of the collected measurements.
Next, LSv forms the accurate observed measurements vector for that part of the gridS and
runs the cosine similarity test to compare between the estimated matrix S and the expected
one Sˆ as follows:
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denotes the product of their Euclidean lengths.
If Λv = 1, LSv forwards that fully-guaranteed accuracy measurements to CC. But, if Λv
equals 0, LSv rejects this set of measurements and check the corresponding units, i.e., this case
almost cannot happen. While if Λv is between 0 and 1, LSv determines the accuracy level of
the collected measurements according to the exact value of Λv. If Λv value is greater than 0.5,
then LSv can accept that set of measurements as partially-guaranteed accuracy measurements
and forwards them to CC. And if Λv value is less than or equal 0.5, then LSv rejects this set
of measurements and check the measurement units to detect the malicious units.
Then, LSv includes the matrix of all the accurate measurements for the area in a message
MTv. LSv first attaches a timestamp Tsv and random nonce qv to the message; mTv =
MTv‖Tsv‖qv and then encrypts it by CC’s public key; Tlsv = mTvGcc ⊕ ev. Then, LSv
forwards Tlsv to CC.
7.7 Summary
FDI attack injects fake measurements in the grid that mislead the CC to make wrong decisions
for the grid and consequently threaten smart grid’s efficiency and reliability. Previous research
works focus on detecting the attack mainly utilizing estimation detectors and optimization
techniques. This work has presented a prevention technique to alleviate the impact of FDI
attacks on the CC’s decisions; the proposed scheme is based on guaranteeing the integrity and
availability of the measurements at measurement units and during their transmission to CC
even with the existence of compromised units; it also utilizes an efficient SE as another filtering
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level for FDI attacks. In conclusion, our scheme guarantees the accuracy of the measurements




Conclusions and Future Work
8.1 Conclusions
This PhD research works focus on analyzing security concerns for the three principal smart
grid’s communication architectures: customer-side networks, V2G connections, and power
control and state estimation systems. We have proposed lightweight security and privacy-
preserving schemes that guarantee the main security objectives for these architectures as fol-
lows:
• First, we have studied security and privacy threats for smart grid’s customer-side net-
works, i.e., HANs, BANs/IANs, and NANs and proposed two different solutions to guar-
antee security and privacy requirements for these networks; at the same time, our proposed
approaches are lightweight schemes so that they are appropriate for limited-capabilities
devices in the network.
The first proposed scheme is a lightweight lattice-based security and privacy preserving
scheme. Our scheme is based on forecasting the future electricity demand for a cluster
of customers in the same residential area; it limits the whole cluster’s connection with
electricity utility only when the cluster needs to adjust its total electricity share. The
proposed scheme guarantees security and privacy demands, i.e., customers privacy, data
integrity, and network resources and information availability, for customer-side networks.
It is also a lightweight and efficient in terms of communication and computation com-
plexities so that it is suitable for limited-capabilities devices, i.e., smart meters.
The second solution is a lightweight lattice-based homomorphic privacy-preserving data
aggregation scheme for the residential electricity consumers in smart grid. The proposed
scheme (unlike the related works) allows the household smart appliances to aggregate
their consumption among themselves without involving the related smart meter utilizing
a lightweight lattice-based homomorphic crypto-system. Smart meter does not know the
reading for each individual smart appliance; it receives the total encrypted aggregated
consumption for all smart appliances in the HAN. So, smart meters, also the related base
station, work as relay nodes and just forward HAN’s total consumption to CC. How-
ever, smart meter, i.e., base station as well, has the ability to check the authenticity of
messages’ senders without revealing their contents. Consequently, the proposed scheme
guarantees the security and privacy demands, i.e., customers’ privacy, data confidentiality
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and integrity, for the connection. It is also lightweight and efficient in terms of communi-
cation and computation complexities so that it is suitable for limited-capability devices,
i.e., smart meters and smart household appliances in that case.
• In V2G connections, we have analyzed and determined their essential security concerns,
and proposed a lightweight secure authentication and privacy-preserving V2G connection
scheme. The scheme allows EVs to generate their own pseudonym identities and do not
expose their private information to any party even the grid’s operator; so, the EVs’ pri-
vacy is preserved. In addition, the scheme forces EVs to follow a specific procedure, i.e.,
finishing their part in the connection first, to prevent them from acting maliciously so that
the proposed scheme keeps the grid’s financial profits. The scheme also assures the con-
fidentiality and integrity of exchanged messages during (dis)charging sessions in addition
to keep the accountability of the electricity-trade operation. Furthermore, the scheme
achieves these security requirements with lightweight computation and communication
overhead.
• According to power control and state estimation system, we have analyzed and studied
the main problem in this communication environment: FDI attacks. Moreover, we have
proposed FDI attack prevention scheme that protects integrity and availability of the mea-
surements at measurement units and during their transmission to CC with lightweight
communication and computation overhead; even if some units in the area are compro-
mised. In addition, the scheme utilizes an accurate cosine similarity-based SE to filter out
any error or noise on the measurements and to prevents the attacker from inserting bad
data to the system, if the adversary manages to exceed the applied protection mechanism.
The scheme provides that protection from then FDI attacks with lightweight communi-
cation and computation load. As a result, the proposed scheme bounds the damaging
impacts of FDI attack on the power grid, simultaneously saves its resources with low cost.
In other words, we have satisfied the main security objectives of the smart grid’s com-
munication architectures. As our proposed schemes guarantee the privacy of different parties
during exchanging messages; for instance, in customer-side networks, the personal habits for
electricity consumers are concealed from all other parties. According to V2G connections, the
service provider, EVs, preserves its private information so that on one can link between EV
owner’s identity or location to extract some knowledge about the owner’s behaviour or life style.
In addition, the schemes assure the different security requirements: confidentiality, integrity,
availability, and authenticity, for each device in the connection. For example, authenticating
EVs in V2G connections is satisfied, while in power control and state estimation, the proposed
solution focuses more on guaranteeing the transmitted messages’ integrity. Lastly, the proposed
works provide these security needs for each party in smart grid exploiting lightweight security
crypto-systems; this objective is significant because of the existence of restricted-capabilities
devices in the different network architectures of smart grid. In customer-side connections,
smart meters and smart appliances are limited-computation capabilities devices. For V2G con-
nections, EVs are not prepared to perform complex crypto-operations. According to power
control and state estimation system, the measurement units that monitor the grid’s status are
restricted-capabilities sensors.
113
8.2. Further Research Topics
8.2 Further Research Topics
There are certain open security problems in each communication network from the three main
smart grid architectures that could be analyzed and studied in the future. In customer-side
networks, the first proposed scheme predicts the expected electricity demand for a cluster of
HANs, i.e., one BAN. The connection with electricity provider is done throughout the BAN’s
server only when the total cluster’s demand needs to be adjusted. So, the impact of malicious
servers on the performance of the customer-side networks is worth further studying. For the
second proposed solution, the household smart appliances aggregate their consumption among
themselves without involving the connected smart meter or the corresponding base station of
the area. However, the effect of using EVs, i.e., the residential costumers’ vehicles, as storage
for the extra electricity on the performance of the proposed scheme needs more investigation.
According to V2G connection, the proposed scheme preserves the security requirements
for the EV’s connection with the grid during charging/discharging sessions. However, the
optimal selection for the charged/discharged EVs during the electricity-trade process needs
to be explored. In power control and state estimation system, we have proposed FDI attack
prevention scheme that prevent the integrity and availability attacks from affecting on the
accuracy of the final values of measurements. In the future, studying the optimal placement
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